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ABSTRACT 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF THINK TANKS AND  
 MEDIATOR INTELLECTUALS IN TURKEY 
 
Fındıklı, Burhan. 
MA, Department of Sociology 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Alim Arlı 
June 2015, 145 pages 
 
This study examines the rise and development of think tanks in Turkey 
over the past five decades from a field-analytical perspective. In spite of 
the rapid growth and increasing effects of think tanks, few case studies 
have been conducted on the historical and current influences of these 
institutions in Turkey. Based on fourteen in-depth interviews with staff 
members of various think tanks, first hand observations, secondary 
resources, and descriptive statistical data, this dissertation aims to fill the 
void by presenting both a historical outline and present day landscape of 
the think tank field. As distinct from the large part of the existing literature 
on think tanks in political science and international relations, this analysis 
presented here also attaches particular importance to understand the 
dynamics of knowledge production as well as the modes of intellectual 
intervention that think tanks undertake, relocating the issue in the 
sociology of intellectuals. The historical analysis argues that although the 
earliest think tanks outcropped in the 1960s, think tanks began to exhibit 
field-like properties in the mid-1990s. It follows that the proliferation of 
think tanks was accompanied by the emergence of a specific kind of 
intellectual conduct, the “mediation”, along with the rise of a particular 
type of knowledge production, the “policy knowledge”. 
 
Keywords: Think Tank, intellectual, field, mediation, intellectual 
production, policy.    
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ÖZ 
 
TÜRKİYE’DE DÜŞÜNCE KURULUŞLARININ VE  
ARABULUCU ENTELEKTÜELLERİN DOĞUŞU 
 
Fındıklı, Burhan. 
MA, Sosyoloji Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Alim Arlı 
Haziran 2015, 145 sayfa 
 
Bu çalışma Türkiye’de düşünce kuruluşlarının ortaya çıkışını ve gelişimini 
alan analizi perspektifinden ele almaktadır. Düşünce kuruluşlarının hızla 
yayılmasına ve etkilerinin artmasına karşılık, Türkiye’de bu kurumların 
gerek tarihsel gerekse günümüzdeki etkileri üzerine çok az vaka 
çalışması yapılmıştır. Düşünce kuruluşu araştırmacılarıyla yapılan on 
dört derinlemesine mülakat, birinci elden gözlemler, ikincil kaynaklar ve 
tasviri istatistiksel veri seti gibi kaynaklara dayanan bu tez, hem düşünce 
kuruluşlarının tarihsel gelişimiyle ilgili açıklayıcı bir çerçeve çizmeye hem 
de alanın günümüzdeki manzarasını betimlemeye çalışarak önemli bir 
boşluğu doldurmayı hedeflemektedir. Siyaset bilimi ve uluslararası 
ilişkiler alanlarında çalışan araştırmacıların bu alanda yaptığı 
araştırmaların kahir ekseriyetinden farklı olarak, bu çalışmada geliştirilen 
yaklaşım düşünce kuruluşları alanındaki bilgi üretiminin dinamikleri ve 
entelektüel müdahalelerin analizine özel bir önem atfederek nesnesini 
entelektüeller sosyolojisi bağlamında kurmaya çalışmaktadır. Söz 
konusu tarihsel analize göre, ilk düşünce kuruluşları 1960’larda ortaya 
çıksa da, bu kuruluşların alan benzeri bir uzam karakteri kazanmaları 
1990’ların ortalarına tekabül etmektedir. Düşünce kuruluşları alanının 
doğuşunun aynı zamanda kendine has bir entelektüel icra tarzı 
(arabuluculuk) ve muayyen bir bilgi üretim faaliyetinin (siyasa bilgisi) 
ortaya çıkışıyla eş zamanlı olarak gerçekleştiği sonucuna varılmıştır.        
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Düşünce kuruluşu, entelektüel, alan, arabuluculuk , 
entelektüel üretim, siyasa.    
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent decades, there has been an observable increase in the number 
of think tanks1 in Turkey. These organizations have generated numerous 
policy reports and bulletins, and their affiliated policy researchers have 
become more visible in both national and international media discussions 
and academic conferences for the last ten-year period. For a person 
living in Turkey, it is almost inevitable to encounter a think tank-affiliated 
intellectual figure, particularly those who are specialists of foreign policy, 
on TV panel discussions devoted to the analysis of a contemporary 
heated social and/or political issues. Television, as Bourdieu points out, 
creates the reality, instead of merely recording it (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 22). 
Inspired by Bourdieu’s ideas on television, one can safely claim that think 
tank-affiliated intellectuals as “fast-thinkers” evaluating the burning 
incidents in the country and its adjacent regions in the 24 hours of  news 
channels is directly a part of the social construction of (socio-political) 
reality. Yet, their activity is not limited to TV discussions; at the same time, 
these intellectuals exist in different social fields such as the economy, 
politics, academia, and the media by mediating and shuttling between 
them.  
Do think tanks and their affiliated intellectuals or “policy experts” as it is 
used in the literature have a political impact on politics to their 
accelerating visibility, or has their role and impact been dramatized? I 
decided to deal with this problem since I have always been interested in 
knowing about the intellectuals and their relations with politics. Moreover, 
a social scientific knowledge regarding the emergence and influences of 
                                                                 
1 The term “think tank” may sound fuzzy and imprecise. It is actually a nebulated term 
which has vague connotations that opens up the possibility of different interpretations.  
Instead of providing an a priori definition of the term at the outset, I will scrutinize 
different descriptions of it in the following chapters.    
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think tanks has not been adequately produced yet in Turkey. This study 
will try to build think tanks in Turkey as an empirical object with the tools 
of sociological investigation. For this reason, it has the intention to fill in 
a vacuum in the literature by contributing to the understanding of such 
organizations and new forms of intellectual production and intervention 
situated within it.  
 
1.1. Design and Method 
This study will apply the methodological approach developed by Pierre 
Bourdieu, particularly as it is integrated into the cardinal concepts of field, 
habitus, and capital. One of the main merits of this perspective, i.e., the 
field theory, lies in its relational conception of structure. Bourdieu 
persistently stresses that the proper object of socio-analysis is not entities 
or things, but rather a set of relations. By courtesy of the notion of field, 
which refers to a relatively autonomous social context both shaping and 
constraining the human action, he gives the possibility to a researcher to 
shift the analytical focus from the “organization” (think tanks) or the 
“actor” (intellectuals) to the system of relations in which they are 
embedded. For this reason, this perspective rejects to use any a priori 
category of “think tank” or “intellectual” by regarding the definition of a 
concept as an empirical question. The refusal of working with pre-defined 
concepts is also a very requirement of the principle of reflexivity 
stipulating sociologists to establish a twofold “epistemological break” 
from both folk categories (common-sense) generated on their research 
object, and, in many cases, prior scientific knowledge (scholastic 
common-sense) produced about the categories and concepts of their 
specific research object. The principle of epistemological break 
constitutes the first step of the threefold hierarchy of epistemological act 
on which scientific knowledge rely. This phase is chased by the process 
of constructing the object. For, the object of scientific research is not 
given or self-evident as positivist empiricism deems, on the contrary, it 
should be won and built by the sociologist the way that it no longer has 
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in common with naive categories of the spontaneous sociology. The final 
stage, applied rationalism, hinges on verifying outcomes achieved by 
means of the entire technical and logical transactions used in the 
construction of the object.2   
In order to understand the system of relations within the think tank  
universe, this study was predicated on a multi-method research 
procedure with the following empirical components: 
a) I collected and examined “limitedly” available archival and 
organizational documents, and other materials such as personal 
memoirs of think tank founders in order to construct a historical 
narrative regarding the emergence of think tanks. In the absence 
of rich archival resources, it is inevitable to make reference to 
secondary sources.     
b) I conducted 14 in-depth interviews with people variously settled 
throughout the think tank universe, from policy experts and 
researchers to upper managers and founders. The interviews 
lasted 45-90 minutes depending on interviewees’ devotion and 
communicativeness. Almost all of the interviews were carried out 
in interviewees’ offices and tape recorded with their permission. 
c) I carried out first-hand observation in diverse think tank settings. 
Throughout a month and a half in Ankara and following several 
months in Istanbul, I attended various think tank events, including 
panel and roundtable discussions, conferences, workshops, and 
seminars. At these events, I observed speeches and discussions, 
established informal dialogues with both think tank fellows and 
employees, participators and followers of think tank activities. 
d) I built a database regarding the educational backgrounds of 
think tank-affiliated intellectuals at seven major think tanks taking 
                                                                 
2 Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron’s The Craft of Sociology [1968] (1991) is the 
locus classicus text where this epistemological framework, inspired by Bachelard and 
Canguilhem who were representatives of French tradition of historical epistemology, are 
elaborated.   
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place in my sample. This data comprises of educational degrees 
earned and academic disciplines studied by in-house staff 
described as “experts”, “researchers”, or “analysts”. Those who 
are weakly affiliated with think tanks, “research assistants”, and 
“administrative staff” are not included. In addition, I create a 
database of gender distribution in the think tank field. These 
databases enabled me to discover internal configuration of the 
field of think tanks.          
This study poses a series of questions as to both the origins and locations 
of think tanks in the social space (namely their social topography) and 
modes of intellectual intervention and production within it: 
i) What engendered their exceptional appearance and growing 
visibility in Turkey, particularly over the last decade? Are these 
reasons only related with the pro-active foreign policy of Turkey 
aiming at being a role model or leader state in its region as it has 
been constantly uttered by politicians and specialists or are there 
any deeper reasons of this process? If so, to what extent are they 
associated with the complicating structure of the bureaucratic 
field or changing character of the political field and its new 
necessities? 
ii) Do think tanks and their affiliated policy experts have an impact 
on Turkish politics proportional to their accelerating visibility, or 
has their role and impact been dramatized? If they fulfil an 
important function in policy-making, then how so or through 
which mechanisms? If not, why do a plethora of intellectuals still 
flood into these organizations? 
iii) What are the forms of intellectual production and intervention 
within the think tank universe and to what extent do they differ 
that of scientific ones? Do think tank affiliated intellectuals share 
an occupational ethos, a set of mental and bodily dispositions, 
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styles, and manners which constitutes a specific and discernable 
habitus?  
To find an answer to some of these questions, I interviewed with 
representatives from eleven contemporary think tanks in Turkey: six of 
them are from Ankara (SETA, SDE, USAK, LDT, TEPAV, and TBMM-
ARMER), four from Istanbul (TESEV, BİLGESAM, SAV, and İPM) and 
one from Diyarbakir (DİSA). I should indicate that the making of this 
sample was not totally based on my informed choice. Before starting my 
fieldwork, I had read several descriptive studies on think tanks, especially 
on Anglo-American ones, which could have been an inspiration for my 
sample. Nevertheless, contrary to my expectation, studies that I read 
perplexed me concerning how to represent a think tank space instead of 
clarifying the matter. As I will discuss in the next chapter, these studies 
offer a plethora of classification of think tanks with respect to their funding 
sources, affiliations, political dispositions, modes of organizations, main 
functions, area of specializations, staff characteristics and so on. I did not 
find this mainstream typological approach convincing for it straps think 
tanks to the well-defined type by excluding potential overlaps that can 
occur between different types specific to a single think tank. For that 
reason, I decided to construct my sample by selecting some major think 
tanks in Turkey, rather than striving to propose a new typology. 
Nevertheless, it was highly difficult to answer the question of which think 
tanks in Turkey are surely prominent, major or influential is (and also the 
question of what a think tank is in Turkey). Above all, the basic problem 
is that there are very few objective measurements through which one can 
determine which think tanks are truly essential or effective in Turkey. For 
example, if we try to determine prominent think tanks in Turkey in terms 
of their budget sizes, we will fail due to the fact that a vast majority of 
think tanks in Turkey are not transparent about their budget sizes and 
source of funding.3 In the absence of a clear financial size on which one 
can rely, it may be said that the historical importance of a certain think 
                                                                 
3 As far as I know, only the TEPAV and the TESEV’s financial statements and annual 
budget sizes are publicly accessible on their websites.   
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tank could be a criterion to designate major think tanks in Turkey. 
However, this option also is not beneficial since a great majority of active 
Turkish think tanks are an offspring of the 2000s. When compared to their 
centennial counterparts in the US or Europe, they are destitute of both a 
historical experience and continuity and institutional reputation that a 
deep-rooted history can provide. Under these circumstances, I put media 
visibility and recognition of think tanks forward as main measurements of 
their efficacy.   
I also scanned global think tanks rankings, which have been annually 
released by The Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program at the 
University of Pennsylvania since 2007, before designating my sample.   
According to the 2013 Global Go To Think Tank Index, there are 6826 
think tanks all over the world and 29 of them are located in Turkey 
(McGann, 2014, p. 23). In this index, the TESEV and the LDT, two 
foremost think tanks that I included in my sample, are ranked among the 
“Top Think Tanks Worldwide”. The USAK and the İPM are also marked 
among influential think tanks in different categories. However, it is quite 
difficult to find out how an embryonic think tank such as the Internationa l 
Strategic Analysis and Research Center (Uluslararası Stratejik Tahlil ve 
Araştırmalar Merkezi/USTAD), founded in 2011 in Mardin, was ranked 
amongst the “top defense and national security think tanks” in the world, 
whereas some influential and well-known think tanks such as the SETA, 
the SDE, and the SAM, perceived as predominant figures in the field by 
many accounts4 did not find a place anywhere in such an all-inclusive 
index. 
This made me question the validity and efficacy of think tank rankings. 
Even though, these indexes can give us an idea concerning the  think 
tank landscape across the globe, methodological and conceptual 
problems with them abound. For one thing, as I will discuss in detail in 
the following chapter, the national environments in which think tanks 
                                                                 
4 Most of my interviewees, for instance, declare that some think tanks which were not 
ranked in the index, particularly the SETA, have come to the front recently.        
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operate vary and so do the manners in which they perform their roles. 
More than that, we even do not exactly know which organizations ought 
to be acknowledged as think tanks and which ought not to, due to the 
prevalent ambiguity and amphiboly of the conceptualizations of think 
tanks. Furthermore, as one expert criticizes (Koellner, 2013, p. 1), output, 
public outreach, and other performance-based criteria are not properly 
operationalized or weighed in think tank rankings. As a result, I 
approached such ranking indexes with caution, even though I still 
welcome their effort to construct an entire map of think tanks.                    
Some think tanks, which are included in the scope of think tanks indexes 
such as the SETA and the SDE, have come to the fore in recent years 
with their increasing visibility and activeness; therefore, I thought that 
putting these prominent think tanks under the scope would be helpful to 
grasp the present day effects of Turkish think tanks. However, one may 
ask why I incorporated other think tanks in my sample. In fact, simply 
because of “practical reasons”: During my fieldwork, I asked many think 
tanks including the ESAM, the ORSAM, the TESAV, the 21. Century 
Turkey Institute, the TASAM, and the Ankara Strategy Institute for an 
appointment via e-mail or telephone. Some of these think tanks did not 
reply to my request (in the affirmative) and some never returned to me 
again despite their promises. In the and, my sample comprising of eleven 
think tanks took its final shape.    
 
1.2. The Sociology of Intellectuals 
This dissertation is mainly based on the intersection of literature of the 
sociology of intellectuals and think tank literature. To crystallize my 
theoretical position, I would offer a brief and critical reading of these two 
literatures respectively in terms of both their benefits and shortcomings.  
In its wavy history, the sociology of intellectuals sometimes emerged as 
a well-defined sub-discipline of sociology with its own categories and 
specific modus operandi, at other times it was subsumed under 
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conterminous fields such as the sociology of professions and expertise, 
the sociology of knowledge, the sociology of science, and the sociology 
of elites. In order to crystallize the main approaches, theoretical 
orientations, and new trends within the field, I will benefit from the articles 
of Kurzman & Owens (2002) and Eyal & Buchholz (2010) providing ideal-
typical classifications of the whole corpus of the field. 
According to Kurzman & Owens (2002), there has been three distinct 
approaches in the history and development of the sociology of 
intellectuals, from the founding moment of the field in the late 1920’s: the 
approaches treating intellectuals as class-in-themselves, as class-bound, 
or as class-less (p. 63). 
The first approach was inaugurated by French philosopher Julien Benda 
(1928), who wrote one of the founding documents of the sociology of 
intellectuals, La Trahison des Clercs (The Treason of the Intellectuals) . 
In his book, Benda contrasted intellectuals as a distinct social group who 
intervene in the public sphere on behalf of universal values with “the 
laymen”, whose function lays mainly in the pursuit of material interests 
(Benda, p. 43). Benda’s heroic Dreyfusard image of the intellectual class-
in-itself obviously bears a normative tone, which dictates what the role 
and tasks of an intellectual ought to be, has lost its effect in the mid-
twentieth century. Lewis Coser’s classic study Men of Ideas (1965), in 
the same direction with Benda, regards intellectual output as an end in 
itself (in equivalent term of the artistic field, “art for art’s sake”) and the 
intellectual as a man who live for, rather than live off, ideas with the 
specific intellectual ethos. Yugoslav dissident Milovan Djilas (1957) at 
first popularized the term “new class” to identify the position of 
intelligentsia under state socialism.  
Konrad & Szelenyi (1979) carried this analysis onward and placed 
intellectuals and technocrats as a “new class” distinguishing themselves 
from other classes with their monopoly on “teleological knowledge” at the 
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heart of socialist administrations in Central and Eastern Europe.5  The 
“new class” thesis was welcomed by American sociologist Daniel Bell 
(1976) in order to render the “rise of the new elites based on skill” (p. 362) 
and the idea of professionalism providing a new ethos for such a group 
in post-industrial societies. Finally, Alvin Gouldner (1979) claimed that 
the new universal class, which is composed of technical intelligentsia and 
critical intellectuals, at the bottom are replacing the proletariat and 
gaining authority through their social knowledge, cultural capital, and the 
ideology of professionalism. In Gouldner’s controversial work, the new 
class is caught in the tension between “universalistic aspirations”, i.e., 
defending universal truth and morality and “particularistic interests”, i.e., 
rewarding cultural capital and increasing their political power to achieve 
the foregoing (Kurzman & Owens, 2002, p. 72). 
Italian Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci’s work on intellectuals is the well-
known exemplar of the class-bound approach in the literature of the 
sociology of intellectuals. As a keen opponent of the consecrated 
depiction of the intellectual brought into the literature by Benda, Gramsci 
emphasizes the allegiance of intellectuals to other social groups. He 
strictly repudiates the idea of intellectuals as an autonomous and 
independent social group, which was alleged by the “traditional 
intellectuals” of the ancien regime such as the man of letters, the 
philosopher, and the artist by labelling it as a self-illusory “social utopia” 
(Gramsci, 1980, p. 8). Rather, every social group coming into existence 
creates its organic intellectuals strata which gives it homogeneity and 
awareness of its function in economic, social, and political fields (p. 5). In 
capitalist societies, the bourgeoisie as an essential social class created 
its “organic intellectuals” who are the dominant class’ deputies 
“exercising the subaltern functions6 of social hegemony and political 
                                                                 
5 Konrad and Szelenyi (1979, p. 63-67) offers a historical typology of intellectuals’ 
structural position in society of different ages: the intelligentsia as an estate (the age of 
traditional distribution-Western European capitalism), as a stratum (free-market  
capitalism), and as a class (rational distribution). 
 
6 The concept of “function” is key to grasp Gramsci’s approach to intellectuals. In the 
eyes of Gramsci, all men are intellectuals by nature since there is no human activity, 
even the most degraded and mechanical ones, from which all the forms of intellectual 
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government” (1980, p. 12). Gramsci’s intervention, which has spread 
amongst Marxists, as well as some non-Marxists, social theorists, has 
made Benda’s work considerably forgotten. C. Wright Mills (1945), for 
instance, laid emphasis on the ascending boundedness of intellectuals 
to the interlock power machinery of elites and, in a highly pessimistic 
tone, claimed “the material basis of his initiative and intellectual freedom 
is no longer in his hands” (p. 236).  
As a redolent of Gramsci’s distinction between the “traditional” and 
“organic” intellectual, Foucault made a distinction between the “universal” 
and the “specific” intellectual. The former was able to transcend his class 
origins and advocates universal values “as the spokesman of the 
universal”, “the consciousness/conscience of us all”, and “a free subject” 
(Foucault, 1989, p. 126). Eventually, writing as the sacralizing mark of 
the intellectual has disappeared, each individual’s specific activity has 
become the basis for politicization, and it has become possible to develop 
connections between diverse forms of knowledge (p. 127). This historical 
transformation has paved the way for the emergence of a new intellectual 
type, i.e., the “specific intellectual” situated within specific sectors such 
as the university, the hospital, the laboratory etc. According to Foucault, 
this new kind of intellectual is no longer the “bearer of universal values”, 
rather it is the person who uses his knowledge and competence in the 
field of political struggle (p. 128). The intellectual has a three-fold 
specificity: that of his class position (whether as petty bourgeois in the 
service of capitalism or ‘organic’ intellectual of the proletariat) that of his 
conditions of life and work, and the specificity of the politics of truth in our 
societies (p. 132).  
Both Gramsci’s concept of “organic intellectuals” and Foucault’s notion of 
“specific intellectuals” more or less have affected a great number of 
scholars from different disciplines. With heated debates, the class-bound 
approach has been theoretically revised and operationalized in order to 
                                                                 
participation can be excluded (p. 9). However, only a small group fulfils the intellectual 
function in society as “functionaries” of the fundamental social group (p. 12).      
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explain the role of intellectuals not only in contemporary Western 
societies, but also in different socio-cultural universes and trajectories, 
especially in the non-Western world.7 
Karl Mannheim, in his famous book Ideology and Utopia, distanced 
himself from the view that intellectuals constitute a distinct social class 
(Benda) or they comprise at least an appendage to a social class 
(Gramsci). Drawing on the works of Alfred Weber, Mannheim asserted 
“socially unattached intelligentsia” (freischwebende Intelligenz) are an 
“unanchored, relatively classless stratum” (1979, p. 137-138). According 
to Mannheim, intellectuals are able to transcend their class of origin by 
attaching themselves to classes to which they did not belong by courtesy 
of education (p. 141). Looking at the mid-twentieth century American 
sociology, it can be clearly seen that the structural-functionalist paradigm, 
which was somehow influenced by Mannheim, reserved a special role for 
intellectuals, not as organic representatives of a group, but as occupants  
of a special role stressing non-material and symbolic factors of effective 
social action (Kurzman & Owens, 2002, p. 68).  
Edward Shils, the leading sociologist of this period, defines the function 
of the intellectuals in the social “system” as eliciting, guiding, and forming 
the expressive dispositions within a society through their provision of 
models and standards and the presentation of symbols to be appreciated 
(Shils, 1972, p. 5). He also wrote that the inherent tension between the 
intellectuals’ universalistic ideals and the more mundane value 
orientations embodied in the actual institutions of any society led to an 
intra-intellectual alienation or dissensus (1972, p. 7).8 Finally, Sadri’s 
(1994) and Collins’ (2002) works emphasizing the relative autonomy of 
intellectual life from its social context and the intellectuals’ “detachment 
                                                                 
7 Some significant studies in this approach belong to Said (1996), Laroui (1976), Karabel 
(1996), Brym (1987), and Eyerman (1994).  
 
8 Shils identifies five historical traditions that have played a great part in forming the 
relations of the modern intellectuals to authority: the tradition of scientism, the romantic  
tradition, the apocalyptic tradition, the populistic tradition, and the tradition of anti -
intellectual order. (p. 18-21).   
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from ordinary concerns” (Collins, p. 19) can be safely deployed within the 
class-less approach.  
As Eyal (2010) points out, the classical problematic of the sociology of 
intellectuals was strongly dominated by the problem of “allegiance” from 
its very inception: Who are the intellectuals9 and to what do they owe 
allegiance? Indeed, this chronic definitional cul-de-sac has shackled the 
study of intellectuals from its inception. For instance, the sustained 
debate concerning their class position, as briefly outlined above, firstly 
was about whether they owed allegiance to their own class (as suggested 
by class-in-itself approach) or to another social class (as suggested by 
class-bound approach). The same logic of investigation is also in pursuit 
of a set of moral and/or material values to which intellectuals devote 
themselves such as to the truth, universal values, the life of the mind, the 
sacred, ideas, material interests and so on. Therefore, the field was 
preoccupied with finding a myth of origin or meta-narrative to explain the 
appropriate conditions under which the intellectual as a particular social 
type emerge and flourish. Instead of this mode of thinking, Eyal and 
Buchholz suggest a new sociological research project what they call as 
“the sociology of intervention” that is mostly based upon field analysis. 
Bourdieu’s strategy to tackle intellectuals provides a new base for the 
sociology of interventions. Bourdieu’s (see 1969, 1975, 1988, 1990, 
1991a) alternative approach to the sociology of intellectuals rejects any 
attempt to define intellectuals, in a priori sense, as a distinct social type 
with a set of substantive properties. To him, the act of definition is par 
excellence a matter of symbolic power within intellectual fields so that 
there can be no “objective” definition of intellectuals.10 He underlines that 
one of the major issues at stake in symbolic struggles occurring in the 
                                                                 
9 It should be noted that any definition of intellectuals is a self-definition as Bauman 
(1987, p. 2) underscores. Therefore, it is a futile endeavor to ask the question “who are 
the intellectuals” by expecting a bundle of objective answers.        
 
10 In Homo Academicus, Bourdieu writes: “The question of the definition of the 
intellectual, or, rather, of specifically intellectual work, is separable from the question of 
defining the population which can be allowed to participate in this definition.” (1988, p. 
269). 
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intellectual field is the legitimate definition of the term intellectual and the 
demarcation of the field. Thus, rather than taking “predefined” 
intellectuals as a unit of analysis, as is in the actor-centered modes of 
explanation, Bourdieusian research programme approach its object by 
constructing the “intellectual field” in which intellectual practices are 
embedded and interrelated as a whole. This analytic shift also gives the 
possibility to the analysis of particular modes of intellectual intervention, 
struggle for symbolic power with various resources including cultural, 
political, economic, and social capital, and “competition for cultural 
legitimacy” (Bourdieu, 1969, p. 91) within intellectual fields instead of 
showing the characteristics of the intellectual as a distinct social type and 
where its allegiance lie. Replacing the concept of “class” which has been 
prevalent in the study of intellectuals with the concept of “field”, Bourdieu 
distances himself from both the class-less (free-floating intelligentsia) 
and class-bound (the organic intellectual) approaches. However, in field 
analysis, the problematic of allegiance to some extent is preserved, when 
assessing the degree of autonomy of a particular intellectual field from 
other fields (Eyal & Buchholz, 2010, p. 124).  
According to Eyal & Buchholz’s (2010) classification, there are three 
strands in the intellectual fields/markets approach constitutively drawing 
upon Bourdieusian methodological tools and concepts:  
a) The first analyzes the making, structure, and transformation of 
specific relatively autonomous intellectual fields such as the 
academic and the literary field (e.g., Bourdieu 1975, 1988, 1996, 
Ringer 1992, Kauppi 1996, and Sabour 2001). In this line of 
research, the problematic of allegiance is overcome yet 
preserved in the sense that it accords to the question of 
autonomy. Field analysis rejects any normative attributes of 
allegiance and draws attention to how fields as relatively 
autonomous arenas of struggle and its structure cause field-
specific and internal alliances, oppositions, and contentions.    
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b) The second strand uses the field analysis to explain the 
emergence, success, or failure of certain models of intellectuals 
and related modes of public intervention (e.g., Sapiro 2003, 
2013, Boschetti 1988, Heilbron & Sapiro 2007, Eyal 2002, and 
Medvetz 2012a). These studies provide genetic account of 
features of the diverse particular types and prototypes of different 
specific intellectuals and their modes of intervention, 
politicization, and engagement.      
c) The third and the last strand within the intellectual field 
literature distances itself from the problems of allegiance or 
autonomy and examine the modes of intervention themselves 
(e.g., Eyal 2000, 2003, and Posner 2001). Most of these studies 
deal with the documentation and typification of modes of public 
intellectual engagement with respect to positions that 
intellectuals occupy.  
My study will mainly correspond to the second strand within the 
intellectual field literature. This is because, this line of research enables 
the researcher to explain the emergence of a new intellectual field or 
field-like space as seen in the example of the US think tanks. Medvetz 
(2012a), in his study on the effects of American think tanks on policy-
making, claimed that think tanks constitute a hybrid and interstitial 
intellectual field situated between the fields of economy, politics, 
academia, and the media. He also argues that this new liminal field 
makes possible the emergence of a new public figure, whose authority is 
based on the capacity to travel between different forms of authority such 
as scientific expertise, economic capital, political power, or media access. 
Eyal (2002), in his analysis of the relations between academic Middle 
Eastern studies and military intelligence, shows that the research 
institutes have become the site where diverse types of capitals and 
relations are accumulated and converted into both political power and 
academic influence. As a “lesser field”, the research institute thus lay in 
the liminal space between the bureaucratic, the academic and the media 
fields, connected them, yet produced its relational reality of separate 
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fields (Eyal, 2013, p. 177). Shifting analytical focus from the organization 
to the system of relations in which they are embedded, the field analysis, 
makes quite possible to study such “boundary organizations” like think 
tanks and research institutes as emergent fields and analyze the new 
forms of intellectual production, habitus, and modes of intervention rooted 
within them.   
 
1.3. Different Perspectives on the Think Tank 
The entrance of the topic of think tanks as an object of study into the 
academic discourse, even American academia, is a relatively new 
phenomenon when compared to the long history of the term.11 Medvetz 
(2012a, p. 29) attributes this lack of academic interest particularly to the 
liminal organizational characteristics of think tanks that outwardly placed 
them in-between the subject matters of traditional academic disciplines 
such as political science, history, and sociology.12 The topic of think tanks 
received its first genuine attention from the scholars operating within the 
elite theory approach inaugurated by sociologist C. Wright Mills, 
especially G. William Domhoff (Medvetz, 2012a, p. 30). In this 
subsection, I would like to concisely glance at the existing academic 
knowledge produced concerning think tanks in accord with Medvetz 
(2012a) who subsumes the think tank studies under three distinct 
theoretical perspectives; the elite theory, pluralism, and institutionalism.13 
                                                                 
11 The early usages of the phrase that vaguely refers to a scorning statement about 
one’s brain or head, which can be found on both newspaper articles and novels, traces 
to the late nineteenth century in American popular discourse. The more specific sense 
of the word referring to a kind of organization debuted to the English Language in 1958.  
For a brief history of the term, see Medvetz (2012), p. 25-29.   
 
12 For another interpretation on why think tanks historically have drawn little attention of 
social scientist, also see Rich (2004), p. 6-10.    
 
13 During my literature search, I have encountered some Marxian analyses on think 
tanks and intellectuals. However, it is apparent that this perspective is not strong or 
widespread in comparison with the aforesaid perspectives. Therefore, I will not discuss 
it in detail here. I can simply remark that especially Gramsci-inspired analyses (see 
Desai, 1994 and Blank, 2003, and Neubauer, 2012) are remarkable in this vein. Desai 
(1994), for instance, analyzes think tank affiliated (organic) intellectuals’ role in the 
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The first perspective claims that think tanks ought to be analyzed, not as 
neutral research centers, but rather as weapons at the disposal of the 
ruling class’ political program. Following C. Wright Mills [1956] (2000), 
the elite theory delineates think tanks primarily as the “intellectual 
machinery” of a firmly interlocked power network of political, military 
financial, and corporate elites. For instance, in his well-known book on 
the American power elite, Domhoff (2006, p. 103) argues that: 
In concert with the large banks and corporations in the corporate 
community, the foundations, think tanks, and policy discussion 
groups in the policy-planning network provide the organizational 
basis for the exercise of power on behalf of the owners of all large 
income-producing properties. 
As seen in the quotation, this point of view regards think tanks as 
intrinsically lobbying firms in the guise of neutral and technical research 
centers. In this model, think tanks are not treated as distinct forms of 
organization, but mere instruments in the hands of a wealthy and 
powerful elite network. Their function is to fulfil “the deepest and most 
critical thinking within the policy-planning network” (Domhoff, 2006, p. 
87). In accordance with this mode of explanation, Peschek who favours 
the “oligarchic model” of policy-making suggested by Dye (1978) and 
Domhoff [1967] (2006), analyses think tanks “not only as objective 
producers of research and recommendations, but also as active agents 
linked to power blocs and policy currents, reflecting and in turn shaping 
ideological shift and political regroupings in a time of momentous 
economic transformations” (1987, p. 2). 
On the other hand, the pluralist view, as clearly opposed to the elite 
theory, proposes that think tanks should be examined, not as instruments 
of the ruling class, but as an organizational breed among many other 
societal groups competing to affect public policy including lobbying firms, 
labor unions, social movement organizations, identity-based associations 
                                                                 
intellectual and discursive production and reproduction of the neoliberal hegemony of 
the Thatcher era from a neo-Gramscian standpoint.    
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and so on (Medvetz, 2012a, p. 8-9). Andrew Rich, for example, 
represents this relatively optimistic view of think tanks and policy 
expertise at the outset of his book:  
[B]y most all appraisals, more experts are good for policy making. 
For much of the twentieth century, this judgment was accurate; 
experts fulfilled these mandates. Even if their work sometimes 
used by others for quite political purposes, experts remained 
ostensibly neutral and detached. Experts offered ideas and 
policy prescriptions that were rigorously crafted, rational, and, in 
the long run, helpful to the work of decision makers (2004, p. 3). 
However, in the final chapter of his study, Rich criticizes the role of 
present think tanks in the policy making process for having become 
focused more on providing skewed and biased commentaries rather than 
neutral analysis (2004, s. 204). Such a jeremiad on the “degenerating” 
role of policy experts is widespread in the pluralist literature.14 Since they 
attribute a normative authority to policy experts by whom the policy 
making process to be rationalized, pluralists often reprimand the 
transmutation of “impartial” policy expert to “partizan” ideologues.  
The main difference between these two perspectives, as Abelson (2002, 
p. 36) indicates, is that the pluralists by and large illustrate think tanks as 
“one voice among many” in the political sphere while the elite theorists 
seek to demonstrate that think tanks are actually nodes in an interlocked 
elite policy-planning network. After all, in spite of their ostensible 
differences, the elite theory and the pluralist perspectives converge on a 
reductionist tendency. In the former case, think tanks are reduced to a 
simple tool at the disposal of prosperous and competent sponsors. By 
depicting think tanks as disguised lobbying firms or an advocacy group, 
                                                                 
14 A similar “pluralist” concern is conspicious in the Genç’s analysis of Turkish think 
tanks: “As Turkey becomes more pluralistic, the public sphere is becoming more lively  
and crowded with opinion leaders, activists, researchers, and journalists, as well as 
print, visual, and social media and NGO’s. However, in the enlarging ‘open society’, 
there is a tendency to produce opinion and ideas based solely on impressions and 
political, socioeconomic, and ideological positioning, instead of on neutral and analytical 
data” (2013, p. 101).     
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this objectivist view degrades them to the status of epiphenomenon. With 
the hyper-functionalist fallacy conceiving the social world is a 
representation or a performance in which the social action as “the acting-
out of roles, the playing of the scores or the implementation of plans” 
(Bourdieu, 1990b, 52), this perspective imagines think tanks as mere 
intermediary institutions of economic, political, or military power. For this 
reason, as Medvetz (2012a, p. 9) contends, the elite theory may propose 
a convincing macro-structural picture of the networks linking think tanks 
to interlocked elite groups; however, it is less enlightening when the point 
comes to how these networks virtually translate into political effect. 
Accordingly, it could be fairly claimed that the language of the elite theory 
perspective, which relegates think tanks to static phenomena by ignoring 
the symbolic dimensions of it at the expense of material ones, is too 
mechanical and functionalist to describe think tanks adequately.  
On the other hand, in the pluralist perspective, the problem is the naive 
literal motivation to consider uncritically or to take account of only the self-
identity claims of think tanks as neutral producers of expert knowledge, 
rather than instruments of a kind of power. By contrast with the elite 
theory, the pluralists broadly avoid ascribing any essentialist character or 
function to think tanks. Nonetheless, they also have few general claims 
regarding think tanks so that it is sometimes impossible to recognize a 
think tank in the wide sea of interest group struggles (Medvetz, 2012a, p. 
9). As Steven Lukes shows, the pluralist literature is based on the 
hypothesis that different actors and interest groups compete almost 
ultimately to influence decision-making processes in different issue-areas 
in which “there is no overall ‘ruling elite’ and power is distributed 
pluralistically” (2004, p. 5).  
These are well-known standard critiques of the elite and pluralist 
perspectives that many critical scholars agree on. However, as Medvetz 
demonstrates, the real nature of the discrepancy between them becomes 
only apparent from a vantage point fortified with the sociology of 
intellectuals:  
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Put simply, if we take a step back and consider the wider 
relationship between the elite theorists and the pluralists 
themselves, then the debate begins to seem less like a 
straightforward argument about think tanks per se than an 
euphemized battle between two sets of intellectuals over their 
own proper social role (Medvetz, 2012a, p. 10). 
As a result, by following Medvetz (2012a, p. 11), we can say that the two 
perspectives get stuck in what Gil Eyal and Larissa Buchholz (2010) call 
the “problematic of allegiance” in their approach to intellectua ls. As 
mentioned above, by this phrase, Eyal and Buchholz refer to a mode of 
analysis focused on the question of an intellectual’s terminal fidelity or 
commitments which characterizes the great majority of approaches in the 
classical sociology of the intellectual. The main problem with thinking 
concerning intellectuals in this way is that it tends to oblige scholars to 
assign an ideal, mission, or function to which the intellectual devote 
themselves to. Consequently, scholars operating with this mode of 
analysis have to establish a separating line between authentic 
intellectuals and pseudo-intellectuals.  
The antinomy between the elite and the pluralist perspectives, therefore, 
can be read under the light of their definitional insights about the 
intellectual. Whereas the elite theory perspective propounds that think 
tanks are not genuinely units of intellectual intervention and production 
and their affiliated experts are not truly intellectuals, but rather mere 
servants of power, the pluralists tend to see think tanks as a kind of 
intellectual organization and experts as free-thinking intellectual 
producers.  
The third and chronologically the most recent perspective that academic 
scholars have used to analyze think tanks is institutionalism. The family 
approaches that can be subsumed under the rubric of institutionalism 
seems to provide some correctives to the aforesaid drawbacks of the elite 
and the pluralist theories. As distinct from these two perspectives, the 
institutionalists “focus on the structural environments in which think tanks 
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are embedded, the rules and norms that shape their behavior, and the 
organizational arrangements and processes to which they must respond” 
(Medvetz, 2012a, p. 12-13). The main veins in this approach focus on 
“epistemic communities”15, or “policy-planning networks” (Burris, 1992) 
of politically engaged professionals and experts. For example, Teichler 
(2007) portrays think tank-affiliated policy experts sharing the same 
“normative beliefs” and “consensual knowledge” as members of a distinct 
epistemic community and investigates how they shape the political 
agenda and contribute to the policy making process.  
Describing the think tank-affiliated actors as professional experts in an 
epistemic community and think tanks as members of the “organizational 
ecology” (Hannan & Freeman, 1989), the institutional approach seems to 
suggest an escape from the problematic of allegiance of classical 
sociology of intellectuals that hampered both the elite and the pluralist 
theory. However, as Medvetz (2012a, p. 14) points out, when applied to 
think tanks, the idea of shared certain brand of expertise, scientific 
knowledge, and normative belief tends to conceal as much as it 
illuminates. For, it is too difficult to assume that think tank-affiliated actors 
are obviously engaged in a coherent professional ethos, being equipped 
with different sets of skills, credentials and form of expertise.  
 
1.4. Think Tanks in Turkish Academic Discourse 
Compared to the North American and British experience, think tanks are 
relatively new organizational forms for Turkey. And the think tank-
affiliated intellectuals are emerging social actors. Accordingly, the topic 
of think tanks is a considerably new phenomenon for Turkish academics. 
Any student of the topic can readily see that Turkish think tank literature 
dates back only since the early 2000s.16 Before this term, there were only 
                                                                 
15 Peter Haas (1992, p. 3) defines epistemic community as “a network of professionals  
with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative 
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area.” 
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sporadic references to the term think tank, if we leave off several articles 
that were directly about the topic. Seemingly, just several academics 
have approached think tanks as their research object and moved them 
toward to the center of their analyses. 
Looking at the studies dealing with the topic, it is evident that there is 
much elusiveness around the idea of a think tank. First of all, there is 
even a disagreement about the naming of these organizations in the 
Turkish language. If studies using the term “think tank” without translating 
it into Turkish are left aside, a plethora of phrases can be seen such as 
düşünce küpü (Alpkaya & Kavas, 1993), akıl deposu (Bora & Peker, 
1999), düşünce üretim merkezi (Erhan, 2005), düşünce kuruluşu 
(Güvenç 2006, Taşkın 2006), düşünce fabrikası (Tezcek, 2009), stratejik 
araştırma merkezi (seen both in the heading of the compilation and the 
large majority of the articles in Kanbolat & Karasar, 2009), düşünce 
merkezi (Sönmez 2009, Kanbolat 2009), and araştırma merkezi (Aras, 
Toktaş, & Kurt, 2010).  
Second, a similar nominal disagreement is prevalent in the denomination 
of think tank-affiliated actors or think tankers. In this case, when some 
academics prefer the category of “researcher” (araştırmacı), others use 
more weighty terms such as “strategist” (stratejist) or “expert” (uzman 
and/or in more specific sense siyasa uzmanı, bölge uzmanı, strateji 
uzmanı etc.). In this study, I will prefer the term “intellectual” in a more 
generic and neutral sense to keep away from the “rhetorical” connotation 
of the terms of expert and strategist prevailing as a dominant discourse 
in the studies on think tanks in Turkey. With a clearly expressed opinion 
that there is a lack of expert(ise) regarding think tanks in terms of both 
quality and quantity, many academics take a normative stance towards 
their research subject. By a “normative stance”, I mean that they 
propound the lack of expertise not as a statement derived from scientific 
                                                                 
16 For instance, see Okman (1987), Baker & Şen (1994), Bora (2001), Erhan (2005),  
Uzgel (2005), Karabulut (2005, 2012), Keskin (2005), Aydın (2006), Güvenç (2006,  
2007), Taşkın (2006), Karakurt (2007), Bilhan (2008), articles in Kanbolat & Karasar 
(2009), Aras, Toktaş, & Kurt (2010), Kurt (2011), Aras & Toktaş (2012), Tezcek (2009,  
2011), Kaya (2012), Sala (2012), Genç (2013), Yıldız et al. (2013), and Çınar (2014).  
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investigation but as one of the fundamental problems that think tanks 
should overcome at once.17 It is possible to observe that there is an 
almost exact correspondence between the think tank-affiliated social 
actors’ jeremiad about the lack of expert – I lean on a finding of my field 
research here – and academic scholars’ approach to the issue.        
Third, the literature existing on think tanks is mostly descriptive and 
superficial in nature. This fact is, no doubt, related to the topics novelty 
and peculiarity that make it difficult to explore. Furthermore, I would 
argue, this can be also associated with the lack of methodological and 
epistemological vigilance by scholars that any work of social science 
requires. Such a problem can be seen, for example, in Aziz Aydın’s work 
on “the genesis of think-tank culture in Turkey” (2006).18 Aydın begins his 
study with a presentation of the think tank literature as usual in order to 
construct a general framework for think tanks including their definitions, 
classifications, historical developments, functions, influences, and 
funding. Nevertheless, he neither discusses the pros and cons of the 
different perspectives on think tanks by establishing a critical dialogue 
with the literature, nor does he offer a new viewpoint by which we may 
handle think tanks. The main body of his work is devoted to “the evolution 
of think tanks in Turkey” in which all of the organizations in Turkey that 
seem as think tanks (total number is 46) are mentioned in terms of their 
founders, foundation years and places, working areas, publications etc. 
in one or two pages. Such a presentation of the topic, which is 
characterized with the rehearsal of the basic information about Turkish 
think tanks, seems more of a catalogue that one can clearly see by 
looking at the web sites of the mentioned organizations rather than a 
historical analysis through which one can hold a view as to how and why 
these organizational bodies have spawned in the social structure. In the 
absence of any scientific problem or an intellectual puzzle, 
                                                                 
17 As a representative sample, see Karasar’s (2009) article bringing forward some 
proposals for the cultivation of what he calls “ideal expert”.    
 
18 It is the first dissertation concerning think tanks, submitted to the Department of 
International Relations of the Middle East Technical University.  
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methodological and epistemological wariness, and a representative 
sample, it is inevitable to construct a prosaic narration about the genesis 
of “think tank culture” keeping power relations between elite groups from 
analysis.   
Moreover, Aydın’s study’s shortcomings can be found in many similar 
academic research associated with the topic. These shortcomings may 
be ascribed to the limits of the analytical and methodological tools of the 
discipline of “international relations” in Turkey. It is easy to diagnose that 
most of the scientific research on think tanks in Turkey has been done by 
those who are operating in the international relations discipline which is 
sometimes located as a sub-branch of political science in the Turkish 
academic field, but largely is promoted as a distinct and relatively 
autonomous working area. These studies commonly have handled think 
tanks as an ascending actor in Turkish foreign policy, playing a role in the 
formation of national securitization and foreign policy making and transfer 
processes. Even though the studies19 are somehow significant to 
understand the affect of these organizations, they all tend to belt think 
tanks to its mission in the field of foreign policy.  
Fourth, the existing literature is also rife with quasi-scientific and even 
idealistic accounts about the role of think tanks, hinging upon conspiracy 
theorising or ideological constructions, rather than clear evidence or 
argumentation derived from scientific investigation. Dramatically, such a 
kind reasoning can be even encountered in the writings of academic 
social scientists alongside military officers and diplomats, “seeing like a 
state” and speaking the language of power politics (Machtpolitik), by 
locating these organizations (strategic research centers in their lexicon) 
as one of the builders of the national and official state strategies. To 
illustrate, Çeçen (2009, p. 196) imagines Turkish think tanks as national 
forces that would eternize the Turkish Republic by amplifying it in a 
contentious new world order through creating the “new Turkish thought”, 
                                                                 
19 See especially Karaosmanoğlu & Onulduran (2004), Erhan (2005), Güvenç (2006,  
2007), Aras, Toktaş, & Kurt (2010), Aras & Toktaş (2012). 
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as distinct from exterior think tanks which are “Trojan horses of 
imperialim”. Needless to say, such pseudo-scientific essays in which 
authors project their ideals, expectations, and value-laden judgements 
onto their objects hinder a scientific understanding of the subject matter.        
Last but not the least, most of the studies concerning think tanks of 
Turkey have tended to use organization-centered modes of explanation 
which analytically focusing on the organization per se rather than taking 
think tank-affiliated actors as their unit of analysis. By this determination, 
I would not like to trivialize the organization-based approach and put 
actor-based modes of analysis forward at the expense of the former. But 
rather, I want to emphasize that these “two separate but complementary 
modes of analysis” (Medvetz, 2012a, p. 25) can be interconnected 
through the field-analytic perspective shifting our focus from static 
organizational entities or actors to dynamic system of relations (i.e., field) 
of which they are part. By virtue of this combination, despite the tension 
between them, we can both construct the place of think tanks in the 
broader social space and understand the specific illusio of a distinct kind 
of social agent; both objectivist social topology of the think tank space 
and subjectivist phenomenology of policy think tank-affiliated 
intellectuals; both material and symbolic dimensions of policy research.    
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CHAPTER 2 
HOW TO THINK ABOUT THINK TANKS? 
 
The introduction chapter provided a bird’s eye view of think tank literature 
as well as the general corpus of the sociology of intellectuals. In this 
chapter, I will be discussing think tank literature again with respect to a 
few but substantial problems, which are more or less salient throughout 
the prominent studies in this area. To suggest a more fine-grained 
argumentation and even reconstruction regarding my research object, I 
find such a discussion necessary and ineluctable.     
 
2.1. The Problem of Definition  
What is a think tank or how should one define it?20 This is the 
fundamental question all of the scholars who wants to grasp the think 
tank and its location within society have attempted to adress. It could be 
comfortably said that the peculiar difficulty every scholar compromises 
on is that the category of think tank per se is elusive, unsteady, and 
controversial. Many scholars begin their discussion by propounding the 
specific hardness of an accurate and encompassing description of think 
tanks. For instance, as Abelson argues, “These organizations elude 
simple definition, in large part because there is no consensus about what 
constitutes a think tank” (2002, p. 8). Stone and Garnett, in the same 
direction with Abelson, label the term think tank as “slippery” and imply 
                                                                 
20 In his blog on think tanks, Enrique Mendizabal, who is an independent researcher 
and adviser to think tanks, agglomerates different ways of defining think tanks. 
Interestingly enough, at the end of his article, he asks the reader to answer the poll to 
determine the most useful way of defining think tanks. The options in Mendizabal’s poll 
may give an idea concerning the definitional variation of think tanks: legal definition,  
existing normative definitions, size and focus, evolution or stage development, funding 
sources, balance between research, source of arguments, manner in which research 
agenda is set, influencing approaches, audiences, affiliation, relational definitions,  
functional descriptions. See, Mendizabal (2011).        
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the specific difficulties of defining think tanks due to “the diversity of style, 
activity and focus of these organizations, alongside cultural variations” 
(1998, p. 3).21 Weaver and McGann (2009) also write “defining think 
tanks, and establishing clear boundaries as to which organizations fit 
within the category, is one of the most conceptually difficult tasks in 
analyzing these organizations” (p. 4).    
However, expressing the fuzziness and ambiguity surrounding their 
subject matter do not hamper the scholars to normatively define think 
tanks in a priori sense at the outset of their analyses. For the scholars, if 
think tanks are a voice like many other organizations in civil society or the 
public sphere as pluralists often utter, it should draw the line between 
them and similar organizational bodies such as activist organizations, 
pressure groups, consultant firms, government research bureaus, 
university-affiliated policy centers etc. This is because, “the boundaries 
between think tanks and other groups are blurring” (Stone, 2007a, p. 
151). For this reason scholars have tried to give a normative account of 
the think tank separating it from its akin organizations. As Medvetz subtly 
demonstrates, they have tried to resolve the problem of demarcation “by 
simply stating that ‘true’ think tanks are policy-oriented research organs 
marked by formal separation from government, party, and market 
institutions” (2012a, p. 31). The hyphothesis of formal independence or 
autonomy can be seen most by the Anglo-American authors operating 
within both pluralist and institutionalist traditions.  
For instance, Weaver and McGann give an operational definition of think 
tanks based on mostly Anglo-American experience. In their view, think 
tanks are “policy research organizations that have significant autonomy 
from government and from societal interests such as firms, interest 
groups, and political parties” (emphasis added; Weaver & McGann, 2009, 
p. 5). In similar way, Rich defines think tanks as “independent, non-
interest-based, non-profit organizations that produce and principally rely 
                                                                 
21 In their introduction to their new compilation about think tanks, Think Tank Traditions 
(2004) that is a follow-up monograph of Think Tanks Across Nations (1998), Stone and 
Denham note that all of their contributors point to the dilemma of definition. (2004, p. 2).     
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on expertise and ideas to obtain support and to influence the policy 
making process” (2004, p. 11). In a relatively new article on the topic 
called Revisiting the Think-Tank Phenomenon, Pautz (2011) devotes 
several pages to “redefine” the think tank. He revises the definition by 
claiming that the “not-for-profit” criterion, which is a strong component of 
the definitions of Weaver & McGann and Rich, should be excluded from 
any definition of the think tank due to its mere legal characteristics and 
ineffectiveness to understand particularly the UK and the US think tanks 
that enjoy charitable status and tax-exemption status respectively. 
Nonetheless, this revision does not let the author to surpass the premise 
of independence or autonomy. According to Pautz’s redefinition: “think-
tanks are non-governmental institutions; intellectually, organizationally 
and financially autonomous from government, political parties or 
organized interests; and set up with the aim of influencing policy” 
(emphasis added; Pautz, 2011, p. 423). 
In my point of view, this definitional frame is not too illuminating to 
approach the think tank phenomenon for several reasons. First of all, as 
indicated above, this definition prioritizes the British, American, and 
Canadian think tank models over its counterparts in the rest of the world. 
In Continental Europa, Latin America, Asia, and Africa, the term think 
tank may be used to refer to organizations directly affiliated with or 
dependant on universities, government agencies, political parties, 
unions, companies, trade associations or interest groups. For instance, 
as Gellner points out, “the German political system has only a few 
institutions which correspond directly to the organizationally independent 
US-style think tanks. Typical German think tanks are the research 
institutes and advisory bodies which are associated with a foundation or 
an interest group” (Gellner, 1998, p. 82). In addition to the absence of 
organizational autonomy, most of the German think tanks are also 
financially dependant to the support of the Federal Government or the 
Länder. The trajectory of Northeast Asian think tanks also differs from the 
Anglo-American experience of think tanks and destabilizes the normative 
definition promoting the concept of independence. In this region, think 
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tanks typically are affiliated with a corporation or an industry, a political 
party, a university or the government.22 At the inception of her article on 
think tanks in Japan, Korea, China, and Taiwan, Ueno addresses the 
definitional impasse: 
If we use the Western definition of a think tank as a non-profi t, 
nongovernmental research institution that generates 
independent policy research and recommendations on domestic 
and international issues for the purpose of serving the people, 
and if we exclude the research arms of private industry, there are 
almost no think tanks in east Asia (Ueno, 2009, p. 223).      
The Turkish experience regarding think tanks constituting the research 
object of this study also destabilizes the definitional approach based on 
the idea of formal independence. For instance, some of the leading and 
extensively recognized think tanks in Turkey have organic links with 
universities like the Istanbul Policy Center, (affiliated with Sabancı 
University), with trade associations like the Economic Policy Research 
Foundation of Turkey (founded and still supported by The Union of 
Chambers and Commodity), or with government agencies like Center for 
Strategic Research (the research center of The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs).  
Second, the tenet of organizational or financial independence easily 
leads to the corollary suggestion of “cognitive independence”23 (Medvetz, 
2012a, p. 32). This concept sometimes appears as “intellectual 
independence” or “scholarly autonomy” in the works on think tanks. To 
illustrate, Pautz suggests, “scholarly autonomy is important for an 
                                                                 
22 Think tanks in Japan, for instance, have been historically used by the government or 
the ruling party to promote economic growth by making developmental plans related to 
the vast national investments (Ueno, 2009, p.228). This case shows that think tanks 
could operate as a consulting or a planning board rather than an independent  policy 
research organization in the countries practising corporatist developmental strategies.   
 
23 The notion of cognitive independence or autonomy has been one of the most 
essential problematics of the sociology of intellectuals, knowledge, and science from 
their inceptions. For the purpose of my discussion, I will operationally use it in the sense 
of intellectuals’ relative autonomy from the constraint of existing institutions and 
obligations of political or economic forces.  
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organization if it is to be classified as a think-tank” (2011, p. 422). Diane 
Stone who has numerous papers on think tanks connects these different 
types of autonomy together on the assumption that independent policy 
research institutes “do not have a fixed or dependent policy position – 
they are intellectually independent. The nature of their work is determined 
by the institute rather than any specific interest” (emphasis added; Stone, 
1996, p. 15). In one of her similar studies, she defines scholarly 
independence as a concept, which is reliant on certain practices within a 
think tank such as the process of peer review or commitment to open 
inquiry instead of directed research (Stone, 2004, p. 4-5). However, I am 
not convinced by this narrow identification since it reduces the concept 
of scholarly autonomy to an intra-organizational problem. Rather, 
scholarly autonomy is related to the degree of autonomy of the field or 
field-like space in which think tank-affiliated intellectuals create their 
intellectual productions. In other words, the notion of cognitive, 
intellectual, or scholarly autonomy, refers the field’s capacity “to insulate 
itself from external influences and to uphold its own criteria of evaluation 
over and against those of neighboring or intruding fields” (Wacquant, 
2007, p. 269).24 
From my standpoint, Stone’s emphasis on the intellectual independence 
of think tanks and their affiliated experts is neither convincing nor 
explanatory. Instead of investigating empirically how or to what extent the 
actors of think tank space are free from constraints or interests of external 
forces, this approach “prejudge the character of think tank and its 
products” (Medvetz, 2012a, p. 32).25 Put it differently, authors clinging to 
the premise of independence obstruct the construction of think tanks as 
a research object by approaching it as given pre-constructed object. I 
would like to argue that the task of a socio-scientific study which is to 
                                                                 
24 It also should be noted that only the constitution of a relatively autonomous intellectual 
field is able to bring about the appearance of a cognitively independent intellectual 
figure, “who does not recognize nor wish to recognize any obligations other than the 
intrinsic demands of his creative project” (Bourdieu, 1969, p. 91).  
 
25 Such a prejudgment can be seen in the statements like, “think tanks are a repository  
of ‘independent’ and ‘scholarly’ experts” (Stone, 2007a, p. 152).   
 
30 
 
some extent related to intellectuals would be more than to sanguinely 
label some intellectuals, intellectual practices and products as 
“independent” by their nature without probing what kind of intellectual 
practices think tanks attend to. 
 
2.2. The Problem of Location 
Another problem, which is closely associated with the problem of 
definition, any scholar somehow faces, is how to locate think tanks 
accurately with respect to the state, civil society, and market. Most of the 
scholars have tended to solve the problem of location by treating think 
tanks as a form of civil society organizations specializing in the production 
of knowledge relative to the process of public policy. This stance 
especially prevalent in the academic studies of think tanks that can be 
gathered under the rubric of pluralist model conceiving think tanks as a 
distinct organizational entity among many others in civil society. McGann 
and Sabatini’s following expressions evidently epitomize this position: 
Civil society comprises range of associations that occupy the 
space between government and its citizens. Think tanks are one 
type of civil society organization. As objective, independent policy 
analysts and producers representing neither the public, nor the 
private sector, think tanks constitute an important part of a strong 
civil society (McGann & Sabatini, 2011, p. 13). 
However, I do not find the concept of civil society compelling enough to 
analyze think tanks and their place in social space for some reasons. The 
first reason is that the concept of civil society does not reflect the 
complexity of the social world in which the sharp lines between the civil 
society and its “constitutive other”, the state and the market, are blurring. 
For the purposes of my argument here let me define the concept of civil 
society operationally as the aggregate of institutions and organizations 
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apart from both the state and the market economy.26 This tripartite 
division of society - state, civil society and the market which is truly a 
product of the 19th century social thought - was based on the assumption 
that these three sectors of the social world are independent of each other 
and their boundaries can be distinguished.27 I would like to argue that this 
“holy trinity” of early modernity is not sufficient to explain the social reality 
of our time since it became blurred with the overlapping and intertwined 
boundaries of state, civil society, and the market. Through the 20th 
century, civil society mostly has been a terrain to be assimilated or 
invaded by the market and the state. For this reason, I contend that civil 
society is not a sphere which is autonomous and independent from the 
invasion of economic and bureaucratic fields. The following passage 
draws attention to the analytical futility of separating these three spheres 
from each other: 
[T]he distinction of state/market/civil society is quite simply an 
implausible one, as any real actor in the real world knows. The 
market is constructed and constrained by the market and the civil 
                                                                 
26 In their monumental treatise, Cohen and Arato (1992) propound a normative model 
of civil society referring a societal realm of interaction different from both the state and 
the economy with the following organizing chief characteristics: “(1) Plurality: families, 
informal groups, and voluntary associations whose plurality and autonomy allow for a 
variety of forms of life; (2) Publicity: institutions of culture and communication; (3) 
Privacy: a domain of individual self-development and moral choice; and (4) Legality:  
structures of general laws and basic rights needed to demarcate plurality, privacy, and 
publicity from at least the state and, tendentially, the economy. Together, these 
structures secure the institutional existence of a modern differentiated civil society” (p. 
346). 
 
27 As Wallerstein et al. (1996, p. 36) argues, the sharp distinction between the market, 
the state, and the civil society is one of the lines of cleavage in the system of disciplines 
of the social sciences being structured in the late nineteenth century. In this division of 
labor, sociology as the science of the civil society distinguishes itself from economics 
(science of the market) and political science (science of the state). According to the 
same authors, the social sciences was institutionalized under the epistemological and 
methodological impact of deterministic models within the natural sciences, particularly  
Newtonian physics based on the idea of certainty, linearity, reversibility, and equilibrium. 
Burawoy, on the other hand, sees sociology as originated from and protecting the 
interests of civil society as distinct from political science and economics manufacturing 
ideological bombs that justify both “state despotism” and “market tyranny” (Burawoy 
2005, p. 24). Both Wallerstein and Burawoy admit that the boundaries of state, 
economy, and society are blurring. Nevertheless, when Wallerstein suggests that social 
sciences should give up this trilateral framework, Burawoy maintains the division by 
attributing a normative and privileged role to sociology adhered to society in defence of 
the public.   
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society. And the civil society is defined by the state and the 
market. One cannot separate these three modes of expression 
of actor’s interests, preferences, identities, and wills into closeted 
arenas about which different groups of people will make scientific 
statements, ceteris paribus (emphasis added; Wallerstein, 1999, 
p. 246-247). 
In Bourdieu’s conceptual framework that I will deploy in this study, state-
civil society-market division does not carry any value in an analytical 
sense. As Swartz points out, Bourdieu refuses to parcel out the social 
order into three separate entities or spheres (2013, p. 184). Rather, he 
offers one to think that the social space is consisted of differentiated and 
relatively autonomous domains what he calls field such as artistic, 
scientific, economic, or political. This model gives us a more dynamic and 
complex representation as to the social world in which the boundary and 
the degree of autonomy of any field is an empirical question. I will 
elaborate this point later, but now, in the context of my discussion here, 
permit me to quote a passage from one of Bourdieu’s later books, The 
Social Structures of the Economy. In this work, Bourdieu rejects the 
deeply rooted state/civil society dichotomy in harmony with his general 
endeavor to transcend Cartesian dualities of social theory:   
It is not easy to determine concretely where state ends and ‘civil 
society’ begins. … In fact, abandoning the dichotomy, which may 
produce its effects in ‘debates on the state of society’, we have 
rather to speak the language of differential access to specifically 
bureaucratic resources – law, regulations, administrative powers, 
etc. - and to power over these resources, which the canonical 
distinction, as noble as it is empty leads us to forget (Bourdieu, 
2005b, p. 163-165).  
To crystallize this point, let me shortly discuss the example of the 
Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (Türkiye Ekonomi 
Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı, TEPAV), which is thought to be one of the 
most significant think tanks in Turkey by many accounts. Where should 
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we definitely situate the TEPAV with regard to state, civil society and the 
market? One could remark that the TEPAV was founded with the fund 
provided by the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of 
Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği, TOBB) which is an 
organization that represents the private sector which consisted of the 
commerce and industry chambers, and, it has developed projects and 
laid out policy proposals in the name of the TOBB since its foundation. 
For this reason, one could easily claim that the TEPAV seems as a 
lobbying firm operating in the market rather than working as a typical civil 
society organization. In other respects, one could underscore that the 
TEPAV is not a profit-oriented organization but a non-profit one, and 
therefore, it is outside of the market. Moreover, one could maintain 
his/her argument by indicating that the TEPAV is not, after all, an official 
government agency or a public institution. As a consequence, s/he could 
suggest that it should be located within the civil society as a non-
governmental research organization.  
Nonetheless, I would contend that the arguments mentioned above are 
not convincing for a social scientific analysis of think tanks. The TEPAV’s 
official separation from the state, for instance, may be important in terms 
of tax law, but tells us very little concerning its influence. After all, the 
TEPAV is in close connection with governmental institutions from the 
presidency to the ministries: “We are ultimately an actor in Ankara. By 
means of our connections, we could enter the rooms of ministries in 
which laws are prepared to work together with them” said one of the 
senior officials of the TEPAV (author interview, December 30, 2013). 
Moreover, it could be said that the TEPAV’s non-profit status does not 
make it automatically “non-market”. Its considerable portion of funding 
and endowment springs from the TOBB and the private sector. It should 
be also added that the TEPAV, from its inception, has championed a 
“market-centered growth strategy” (Tezcek, 2011, p. 235-247) and gave 
intellectual support to the consolidation of the private sector and well-
functioning market.  
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In addition to aforementioned analytical problems, I also have some 
drawbacks concerning the explanatory power of the term civil society in 
the context of Turkey. In the debates regarding the Turkish experience of 
socio-political modernization and capitalist development, the state-
centric modes of explanations such as the “center-periphery” model 
(Mardin, 1973) and the “strong state tradition” thesis (Heper, 1985) has 
been methodologically and epistemologically influential.28 In these 
studies, the Ottoman-Turkish state tradition, if any, is described with the 
duality between a strong political/bureaucratic center and a weak 
periphery. According to Heper (1985), this strong state tradition in which 
political, economic, and social power is concentrated on the Ottoman 
state was taken over by modern Turkish politics and impeded the 
emergence of a powerful civil society. Mardin’s analysis similarly is based 
on the inference of “the lack of civil society” (Mardin, 2007, p. 18) in the 
Ottoman-Turkish social order characterized with the enduring and stable 
political and military structures. In Turkish history, a sphere of civil society 
functioning as a mediator to appease the social conflicts between the 
center and the periphery as seen in the history of Western societies is 
not found (Mardin, 1995).29 
I will not trace the whole story of the concept of civil society in Turkish 
social science literature. Rather, I would like to assert that the civil society 
debate in Turkey has got stuck in the “problematic of absence” for 
decades. By this phrase, I mean that social scientists have primarily dealt 
with the question of whether or not there is a civil society in Turkey. The 
concomitant problem that Turkish academic scholars have tackled with 
is how to draw the line between the civil society and the state. The 
“problematic of demarcation” or where the boundaries of the civil society 
lie, as Bourdieu indicates, have produced and reproduced the useful but 
                                                                 
28 For critiques of “center-periphery paradigm” and “strong state tradition thesis”, see 
respectively Arlı (2006) and Dinler (2009).  
 
29 Mardin’s “the lack of civil society” thesis has some orientalist implications in terms of 
implying that the absence of a civil society a la Occident in Turkish history is a flaw that 
should be overcome. For a detailed analysis of Mardin’s work and its relation to 
Orientalism, see Arlı (2004). It should be also noted that from a different standpoint,  
Küçükömer (1994) also emphasizes the absence of civil society.  
35 
 
actually empty dichotomies like the state and civil society among social 
scientists.30  
Additionally, it could be argued that many left wing and liberal Turkish 
intellectuals have paid attention to the notion of civil society as a 
normative category of political discourse rather than an analytical 
category from the 1980’s to the present in parallel with the renaissance 
of the idea of civil society throughout the world. In 1970s and 1980s, the 
Central and Eastern European dissident intellectuals deployed this 
concept as an integral part of their political discourse that they had 
developed to democratically oppose Soviet power. The Polish exiled 
intellectual Leszek Kolakowski, for instance, regarded the destruction of 
the autonomy of civil society, namely of independent social life, as the 
key feature of communist totalitarianism (Goldfarb, 1998, p. 90). In the 
lexicon of the Czechoslovakian dissident intellectuals, in the same vein 
as the Kolakowski’s formulation, the concept of civil society referred to 
the “self-organization of the society” sharply contrasted with the 
“mechanical order of the state plan”; to put it more explicitly, it connotes 
an alternative kind of art of government - actually a neoliberal one - based 
on individual responsibility of citizens and the rule of law central, rather 
than state intervention to socio-economic activities and central planning 
(Eyal, p. 67-72).     
What I would like to accentuate is that the concept of civil society has 
been used by many members of the intellectual field of Turkey not as an 
operational and analytical term but as a discursive and value-laden 
buzzword. The Özal period, for instance, was welcomed by many 
                                                                 
30 In passing, I would like to accentuate some limits of the state-centric modes of 
explanation in theorizing the state by drawing on Timothy Mitchell’s sophisticated 
criticism of statist approaches. As opposed to the approaches taking the state as a 
separate self-sustained entity, whether an agent having subjective intentions such as 
rule-making and policy-making or an organization autonomous from society, Mitchell 
(1992) proposes to examine the state as a “structural effect” of political practices 
constantly blurring the boundaries between the state and society: “The state should be 
addressed as an effect of detailed processes of spatial organization, temporal 
arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and surveillance, which create 
the appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society” (Mitchell, 1992,  
p. 95). 
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intellectuals as a deepening of political pluralism, demilitarization, and 
democratization, a strengthening of the market economy and an 
“autonomization of politics and civil society” (Göle, 1994). They have 
seen the emergence and expansion of civil society as an antidote to the 
domination of the repressive state, a prerequisite for the democratization 
of the political society, a sphere of freedom in which identities and new 
social movements find an opportunity for representation. This is why 
many scholars have shifted their analytical focus from the state to (civil) 
society from the 1980s. Furthermore, it can be also observed that these 
intellectuals accused their opponents, who are criticizing or objecting to 
the reforms and implementations to consolidate civil society and the 
market, of being archaic and statist (Taşkın, 2013, p. 278). It can even 
be claimed that the ideological polarization between the left wing and 
right wing intellectuals prevalent in the intellectual field during the 1970s 
has been replaced by the new main dividing line between “statists” and 
“civil societists” in the intellectual field after the 1980s. The latter camp 
has tended to constitute politics through the binary opposition between 
the despot state (in Turkish, the phrase of ceberrut devlet) and the 
oppressed society. 
The think-tank literature in Turkey is filled with emphases on think tanks’, 
which are considered as parts of civil society, a positive contribution to 
the democratization of political culture in a normative way and with a 
positive presupposition. In their reasoning, scholars have tended to 
establish a simple cause and effect relationship between two variables, 
the proliferation of think tanks and the progress of civil society and 
democracy. This posture is clear in one of the comprehensive studies on 
the topic. Aydın’s following expression epitomizes this sanguine pluralist 
account of think tanks by ruling power relations out of his analysis:    
[L]ike in the other countries, think tanks in Turkey contribute to a 
mere plural and open society by promoting a diversity of political 
analyses and policy opinion. A diversity of think-tanks strengthens 
the democratic functioning of society by educating the public and 
providing another forum for political debate and participation. Thus 
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one of the main functions of think-tanks is to strengthen civil 
society in Turkey (Aydın, 2006, p. 134). 
 
2.3. Constructing the Object: A Field-Analytical Approach to Think 
Tanks 
I have propounded some problems and limitations prevailing the modes 
of definition, conception and analysis of think tanks and think tank 
intellectuals. In this sub-chapter, I would like to propose a more 
generative socio-scientific approach to think tanks, e.g. the relational 
sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, which would enable us to overcome 
aforesaid predicaments of the literature focusing either on Anglo-
American experience or its Turkish counterparts.31 Permit me first to 
delineate the conceptual repertoire of relational socio-analysis of 
Bourdieu, after that I will discuss how this tool box would provide 
advantages in understanding our subject matter. 
According to Bourdieu, sociology presents itself as a social topology and 
thus, the entire social universe could be represented as a space 
(Bourdieu, 1985, p. 723). This topological understanding of society or 
field theory32 is constructed on the concepts of social space and field. In 
this frame, the concept of social space refers that the whole social 
structure could be topologically represented as a relational and 
multidimensional configuration of positions generated by the composition 
and volume of different varieties of resource, i.e. capital current in a given 
moment. In modern societies, fields as various differentiated and 
relatively autonomous domains of action in which agents such as 
individuals, social classes or groups strive for obtaining valuable 
resources and designating the criteria of legitimation comprise of social 
                                                                 
31 Medvetz’s (2012a, 2012b) seminal Bourdieusian study on American think tanks that 
I take inspiration is the first attempt to develop both a relational conception and the 
general theory of think tanks.    
 
32 For a comprehensive account on its characteristics, histories and versions in the 
social sciences, see Martin’s (2003) classical paper.  
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space.33 A field, as Bourdieu purports specific to the artistic field, is a two-
dimensional peculiar locus as a “field of forces” and “field of struggles” 
(Bourdieu, 1993, p. 30). It is primarily a field of forces (magnetic field), 
where mutual relations between positions and dispositions are 
constrained and hierarchically ordered by (both symbolic and material) 
external mechanisms. Nonetheless, it is also a field of struggles 
(battlefield), where agents and groups are aiming at preserving or 
transforming of the configuration of potential and active forces (Bourdieu 
& Wacquant, 1992, p. 101) and vying over the control of valued material 
and symbolic resources at stake in spite of the external constraints. A 
succinct definition of field encapsulating these points, in Bourdieu’s own 
words, as follows:         
In analytic terms, a field may be defined as a network, or a 
configuration of objective relations between positions. These 
positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the 
determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or 
institutions, by their present and potential situation (situs) in the 
structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose 
possession commands access to the specific profits that are 
stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other 
positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.) (Bourdieu 
& Wacquant, 1992, p. 97). 
A relational social analysis based on field theory then should initially 
begin by describing the special social space, e.g., the field, which is going 
to be scrutinized, whether of academia, law, literature and so on. As 
Martin (2003, p. 23) indicates, even though they are connected in the 
substratum of the same social space, fields may be treated as analytically 
distinct (and their scope and degree of autonomy is an empirical 
question). Only through such a construction, the scholar can form a basis 
to understand the logic of the game peculiar to the field; a game in which 
                                                                 
33 For an analytic and elaborative account on the relation between the notions of social 
space and field, see Vandenberghe (1999), p. 53.    
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there is an ongoing struggle between the dominants and the 
subordinates, in other words, those who have an interest in preserving 
the rules of the game and those who are attempting to invalidate it. 
What advantages could this model provide us to analyze think tanks? 
The first virtue of this approach is that it enables the researcher to shift 
his or her analytical focus from a particular object or entity labelled as 
think tank, or individuals to the system of social relations (that of struggle, 
cooperation, hierarchy, intellectual production etc.) in which they are 
established (Medvetz, 2012a, p. 34-35).34 Scholars, as outlined above, 
have tended to treat think tanks as static and peculiar “things” with 
substantial properties that every members share such as being 
autonomous, independent, non-profit, free-thinking and so on. For that 
reason, they have taken a kind of substance as their major unit of inquiry, 
rather than a dynamic space of relations that think tanks reside.35 
Furthermore, the relational social analysis refuses to deploy a unit of 
analysis such as the individual, group, society, organization or state prior 
to the empirical investigation. The overarching point is that with respect 
to the structure and characteristics of the field that is going to be 
examined, all of these different units could be included in the analysis not 
as separate entities with their essential properties but as participators of 
a social game with their positional features. In our case, actors within the 
field are not only think tanks and intellectuals, but also individuals and 
organizations, for instance, providing financial support to think tanks; 
people or institutions benefiting from the knowledge or ideas that think 
tanks produce and so on.      
The concomitant benefit is that the field-analytic approach rejects 
describing a phenomenon on paper or in a priori way. Thus, in this 
                                                                 
34 Bourdieu reminds us that the true research object of social science is not individuals  
or institutions but “it is the field which is primary and must be the focus of the research 
operations” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 107).  
 
35 The choice between substantalist and relationalist modes of analysis constitutes the 
most fundamental dilemma that sociologists face. And this choice is of course the result 
of the socio-ontological preference between the point of view conceiving the social world 
as consisting in static things or substances and that of seeing it as consisting in dynamic 
processes or relations (Emirbayer, 1997, p. 281-282).  
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framework, the intellectual independence of think tanks or cognitive 
autonomy of think-tank affiliated intellectuals is not a given quality 
immanent in their (pre)definition, but a question one can only answer 
through empirical research. Moreover, it should be noted that the 
boundary of categories of the social world are objects of permanent 
symbolic contest amongst individuals and groups in regard to the field-
centered mode of investigation. This symbolic struggle of demarcation 
and definition is principally prevalent in intellectual fields: 
In fact, one of the major issues at stake in the struggles that occur 
in the literary or artistic field is the definition of the limits of the field, 
that is, of legitimate participation in the struggles. Saying of this or 
that tendency in writing that ‘it just isn’t poetry’ or ‘literature’ means 
refusing it a legitimate existence, excluding it from the game, 
excommunicating it. This symbolic exclusion is merely the reverse 
of the effort to impose a definition of legitimate practice, to 
constitute, for instance, as an eternal and universal essence a 
historical definition of an art or a genre corresponding to the 
specific interests of those who hold a certain specific capital 
(Bourdieu, 1990a, 143-144).    
For that reason, Bourdieu (1990a) warns us to be wary of the positivist 
vision, which for the needs of statistics arbitrarily determines who the real 
intellectual is and who is not, or what the real essence of the intellectual 
is (p. 143). In that vein, one of the central findings of my field study is that 
social actors of the think tank universe have different perceptions on both 
the think tank and the intellectual. The crucial point is that almost all of 
my interviewees, though in different degrees, was part of the symbolic 
struggle over what it truly means to be an intellectual or what a true think 
tanks is. Similar to the symbolic exclusion imposing the legitimate 
practice of novel or poetry in the literary field, the think tank space also 
tends to have its symbolic mechanism of exclusion enforcing its 
habitants, for example, to writing a policy paper in accordance with 
legitimate procedures of policy knowledge production prevailing in the 
field. 
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Another point is that the field analysis approach also provides us a 
relatively non-normative understanding of social order by comparison 
with widespread yet facile divisions such as state-civil society-market. In 
addition to its inadequate explanatory power to construe the complexity 
and intertwinement of social spheres36, one of the shortcomings of this 
tripartite distinction, as I have pointed out above, is its conceptual 
baggage laden with normative presuppositions concerning the socio-
historical trajectories of non-Occidental societies. I contend that the field 
theory provides a more operational and flexible tool set which could be 
employed in different national traditions and socio-historical experiences 
without falling into the pitfall of normativity. As Bourdieu indicates, “each 
national social space has its specific structure” (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 726) 
and therefore the researcher should construct a field by considering the 
specific history of his country.37 
Last but not least, field analysis as topological approach as I indicated 
above enables us to surpass the deficiencies of typological 
understanding of think tanks.38 The mainstream scientific studies on think 
tanks, whether done in the Anglo-American world or Turkey, have tended 
to describe think tanks by developing typologies. Weaver (1989), for 
instance, in his well-recognized article, separated think tanks into three 
distinct types: “university without students” (the most academic and 
scholarly think tanks), “contract research organizations” (the most 
bureaucratic and consulting think tanks), and “advocacy tanks” (the most 
                                                                 
36 By indicating the complexity of social reality, I refer to a cardinal rigour of social 
sciences and particularly sociology. “The peculiar difficulty of sociology”, Wacquant 
writes, “is to produce a precise science of an imprecise, fuzzy, wooly reality. For this it 
is better that its concepts to be polymorphic, supple, and adaptable, rather than defined,  
calibrated, and used rigidly”. (Wacquant, 1992, p. 23).  
 
37 However, it should be noted that despite all of his epistemological vigilance and 
methodological sophistication prioritazing analytical concepts over normative terms, 
Bourdieu still espouses a normative position when he sees the autonomy of the fields  
of cultural prodcution as a positive signal. See particularly Bourdieu 1991a. This is most 
evident when he defends the autonomy of intellectuals against the penetration of the 
money and political influence into the field of cultural production. From my standpoint,  
Bourdieu’s minimalist normative position-taking in defence of the autonomy of the fields  
is ultimately compatible with or logical outcome of his methodological approach.      
 
38 For a discussion on the topological representations versus typological representations 
of think tanks, see Medvetz (2012a), p. 132-137.   
42 
 
ideological and politically-engaged think tanks). McGann (2007, p. 11-
12), replaces this early typology based on academics, advisors, and 
advocates with a new trilateral typology: “traditional think tanks” 
concentrating on scholarly policy research, “think-and-do tanks” 
conducting policy research and public outreach, and “do tanks” focusing 
on the repacking and disseminating of other think tanks’ productions. 
Moreover, he classifies think tanks according to their types of affiliation, 
organizational structure and culture, and philosophical and political 
orientation. For instance, he distinguishes four specific types of affiliation 
for think tanks: party-affiliated, government sponsored, private or for-
profit, and university based. In one of his earlier articles, he had 
distinguished not four but six different types of affiliation including the 
“quasi-governmental” and “quasi-independent” (McGann, 2002, p. 15).39 
In his study on Turkish think tanks, Aydın (2006, p. 115) adapts 
McGann’s latter typology of affiliation by replacing the type of “quasi-
governmental” with the “the branch offices of foreign think tanks”.  
This typology and all other typologies ostensibly seem judicious and 
persuasive. Nevertheless, I would argue that typologies tend to mystify 
as much as they enlighten. First of all, “they force us to establish arbitrary 
lines of separation among think tanks” (Medvetz, 2012a). Indeed, in spite 
of the whole diversification, it is almost impossible to find a think tank that 
can be associated with only one type. For example, a think tanks does 
not overtly pertain to just a particular or distinct type, but rather adhere 
mostly to more than one type. If we take the Turkish experience of think 
tanks into account, we could see that Weaver’s renowned triple typology 
does not work well. This is because; a clear majority of think tanks in 
Turkey tend to heavily rely on academics as researchers. Furthermore, 
one can easily measure that many of these academics at the same time 
belong to the academic field as full-time and part-time faculty members, 
                                                                 
39 It can be noted that McGann uses the category of “autonomous and independent” 
instead of the category of “private and for profit” in the same article.  Moreover, he claims 
that his typology captures the full range of think tanks all over the world; however, think 
tanks outside the United States generally are not as not autonomous as their American 
counterparts be (McGann, 2002, p. 15-16).     
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or graduate and doctoral students. This basic empirical fact suffices to 
destabilize the boundaries between the category of “university without 
students” and the other two categories.40  
More than that, some think tanks operate both as an academic 
organization (university without students) and political or ideological 
(advocacy tanks) one at the same time. I would like to ensample this case 
by referring to a particular think tank; the Foundation for Political, 
Economic and Social Research (Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum 
Araştırmaları Vakfı, SETA). As a research-based institution, SETA 
declares in its mission statement that it pursues “international scholarly 
standards” in its knowledge production processes (SETA Foundation, 
2012). When compared to its counterparts in Turkey, SETA employs and 
mobilizes a relatively large group of academic researchers and experts 
from different disciplines and exuberantly produces policy papers to 
which SETA owes much of its prestige.  
However, this is only one face of Janus. On the other hand, it can be said 
that SETA also operates like an “advocacy tank” by performing an 
ideological function or intervening for the political agenda for the benefit 
of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) 
which has been in power since 2002. For that reason, SETA has been 
castigated by opponents of the AKP as being a partisan and propagandist 
think tank recently. In the past months, a columnist accused SETA of 
blurring “the line between independent thinking/analytical research and 
government advocacy ... to the point of almost being indistinguishable” 
(Bozkurt, 2013).41 A pluralist also may charge SETA with producing ideas 
and knowledge based on political and ideological positioning, rather than 
neutral standing. However, I would disagree. As opposed to pluralists’  
Pollyanna tenet of neutrality, I claim that taking a political position or 
being implicitly or explicitly proximate to a political party, an interest group 
                                                                 
40 For educational backgrounds of expert staff at seven major think tanks, see Appendix. 
 
41 On the following day, SETA made a statement to the press on its website and label led 
the allegations within this newspaper article as “black propaganda” against itsel f. See, 
http://setav.org/tr/seta-hedef-yapilmak-isteniyor/haber/14266 
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or an ideology is not an exception, but rather a norm for think tanks in 
Turkey. As Hatem Ete, the coordinator of Political Research at SETA, 
indicates, think tanks already produce knowledge from a political position: 
We have a position. When we write a text, we propound how we 
see an event from our perspective. We do not avoid this. ... The 
fact that our texts are related to a position does not irritate anyone. 
After all, if it is a think tank, it is supposed to have a position (author 
interview, January 6, 2014). 
To put it another way, SETA like many other think tanks is a polymorphic 
organization which is trying to perform more than one function at the 
same time. On the one hand, it is true that SETA produces relatively 
eligible resources that make it influential in the policy-making processes; 
on the other hand, it appears, in any case, as an apologist of 
governmental actions. Against the reductionist inclinations of typologies 
rendering think tanks with one static function or property and drawing 
clear-cut lines between different types, I assert that think tanks in Turkey 
can be treated as characteristically mixed blood, multi-functional, and 
dynamic organizational unities that could not be adequately grasped by 
these typologies. If we think by Weaver’s typology, we cannot really 
comprehend this bi-dimensional, even multi-dimensional, peculiarity of 
Turkish think tanks. This is because, both of these functions, despite an 
on-going tension between them, are constitutive elements of think tanks’ 
identities and in the absence of any of them we can unwittingly miss the 
whole story.   
Weaver’s normative typology, as can be seen, does not fit in with the 
Turkish experience in relation to the discourse on think tanks. What about 
the others? McGann’s typology, as noticed above, is a representative of 
a widespread trend in identifying the differences between think tanks in 
terms of their external connections. A think tank can be a party-affiliated, 
a government sponsored, a private, or a university based organization 
and so on. There are, of course, some think tanks in Turkey coinciding 
more or less with one of these types. Nevertheless, the crucial point is 
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that think tanks in Turkey have been deprived from properly arranged 
legal characteristics such as a charitable status (the UK) or a tax-exempt 
status (the US). This deprivation, to a large extent, makes intelligible the 
organizational diversity within the think tank world. To put it differently, 
the constitution and development of a think tank in Turkey may not be a 
product of intentional and rational calculation of its founders, but rather 
be the result of agents’ strategic42 responses to the structural restrictions 
(such as legal regulations) of the field. Therefore, a think tank can change 
its mode of organization over time. The following passage concisely 
encapsulates this point:          
In the absence of clear legal regulations for civil society 
organizations like think-tanks, the statues of think tanks launched 
by universities are subject to university regulations. Think tanks 
outside the university structure or official regulations are generally 
organized as foundations, associations or commercial 
enterprises. … A think tank may be established as an association 
if it decides to operate on a non-profit basis. This option exempts 
the think tank from tax obligations and financial regulations. … 
Foreign institutions are primarily organized as associations, and 
the number of representative branches of foreign think tanks has 
increased. The advantage of association status is the relative 
ease of establishment and the freedom of organizational structure. 
… Regardless of the limitations of foundation status, think tanks 
which operate as part of other extensive foundations or have 
additional aims such as the establishment of universities prefer 
this kind of status. Additionally, if the government accepts a 
foundation as a public interest institution, it can receive tax-
deductible donations (Aras & Toktaş, 2012, p. 255-256). 
                                                                 
42 I use the term “strategy” here in the Bourdieusian sense. Bourdieu deploys the term 
to stress the interest-oriented character of human action aiming at maximizing symbolic 
or material benefit. However, as distinct from subjectivist forms of theory of action such 
as rational choice theory conceptualizing the concept of strategy as intended pursuit of 
targets based on rational calculation and conscious choice of individual actors, Bourdie u 
understands strategies as improvisational conducts, stemming mostly from agents’ 
practical sense, which enables them to cope with unforeseen and changing situations.    
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Consequently, my analytical strategy is clearly derived from the 
conceptual toolbox of Pierre Bourdieu. I have already spoken of why I 
adopted his field-analytical approach as my central analytical strategy. 
Nevertheless, in this study, I will use his conceptual framework in its most 
extended form. This is because, the empirical case that I selected in fact 
does not precisely conform to the ideal-typical field whose properties 
have been introduced. At the following subpart, I will briefly argue recent 
extensions in the field theory and clarify how these revisions can be 
operationalized in conceptualizing think tanks.         
 
2.4. The Field of Think Tank as a Space between Fields 
The study of intellectuals applying field theory approach has been guided 
by a presupposition that the intellectual production and intervention tend 
to take place within substantially institutionalized and autonomous social 
spheres with well-defined boundaries. As a result of this presupposition, 
Bourdieu, his disciples, and other researchers deploying field analysis 
approach have been disposed to choose relatively institutionalized fields 
as their empirical cases. The academic field, for instance, has empirically 
attracted many scholars; as an highly institutionalized field and strictly 
bounded site in which knowledge producers integrate with formal 
structures such as faculties, departments, academic disciplines, and 
professional associations establishing administrative coordinates of 
intellectual intervention and knowledge production (Bourdieu 1988, 
1996a, Ringer 1992, Kauppi 1996, Sabour 2001). Nonetheless, an 
emerging body of literature on intellectuals and experts have challenged 
this blueprint by focusing upon fields that are relatively less 
institutionalized. 
These studies (Eyal 2002, 2006, 2013, Medvetz 2012a, 2012b, 
Stampnitzky 2011, 2013, Panofsky 2011, Vauchez 2008, 2011, Mudge & 
Vauchez 2012, Jacobs & Townsley 2011 to name a few) have centered 
upon so-called “weak”, “interstitial”, “liminal”, “lesser”, or “in-between” 
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fields of intellectual and knowledge production with permeable and 
porous boundaries making them susceptible to external intervention and 
influence, in contradistinction to the conventional applications of field 
theory constructing fields as separate and highly autonomous arenas of 
action with specific norms, defined boundaries, and distinct logic and 
resources distinguishing them from other fields. Interstitial fields 
represents ill-bounded and intersectional spaces of “oriented between 
and towards multiple arenas of knowledge production, consumption, and 
legitimation, including academia, the media, and the state” (Stampnitzky, 
2011, p. 3). In my point of view, these new lines of inquiry finds its most 
mature expression in Gil Eyal’s conceptualization of the “spaces between 
fields”. Therefore, I will lay stress on this concept below in lieu of providing 
a complete discussion of the literature.43         
Gil Eyal’s idea of “spaces between fields” (Eyal, 2013) suggests a 
theoretical revision and extension to Bourdieu’s approach by 
problematizing the conventional reading of field theory and entering it into 
a generative dialogue with the Latourian actor-network theory. In fact, this 
offer is a product of an empirical problem he confronted when studying 
on the history of Orientalist expertise in Arab affairs in Israel. In his socio-
historical analysis, Eyal (2006) finds out that the position of research 
institutes in the network of intelligence expertise, where Middle Eastern 
studies and military intelligence intercept and blend, destabilizes the 
boundaries between the academic field, the bureaucratic field, the media, 
and the other states.44 This positional peculiarity of research institutes 
                                                                 
43 It is worthy of note that those who contribute to the revision of the field analysis are 
scholars operating in the sociology of professions and expertise as well as the sociology 
of intellectuals. Especially the sociology of professions is where the concepts of “field” 
and “ecology”, in Andrew Abbott’s sense of term, can enter into a fru itful dialogue.  
Indeed, the concept of ecology, which refers to an intermediate social structure in which 
a particular individual action takes place (Abbott 2005a, 2005b), has strong affinities  
with the field notion. As analytical constructions and heurist ic instruments, both they 
assist researchers to represent the social world with regard to a topological way of 
thinking. Even, some scholars from this area of study, such as Mudge and Vauchez 
(2012), compounds insights from the “linked ecologies” model of Andrew Abbott (2005a) 
with the Bourdieusian field analysis to handle less institutionalized forms of professions 
and expertise.       
 
44 Actually, I will not summarize the whole findings or arguments of Eyal’s work to the 
aims of my discussion here. For details, see Eyal 2002, 2006, and 2013. 
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brings the problem of distinction and boundaries between fields into 
question. The question is that: If the research institutes are sites “where 
multiple resources, financial, academic, administrative, and social 
connections, are accumulated and converted into political influence, 
academic power, and even high-level political appointments” (Eyal, 2013, 
p. 171), how and where can one specify the location of them in the social 
space through the lenses of field theory?      
This is why he needs the concept of space between fields, an interstitial 
and hybrid field-like space with its own modality of activity, relational 
reality, valuable resources, and specific logic and history. After all, the 
fact that field is not a concrete entity, an essence, or a thing but a notion, 
a heuristic hypothesis (Eyal, 2013, p. 162) and a metaphor to discover 
and represent the social universe so that it is a futile endeavor to reify it 
in a Durkheimian sense.  Bourdieu himself, as I indicated above, spoken 
of and analyzed analytically distinct and autonomous spheres such as 
the religious field, the literary field, the economic field; however, he did 
not say much on relations between fields apart from the degree of 
autonomy of a particular field. The concept of autonomy, as Eyal justly 
implies, refers to actors’ orientations but says very little concerning how 
to describe the modality of their activities (Eyal, 2013, p. 160-161). Table 
2.1 summarizes the differences to be discussed below: 
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Table 2.1: Dimensions of the contrast between the conventional concept of the 
field and its revised version 
 The Conventional 
Concept of the 
Field 
Revised Version 
of the Concept of 
Field 
Structuring mature, well-
established  
immature, weak 
Location separate, distinct, 
bounded, relatively 
isolated sites 
intermediate, 
interstitial, 
intersectional, 
liminal, in-between 
domains 
Degree of 
Institutionalization 
more 
institutionalized 
 
less 
institutionalized 
 
Degree of 
Autonomy 
more autonomous less autonomous, 
more 
heteronomous 
Boundaries well-defined permeable, 
porous 
Response to 
External 
Interventions 
refraction reflection 
Resources field-specific forms 
of capital 
various forms of 
capital originally 
belonging to 
adjacent fields 
Unit of Analysis fields spaces between 
fields 
Mode of 
Relationality 
analysis of the 
structure of 
relations between 
intra-field agents  
  
analysis of the 
relations between 
fields themselves 
 
 
 
This line of argument putting emphasis on the modality of activities 
alongside the orientations of actors can help us to better grasp the 
repertoire of action of a “think tanker”. In fact, during my study, I have 
been preoccupied with how to describe the action of a think tank-affiliated 
social actor: Are their activities political, academic, or journalistic? For the 
most part, a typical think tank-affiliated intellectual in Turkey combines 
these three modalities of action within his identity. To illustrate this point, 
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let me provide an example of Fuat Keyman, the director of the Istanbul 
Policy Center, who can be considered as a salient representative of this 
type. He is one of the reputable and foremost political scientists and 
experts on international relations, democratization, globalization, and civil 
society in Turkey. As a professor, he is teaching at universities and 
publishing academic articles and books as is expected. Besides, these 
activities that can be classified as purely academic, he also regularly 
writes columns in op-ed pages of newspapers. Keyman also frequently 
appears in diverse television discussion programs to comment on actual 
socio-political problems and advancements. In addition to his academic 
and journalistic activities, he directs a prestigious think tank in Turkey 
along with taking place in the field of think tanks as a member of peer 
review (BİLGESAM’s Journal of Bilge Strateji) and academic boards 
(USAK Academic Council) of various think tanks in Turkey. As Keyman 
himself says, he can be safely characterized as a “hybrid intellectual” 
(author interview, February 17, 2014).45  
Keyman’s statement about himself is a generative starting point to 
understand the matter. This hybridity and multi-dimensionality that 
Keyman speaks out does not pertain to only intellectuals, but also think 
tanks as organizational bodies. I have already stressed this point above 
specifically to SETA operating partly as a scholarly research center and 
partly as an advocacy organization. Some think tanks also partly operate 
like a consulting firm, an activist organization or a technocratic group and 
so forth.  
Herein, one can object to my argument by arguing that think tanks, in the 
last instance, are policy research organizations conducting policy-
relevant research and disseminating policy-relevant ideas and they 
should be evaluated as members of the political field46, trying to affect 
                                                                 
45 Considering Turkish intellectual history, it can be claimed that think tank-affiliated 
intellectuals with their dispositional hybridity that Keyman indicates – part academics, 
part journalist and TV commentators, part advisor, part exponent and so on – constitute 
the most hybrid intellectual group ever seen in Turkish intellectual history.   
 
46 Bourdieu defines the political field as the domain of struggles in which political agents 
and institutions produce political products, programmes, analyses, and commentaries  
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policy-making processes. This suggestion, which is actually embraced by 
many of the scholars studying think tanks, at first glance seems 
reasonable. After all, to anyone somewhat familiar with think tanks, it is 
obvious that almost all of these organizations try to find a way of access 
– formal or informal – to politicians, bureaucrats, party executives, and 
governmental agencies in order to have an effect on policy processes. 
Yet, this fact alone does not suffice to conceptualize think tanks as 
habitants of the political or bureaucratic fields. In fact, many think tanks 
in Turkey also pay attention to avoid some modes of access to the 
political and bureaucratic fields such as establishing “too much political 
access, or in any case, access of the wrong form” (Medvetz, 2012b, p. 
121). For instance, Keyman emphasizes that being proximate to a certain 
political party leads think tanks to suffer from a legitimacy problem (author 
interview, February 17, 2014). In order not to confront such a legitimacy 
problem, many Turkish think tanks strategically abstain from establishing 
close links with a single party or at least rhetorically declare that they are 
equally distant to every political party, ideological positions or identities.   
Consequently, think tanks, in general, have to deal with a complex and 
“dynamic balancing act” (Medvetz, 2012b, p. 122) oscillating between 
engagement and closure or involvement and detachment from the 
politics, the state, academia, the media, and the market. Think tanks, 
therefore, can be situated at the crossroads or the space between fields 
of these more established spheres of action as Medvetz (2012a) already 
did in his Bourdieusian study on American think tanks: 
 
      
 
 
                                                                 
to suggest “the production of politically effective and legitimate forms of perception and 
expression” (1991b, p. 173).     
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                                                                                                EC: Economic Capital 
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Figure 2.1: The space of think tanks. Partially adapted from Medvetz (2012a, 
p. 39) 
   
As Medvetz’s diagram47 suggests, think tanks constitutes an intersititial 
field which is a relatively bounded social space with its anchoring fields 
yet also relatively autonomous with its own norms, hierarchies, history, 
and dynamic. This hybrid and liminal space is a site where several forms 
of capital such as political, economic, cultural, and journalistic – I will 
elaborate this point later – are gathered and balanced by policy 
researchers. To put it more explicitly, the field of think tanks can be 
thought as a “hybrid subspace of knowledge production” (Medvetz, 
2012a, p. 42) which is located in the social space where the academia, 
journalism, market, and politics meet. Therefore, the field of think tanks 
as a sphere where a particular form of knowledge that can be called as 
policy knowledge are produced and disseminated has certain 
consequences for intellectuals, who dwell in or traverse this field. The 
field of think tanks tends to impose its own logic of the intellectual 
                                                                 
47 It should be noted that Medvetz offers this diagram not as a general theory of think 
tanks in itself, but a heuristic hypothesis to construct the think tank space as a 
sociological object.     
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production to its inhabitants and demands obedience from them to the 
rules of the game. This is why the analysis of think tanks is actually the 
socio-analysis of intellectuals.         
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CHAPTER 3 
THE GENESIS OF THINK TANKS IN TURKEY 
 
The previous chapter propounded some major predicaments that any 
researcher can face in studying think tanks and offered a way out via the 
instrument of the Bourdieusian methodological approach. The purpose of 
this chapter is to present a historical overview of the genesis of think 
tanks in Turkey.48 My main thesis is that the Turkish think tank field was 
formed and gained its field-like properties in the 1990s, even though the 
prototypes of these organizations dates back to the early 1960s. In this 
chapter, rather than focusing on the organizations themselves – and the 
question of what the first think tank in Turkey was which is highly 
contested and also futile for my aim here – I will try to demonstrate how 
the formation of think tanks are the offspring of the mutual relationships 
between economic, cultural, and the political-bureaucratic elite groups of 
Turkey. I also should add that my analysis here would largely rest on 
secondary literature and data due to the limitedness of archival records 
and organizational histories of the early think tanks. On this basis, I will 
attempt to develop a historical baseline for the understanding of the 
genesis and development of think tanks in Turkey on the following pages. 
 
3.1. Think Tanks in the Making: An Attempt for Explanation 
The historical roots of Turkish think tanks lie in the early 1960s and its 
cardinal socio-political and economic transformations. The most 
substantial of these was the transition to a planned economy with the 
                                                                 
48 I owe the concept of the “genesis” of a field to Gorski (2013). See his seminal article 
on Bourdieusian theory and socio-historical research in which he discusses different  
forms of field change along with how and through which mechanisms fields emerge and 
crystallize.  
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purpose of quick industrialization mainly based on the inward oriented 
model after the 1960 coup d’etat. For that reason, focusing on the 1960 
coup as a constituent moment can shed light on the story of initiation of 
think tanks in Turkey.  
The 1960 coup that puts end to the ten-year period of the Democrat Party 
(DP) rule can be understood as the movement of a politically and 
historically autonomous faction of the state, i.e., the Turkish Armed 
Forces, against the government. The military coup was implicitly 
supported by a large segment of the intelligentsia, university students, 
and bureaucrats who were, as Keyder (1979, p. 25) points out, bearers 
of a secular and etatist ideology whose origins could be found in the 
Committee of Union and Progress and the Republican People’s Party’s 
authoritarian conception of social change. On the following day of the 
coup, the military officers, more precisely the members of the self-
proclaimed National Unity Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi, MBK), 
summoned five law professors including the rector Sıddık Sami Onar 
from the University of Istanbul to Ankara for preparing the new 
constitution. These professors instantly issued the first declaration of the 
Constitutional Committee, which resembles to “a modern-day fetva” 
(Zürcher, 2004 p. 242), justifying the military intervention by describing it 
not as an ordinary political coup d’etat, but as a revolution:  
It is not right to regard the situation in which we find ourselves 
today as an ordinary political coup d’etat. The political power 
which should represent the conception of the State, law, justice, 
morality, public interest and public service and should protect 
public interests had for months, even years, lost his character, 
and had become a material force representing personal power 
and ambition and class interests (as cited in Ahmad, 1977, p. 
162). 
As it can be deduced from the declaration written by the pro-coup 
professors, the DP had become a spokesman of class interests in the 
eyes of the military officers. Preferring liberal economy policies eliciting 
56 
 
savage capital accumulation and unfair distribution income, the DP 
sheered away from the principles of planned economy that had been 
implemented in Turkey up until 1950s. For that reason, in the new 
constitution prepared by the appointed committee of allied university 
professors in 1961, legislators paid strict attention to “lay the foundations 
of a ‘social democratic’ balance” (Keyder, 1979, p. 26) within society and 
to steer the capitalist economy to a planned and coordinated 
development route. To this end, the new constitution provided a 
constitutional basis for the State Planning Office (Devlet Planlama 
Teşkilatı, DPT), which was equipped with broad authorities in the fields 
of economic planning as well as social and cultural development (see 
article 129 of the 1961 Constitution). 
With the establishment of the DPT, the country’s post-coup economic 
trajectory apparently was taking a new form as Boratav (2007, p. 117-
118) indicates that this period in which economic policies rested on a five-
year progress plan varies from the former periods of the Republic. 
Indeed, pro-coup bureaucrats and intellectuals’ anti-populist 
developmentalist ideology, which “extolled the role to be played by a 
technocratic elite in the industrialization of the country” (Keyder, 1987, p. 
146), seemed to find its expression in the foundation of the DPT.            
To sum up, the 1960 coup made way for transition to a mixed economy 
based on development through interventionist and planned 
industrialization. On a macro-structural level, this transformation can be 
interpreted as the “precocious success of the industrial bourgeoisie in 
carrying out its project” (Keyder, 1987, p. 146) which was actualized with 
the help of a large segment of the bureaucrats, military officers and 
intellectuals.  
As I indicated during the inception of this chapter, the early think tanks in 
Turkey come into the picture at that moment as a consequence of the 
historical cooperation between certain segments of the capitalist class, 
intelligentsia and political-bureaucratic elites. That is to say, the pioneer 
Turkish think tanks were organizational embodiments of the cooperation 
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between the growing industrial class and the technocratic fractions of the 
intelligentsia and bureaucracy. Yet, I should stress that in this 
cooperation between capitalists and intellectual producers, these actors 
were in a vertical relationship, rather than a horizontal one. The growing 
industrial fraction of the capitalist class needed an intellectual organ to 
intervene in the political and bureaucratic fields on behalf of its policy 
choices in the circumstances of a planned developmental episode. This 
intellectual organ could have come into the existence only with the 
availability of a group of intellectuals who would prioritize the interests of 
their funders in their production without seeking too much autonomy from 
economic and political constraints. For that reason, their coalition was 
built on a hierarchical relationship instead of an equal one. We can 
comfortably claim that the genesis of think tanks in Turkey cannot be 
adequately explained without ignoring this collaboration amongst Turkish 
elite groups.  
My explanation concerning the derivation of think tanks in Turkey 
converges on the basic assumptions of the elite theory tradition, which 
was presented in this study – and in most of the other studies in the area 
- as one of the two main perspectives on think tanks together with the 
pluralist approach. The elite theory, as Medvetz (2012a, p. 52-53) argues, 
takes the primacy of “class relations” and “class interests” as a basis in 
order to explain the origins of think tanks and saw them as elite 
organizations in terms of their makeup. Nevertheless, my argumentation 
differs from the elite theory in some respects. Above all, the elite theorists 
tend to underestimate and subordinate the role of intellectuals vis-a-vis 
other segments of the elite by describing them as simple “intellectual 
machineries” or “lobby-like” organizations of a powerful elite network.49 
In my analysis, intellectuals are not “docile bodies” at the service of the 
economic elite of Turkey, more precisely of the industrial bourgeoisie, but 
significant actors of a power struggle in society as cultural elites. Although 
                                                                 
49 For example, C. W. Mills, in his classical work The Power Elite, distinguishes three 
groups of power elite - the military, corporate, and, political elite – and does not attach 
too much importance to the cultural elite. 
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their cultural capital were a lesser valuable kind of power in comparison 
with the capitalists’ ever increasing economic capital, think tanks could 
not come into existence in the absence of the voluntary partnership of 
scientists, academics, economic planners, engineers, journalists, and 
other experts. In this respect, their position at that moment can be best 
recapitulated with Bourdieu’s proverbial phrase: they were “a dominated 
fraction of the dominant class” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 145).  
Furthermore, the elite theory, by and large, put the accord, collaboration, 
and partnership between different elite segments forward. By depicting 
elite subgroups as firmly “interlocked” parts of the single ruling class, this 
perspective excludes intra-elite struggles and conflicts from the analysis. 
Unlike the elite theorists, I do not wish to trivialize the importance of the 
intra-class and intra-elite contentions theoretically; however, with respect 
to the scope of my study, I will not address them here. In fact, the period 
witnessed numerous disagreements and conflicts amongst capitalists, 
bureaucrats, politicians, and, intellectuals: contentions between the 
moderate and immoderate wings of the MBK, the supporters of private 
industry and the fervent etatists, the industrialists and the landowners, 
the CHP and the AP and so on.  
I should add that my explanation also varies from the pluralists’  
arguments. As I indicated above, the pluralist theorists are apt to see 
think tanks as independent civil society organizations, their proliferation 
could be explicable with factors such as civil society voluntarism, political 
and philanthropic culture, governmental reforms, and constitutional 
changes (Stone & Garnett, 1998, p. 6). Especially the last factor, e.g., the 
constitutional change, has been highly acclaimed and used by a great 
majority of Turkish scholars to clarify the emergence of the earliest think 
tanks in Turkey (for instance, Güvenç 2006, Aydın 2006, Bağcı & Aydın 
2009, and Aras, Toktaş, & Kurt 2010). These studies claim that the 
adoption of the 1961 Constitution after the 1960 coup d’etat, paved the 
way for the establishment of the first think tanks by extending the realm 
of freedom such as freedom of thought and freedom of association 
encouraging citizens to set up research organizations apart from the 
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government. Beyond any doubt, the 1961 Constitution created the legal 
infrastructure of these organizations with its relatively liberal articles. 
Nevertheless, this does not suffice to treat the constitutional change 
argument as the root cause for the proliferation of think tanks as many 
scholars did. For, law, or more directly constitution-making process, in 
post-coup Turkey can be evaluated as expressions of social power 
relations of that time. My argument concerning law prima facie may seem 
to come closer to the approach of what Bourdieu called “instrumentalist 
view of law” conceiving law as direct reflections of existing power 
relations in which the interests of dominant groups are uttered, as Louis 
Althusser exemplifies this perspective with his theory of the apparatus 
(Bourdieu, 1987, p. 814). What I would like to emphasize is that the 
juridical field becomes more vulnerable to the social constraints and 
pressures in the moments of military coups in which the usual functioning 
of the legal order are suspended. That is what was exactly realized after 
the 1960 military coup in Turkey where the constitutional committee 
which was going to prepare the constitution was appointed by the 
sovereign junta, the MBK, and not allowed too much room to freely 
determine the constitution from the demands of the military 
administration. For that reason, on one hand, the 1961 coup broadened 
the scope of fundamental rights and liberties as perpetually depicted by 
commentators, it constructed many tutelage institutions narrowing the 
area of democratic parliamentary system on the other.                                                  
After this theoretical excursus revealing the parallelisms and 
discrepancies between my study and the existing literature, I can directly 
focus on some of the early think tanks founded in 1960s in the following 
section. It is not surprising to see that almost all of the earliest think tanks 
were concerned with the macroeconomic policies, or more directly the 
goal of development through industrialization, of the country. Needless 
to say, they were all established and funded by industrial capitalists of 
the time. The major think tanks of that term were The Economic and 
Social Studies Conference Board (Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler 
Konferans Heyeti), the Economic Research Foundation (İktisadi 
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Araştırmalar Vakfı, IAV), The Foundation for Economic Development 
(İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı, IKV), and the Economic and Social Researches 
Center (Ekonomik ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Merkezi, ESAM).  
 
3.2. A Brief History of the Proto-Field, 1961-1993 
The Economic and Social Studies Conference Board (hereafter The 
Conference Board) could be considered as the precursor of think tanks 
in Turkey.50 It was founded under the leadership of Nejat Eczacıbaşı, a 
leading progressive capitalist of the term, in Istanbul in 1961. In addition 
to Eczacıbaşı holding company itself, The Conference Board was funded 
by both national business community convening in the Istanbul Chamber 
of Commerce (İstanbul Ticaret Odası, İTO) and the Istanbul Chamber of 
Industry (İstanbul Sanayi Odası, İSO) and foreign development aid 
agencies and foundations such as the US Agency for Internationa l 
Development and the Ford Foundation (Aydın, 2006, p. 49). According 
to Eczacıbaşı, the Conference Board was going to mainly try to 
investigate both short run and long run economic and social problems 
aroused out of the development process based on the mixed economy 
(Eczacıbaşı, 1982, p. 149). To this end, the Conference Board conducted 
conferences regarding the heavy economic matters of the term such as 
export-oriented industrialization, import substitution, and foreign trade 
with the participation of globally known figures (Vural, 2013, p. 263).    
More importantly, it was going to endeavour to find out and improve what 
Eczacıbaşı called “the Turkish economic and social reality” (1982, p. 
                                                                 
50 “The Conference Board”, originally the National Industrial Conference Board, was 
actually the name of a business membership and research organization founded in 1916 
in New York by a group of industrialists lead by Magnus W. Alexander, a German-born 
American electrical engineer and designer for the General Electric Company, to provide 
economic and business knowledge for member companies to deal with the issues of 
the time, notably worker’s compensation law, labor strikes, and boycotts.  Nejat  
Eczacıbaşı and Feyyaz Berker, two prominent industrialists of the term, were 
participating in meetings and benefiting from publications of this association to which 
they affiliated. As Berker and Uras (2009, p. 96) points out, the “Turkish” Conference 
Board and the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (Türk  Sanayicileri ve 
İşadamları Derneği, TÜSİAD) indeed saw this association as a role model in designing 
their organizations.      
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150). According to him, this reality could be nothing but a scientific truth. 
Within a strongly articulated discourse of neutrality, the Conference 
Board was launched as a platform over any political and economic tenet 
or ideology in its activities.51 His credence to the authority of science and 
technology52 in resolving the fundamental problems of a new socio-
economic order found its expression in the mode of organizing in the 
Conference Board: 
At those times [the early 1960s] the three important segments of 
society were entirely disconnected with each other. The state had 
not relied on free enterprise; the private sector had been afraid of 
the authority of the state authority; the scientists of our universities 
had lived in seclusion. The Conference Board began to work by 
bringing these three important parts of our society close together. 
The Board of Trustee was going to comprise of fifteen people and 
each section was going to be represented by a third (emphasis 
added; Eczacıbaşı, 1982, p. 150). 
Eczacıbaşı’s understanding of think tanks based on the cooperation 
between the state, the private sector, and the scientists epitomizes my 
explanation that I offered concerning the derivation of think tanks in 
Turkey. Indeed, the Conference Board could be conceived as a “tripartite 
organization” (Buğra, 1994, p. 138) in which bureaucrats (the state), 
industrial capitalists (the private sector), and the intellectuals (the 
scientists) congregate to influence public policy choices and make a 
contribution to the development of a intellectual milieu in support of the 
                                                                 
51 The origin of what I call “the discourse of neutrality” can be seen in the example of 
the Conference Board. Many think tanks, from now on, will pay attention to underline 
their neutrality, objectivity, and independence from any ideology, political party, or 
interest group in their official mission statements.   
 
52 It should be noted that Eczacıbaşı’s rationalist worldview must be derived from his 
scientific experiences in 1930s Germany where he spent his academic career at 
prominent educational institutions of the term. He studied chemistry at Heidelberg 
University, then received his doctoral degree in the same discipline from the University  
of Berlin in 1937. He also conducted post-doctoral researches on hormones and 
vitamins at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute to 1939.    
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business community, in a period in which socialist ideas rapidly gained 
popularity among intellectuals.   
Another example of early think tanks that I would like to address was the 
Economic Research Foundation (İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı, İKV), which 
was established on the initiative of the ITO and the ISO in 1965 in 
Istanbul. Like the Conference Board, the IKV also stood up for the mixed 
economy as a representative of the private sector, both industrial and 
commercial capitalists, that were in need of state assistance for 
accumulating economic capital. In the terms of political economy, the 
whole activity of the Conference Board and the Economic Research 
Foundation may be subsumed under two clusters: Reports and 
conferences, aiming to guarantee capital accumulation, regarding the 
import substitution industrialization policies and that expressing the 
blossoming inner capitalists’ need for foreign currency (Tezcek, 2011, p. 
132).53  
In addition to the transition to the mixed economy, there was also a more 
specific reason pushing the holders of economic capital to set up such a 
machine of intellectual production. This was the Ankara Agreement, 
which concluded in 1963 with the intent of inaugurating the process of 
accession of Turkey into the European Economic Community (EEC). The 
Ankara Agreement was the precipitating incident of Turkey’s on-going 
affair of full integration to the European Union. The Agreement created 
the need for the production of what can be called as a kind of know-how, 
a specialized knowledge that would provide the technical infrastructure 
to the integration of economic and commercial policy that the EEC saw 
as requisite. As Güvenç points out, from 1967, a time the IKV actively 
started works, to 1980s, it produced numerous reports – almost 80% of 
all publications on the subject of the EEC in Turkey – on technical 
                                                                 
53 In this chapter, I aim to analyze the social relations giving birth to think tanks by 
wittingly leaving the content or discourse analysis of think tanks’ intellectual outputs 
such as reports, conference papers, journals, and policy briefs out of my scope. For a 
detailed analysis of the IKV’s reports since its foundation to the present, see Tezcek, 
2011, p. 139-215.  
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dimensions, not political or cultural ones, of the relationship between the 
Turkey and the EEC (2006, p. 162).54  
The activities of the IKV was not limited to conducting research that the 
capitalists need to convey their policy preferences to the political and 
bureaucratic fields or carrying out studies that the EEC-Turkey 
relationship requires. This early-established think tank was also 
operating as a lobby-like organization in Europe, especially in Brussels, 
on behalf of the industrial and commercial chambers. Unlike any other 
early think tank operating in 1960s, the IKV acted as an influential part in 
Turkey’s external affairs by conducting diplomatic contact with the 
European Economic Community organizations particularly regarding 
economic issues. Güvenç indicates that the IKV was conceived by the 
traditional actors of Turkish foreign policy not as a rival but as a 
supportive and complementary element due to its close link with the 
rightist governments based on mainly the technocratic discourse of 
“public interest” (2006, p. 162). Therefore, the IKV found a chance to 
function abroad under cover of the state even though policy experts 
operate outside the formal boundary of the state. On the other hand, it 
was seen that the ex-bureaucrats and diplomats such as the DPT-
affiliated planners or ambassadors had worked in the IKV in 1960s in 
particular.   
The Economic and Social Researches Center (Ekonomik ve Sosyal 
Araştırmalar Merkezi, ESAM) can be considered as an organization 
worth mentioning even though it has been ostracized from the better part 
of the studies on Turkish think tanks. The ESAM was established by a 
group of technocrats, entrepreneurs, and politicians in 1969 in Ankara. 
Although he did not officially take part in the founders’ committee of the 
association, Necmettin Erbakan, the secretary general of the TOBB at 
that point, is said to be the real founder of the ESAM. Within the same 
                                                                 
54 For the whole list of reports and other publications produced by the IKV, see 
http://www.ikv.org.tr/ikv.asp?ust_id=70&id=208. After drawing several reports bringing 
diverse planning experiments forward, the IKV shifted its helm towards producing more 
technical knowledge that Turkey-EEC relations elicited.     
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year, Erbakan was going to be elected as an independent member of 
parliament from Konya after his nomination from the AP had been 
rejected by Süleyman Demirel, the chairperson of the party. In the 
following year, Erbakan founded the National Order Party (Milli Nizam 
Partisi, MNP), which was the first political party that adopted the ideology 
of the National Viewpoint Movement (Milli Görüş Hareketi). Therefore, we 
should initially cast an eye over the socio-economic imagery of early 
Erbakan activity to be able to understand the ESAM’s place in the history 
of Turkish think tanks. 
Erbakan was an outstanding mechanical engineer who completed his 
PhD at Aachen University in Germany in the early 1950s. After finishing 
his doctoral training, he had a chance to closely observe the functioning 
of the German motor industry by working for a while at the Deutz Motor, 
a major engine manufacturer of the time. He was greatly impressed from 
the post-war German development experiment based on heavy industry. 
According to him, there was nothing but qualified and experienced man-
power in the post-World War II Germany (Erbakan, 1974, p. 103). Exactly 
like Germany, Turkey could develop and become industrialized through 
its own means. For that reason, Erbakan firmly believed that for Turkey 
to become fully independent it had to complete its autarchic 
industrialization reposing on manufacturing industry, or in the words of 
Erbakan, “machinery-generating machinery industry” (1974, p. 97), in 
place of assembly industry.  
On the other hand, Erbakan also attached great importance to moral 
development targeting to raise Islamic awareness in Turkish society. It 
was considered as vital as economic and techno-scientific development 
so that from the outset of the MNP program, the party set “synthesizing 
moral and material development in a felicitous and circumspect way” 
(article 3) as its essential goal. The ESAM, in tandem with the party, was 
going to operate like a research and development center to realize these 
aims regardless of whether the party in power or not.  
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Let me elaborate some differences and similarities between the ESAM 
and the other think tanks that I referred to here. Just like its analogous 
organizational bodies of the period, the ESAM also believed that the 
production and application of the technical knowledge might both 
accelerate industrialization and be a remedy in solving the fundamental 
problems of it. Furthermore, it could be claimed that the ESAM 
outstripped other think tanks in championing planned development with 
its passionate discourse of “heavy industry” that resonated during the 
1970s. However, unlike its fellow think tanks that I addressed here, the 
ESAM was reluctant to deploy what I call the discourse of neutrali ty 
underlining the independence from an ideology, political party, or interest 
group. On the contrary, this research institute had never strived to cloak 
its close link with the parties of the National Viewpoint Movement.55 Even, 
as a senior official of the institution avers, it was the ESAM that played a 
crucial role in generating and promoting the idea of Milli Görüş as a 
worldview (Ersoy, 2009, p. 230). As distinct from the Conference Board, 
the IAV, and the IKV which were sponsored by Istanbul-centered circles 
of industry and commerce as well as international developmental 
foundations, the ESAM relied upon more modest funds provided by 
mainly provincial entrepreneurs who would be labelled as “Anatolian 
tigers” in 1980s.   
Unlike the founding moment of Turkish think tanks, e.g., the 1960s, the 
following decade is said to represented stagnant years for the 
proliferation of these organizations. Although the former think tanks 
continued to operate, no considerable institution was founded apart from 
the Foreign Policy Institute (Dış Politika Enstitüsü, DPE) in these years. 
This can be heavily ascribed to the fact that the technocratic discourse, 
predicated on the idea of development and modernization by virtue of 
science and technology, that all of the early think tanks had adopted, 
intensely started to be represented by the engineers, the sprawling social 
                                                                 
55 To the present, two presidents, four prime ministers, a good deal of ministers, and 
numerous bureaucrats and mayors had been member of the ESAM (Ersoy, 2009, p. 
226).   
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stratum of this period. As a corollary of the rapid industrialization thrust 
of the post-coup era, the number of technicians and engineers that the 
industrial manufacturing process needs considerably increased. As Göle 
(2008, p. 115) indicates, the number of engineers that had been 15.500 
in 1960 became 17.700 at a rate of a 13,5% increase. Nonetheless, the 
rate of increase between 1965 and 1970 come to the 77,4%, from 17.700 
to 31.400. Approximately the three out of four of these engineers were 
employed in the public sector at that time (Gevgilili, 1973, p. 25).  
Nilüfer Göle’s socio-historical study on the making of the identity and 
ideology of the Turkish engineers can help us in order to grasp the 
rationalist and “technicist” ideas prevailing in 1970s. According to Göle 
(2008), the engineers as a socio-professional elite stratum did not only 
endeavor to ameliorate their vocational circumstances through 
professional associations and syndicates, but also aimed at changing the 
political and economic system of Turkey through the revolutionary 
strategies such as National Democratic Revolution (Milli Demokratik 
Devrim) thesis. Göle contends that Turkish engineers were pursuers of 
Saint-Simon rather than Lenin because of the fact that they were, in 
substance, bearers of an elite group consciousness, based on a social 
model in which the most rational mode of organization that is appropriate 
to the necessities of the industrial production is embraced, under the 
mask of revolutionary vanguardism (2008, p. 185). 
After this short intermission, we can return back to our subject. The DPE 
was built by Seyfi Taşhan, a businessman and journalist with strong 
interests to foreign policy issues, in such a period, 1974, in Ankara. In 
fact, the Journal of “Foreign Policy” (Dış Politika Dergisi) had been 
published, both in Turkish and English, by the same person along with 
Fahir Armaoğlu (a professor of political history), Suat Bilge (a diplomat 
and politician), and Altemur Kılıç (a diplomat and journalist) three years 
ago represents the core of this organization (Güvenç, 2006, p. 163). 
Taşhan says that the main target of the journal was to introduce Turkish 
foreign policy priorities and problems to foreign diplomats and decision 
makers and to illuminate the Turkish public regarding what is going on 
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beyond Turkey’s border (ORSAM, 2013, p. 108). Indeed, the efforts of 
the DPE aiming at the international audience and decision makers 
through publications and diplomatic contacts related to the hot diplomatic 
issues of the term such as the Cyprus question and war, US arms 
embargo against Turkey, and other problems with the Western world 
made it a crucial organization for the Turkish state.56 In addition to these 
activist and didactic concerns, Taşhan’s underlying aim in publishing 
such a journal was to retrieve the foreign policy discussions from 
ideological polarization between the left and the right and to provide not 
political but objective evaluations as to Turkish foreign policy preferences 
(Güvenç, 2006, p. 163). For that reason, it is quite possible to allege that 
the DPE and the Foreign Policy Journal converged on the former think 
tanks by embracing the discourse of neutrality and objectivity in its 
activities of intellectual production.  
However, the DPE differs from its predecessors with its substantial focus 
on a specific area of policy, e.g., the foreign policy as is evident from its 
name. As stated above, passionate attachment for the ideal of economic 
development and concomitant prioritization of the economic policies over 
others were the common denominators of the earliest think tanks such 
as the Conference Board, the IAV, the IKV, and the ESAM. Distinct from 
these organizations, the DPE left economic and developmental issues 
out of its scope and centered upon the diverse aspects and problems of 
Turkish foreign policy. It seems that the DPE attached particular 
importance to fill the void between the bureaucratic and academic sphere 
by banding decision makers of foreign and security policies such as 
diplomats, foreign policy officers as well as retired diplomats and 
generals with academics operating particularly within the discipline of 
international relations together through conferences, panels, and working 
groups. Therefore, along with Karaosmanoğlu and Onulduran (2009, p. 
                                                                 
56 For example, at the request of the US diplomats, the DPE publishes books concerning 
the Armenian question (ORSAM, 2013, p. 109), which acquired currency in the mid-
1970s due to the ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) attacks 
on Turkish diplomats. The DPE, in turn, made use of the government support and 
encouragement.    
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350) we can label it as the first think tank in the field of foreign policy in 
Turkey. 
Just as the 1960 coup d’etat that represented a founding moment in the 
history of the development of Turkish think tanks, the 1980 military 
intervention also had a certain impact on the making of new think tanks 
and what specific role they would play; even if the consequences were 
quite different in some instances. While the former military coup had 
paved the way for the institutionalization of a mode of development based 
on economic planning and import-substitution industrialization strategy, 
the latter targeted to restructure the economy by means of a series of 
IMF-inspired economic neo-liberal reforms in order to create an export-
orientated free market (Öniş, 2010, p. 51). In the post-1980 coup term, 
the civil-military bureaucratic elite reached a settlement to implement the 
economic policies partaking in the 24 January decisions, which had been 
made under the guidance of Turgut Özal in the last pre-coup Demirel 
cabinet. Özal took part in the post-coup cabinet (1980-1983), which was 
formed under the prime ministry of retired admiral Bülend Ulusu, as a 
state minister in charge of the economy.   
The post-coup government exhibited an intrinsic doubt towards party 
politics or more generally the existence of a political field polarized with 
respect to conflicting ideologies and interests and immediately closed 
existing political parties. In addition to the military tutelage prevailing 
during the period, the post-military government’s “bureaucratic 
managerialism” created new forms of technocratic tutelage (Açıkel, 2005, 
p. 206). Indeed, many technocrats and managers were invited 
particularly from the United States (the IMF and the World Bank) to 
Turkey and given extraordinary authority to commence economic 
liberalization and structural adjustment programs to accelerate the 
integration of Turkish economy into global capitalism (Açıkel, 2005, p. 
206).  
The political and economic implications of military interventions in Turkey 
has been extensively studied by the students of Turkish political history. 
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The original purpose of my cursory examination here is to find out how 
these transformations affected the peculiar developments of think tanks. 
As I emphasized above, the early think tanks of the post 1960 coup d’etat 
was the organizatonal offspring of the consensus between the different 
segments of the elite around the idea of development aiming at 
transforming the economic structure from agrarian commercial 
orientation to domestic market based industrialization. Think tanks of that 
term were designed as organizational bodies through which the emerging 
industrial capitalists could convey their demands to policymakers and the 
powerful planners of the DPT. Even, Emre Gönen, one of the previous 
secretary-generals of the İKV, says that the İKV was established as a 
kind of alternative of the DPT (Güvenç, 2006, p. 162).  
However, the post 1980 military coup economic reforms intended to start 
a new export-oriented economic phase as distinct from the import-
substitution strategies of the former period. The transformation of 
economic strategies and the gradual globalization of Turkish business 
circles posed new risks and uncertanties for especially small and medium 
sized enterprises (Tezcek, 2011, p. 185). For that reason, the think tanks 
associated with these circles such as İKV and İAV produced numerous 
reports during 1980s in order to obviate potential problems that 
enterprises could encounter and enhance their capacity of growth and 
competition in an emerging market economy. In other words, while the 
agenda of think tanks during the post 1960 coup planned development 
period was to give a boost “to the administration of capitalism in Turkey 
in a rational way” (Erder et al, 2003, p. 6), the function of such think tanks 
in the post 1980 term was mainly to aid the business world in adapting to 
the new conditions of the market.  
In this period, new think tanks as the Marmara Group Strategic and Social 
Research Foundation (Marmara Grubu Stratejik ve Sosyal Araştırmalar 
Vakfı), aiming at developing economic and political adjustment strategies 
to global transformation, came into play. The Marmara Group Foundation 
was established by Akkan Suver, a journalist and politician, in İstanbul in 
1985. As Suver himself states (Büyük Kulüp Dergisi, 2011) in an 
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interview, the great majority of the İTO executives, many academics from 
the universities located in İstanbul, some retired military officers and 
bureaucrats as well as prominent members of the Motherland Party 
(Anavatan Partisi, ANAP), the party in power at the time, were their 
supporters and subscribers. Looking at the mission statement of the 
foundation (2012), we can see how the foundation put emphasis on the 
economic and democratic transformation of Turkey in the direction of 
contemporary values. However, among its stated aims, what is more 
important for us to grasp is the peculiar history of think tanks in Turkey 
with its mission of supporting the transition from “traditional to modern” 
practices in political and economic life. Think tanks of the term need to 
construct their institutional identities by elevating the ascending 
discourses of the 1980s that are posited in sharp contrast to that of the 
past two decades: international expansion against inward-oriented 
economy, civil society and market against the state, private sector 
against public sector, individualism against collectivism, good 
governance against public administration and so on.  
On the other hand, in the absence of party politics – the political parties 
and the parliament remained closed during the period of 1980-1983 – the 
military government needed organizations that would fill the void of 
representation in foreign relations, notably in the relations with European 
institutions. The Political and Social Studies Foundation (Siyasi ve Sosyal 
Araştırmalar Vakfı, SİSAV) was founded by professor Memduh Yaşa with 
the private sector’s support just after the military coup, in 1981. As 
Güvenç (2006, p. 164) points out, the SİSAV lobbied for Turkey in the 
presence of the Council of Europe, where the parliamentary assembly 
had convened in the absence of Turkish parliamentarians. The 
Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (Ortadoğu ve Balkan 
İncelemeleri Vakfı, OBİV), founded by the retired ambassador Vahit 
Halefoğlu in İstanbul in 1984, in a similar vein, targeted towards 
international audiences, decision makers and the opinion leaders in the 
Middle East and Balkans through international meetings and publications 
(Aydın, 2006, p. 59) and aimed at enhancing Turkey’s political and 
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economic relations with the countries within these regions. These cases 
demonstrate that think tanks such as SİSAV and OBİV were used by the 
government as policy instruments by way of retired military officers and 
diplomats that they incorporated. This also displays that early think tanks 
did not consider it important in becoming organizationally and 
intellectually autonomous from the bureaucratic field. Like the DPE, the 
SİSAV and the OBİV also endeavored to retail and lobby for the official 
policies, particularly foreign policy, of the state in the presence of 
international institutions through conferences, seminars, and meetings, 
rather than trying to influence the decision/policy making processes with 
an independent stance.  
After the adoption of the 1982 Constitution, the generals directed their 
attention to the political restoration program comprising the creation of 
new political parties in a political environment where pre-existing parties 
had been closed and their cadres had been banned from politics for ten 
years. On 24 April 1983, the Political Parties Law came into force and the 
day following the National Security Council turned a new page in the 
political life of the country, removing the ban on politics (Ahmad, 1993, p. 
188). Even though no less than 15 parties were formed within a couple 
of weeks, just two of them came to the fore; the ANAP and the SODEP.57 
These two parties were also distinguishable in terms of their close 
relations with both foreign and domestic political party-affiliated think 
tanks. Hence, the 1980s also witnessed the emanation of think tanks 
linking intellectual practices to political practices and publicly advocating 
certain political ideas in contradistinction to the former Turkish think tanks 
attentive to be supra-partisan and even technocratic in their activities. To 
find out how such a mode of think tank come out in Turkey within this 
decade, we pre-emptively should glance at the experience of German 
party think tanks, or “political foundations” as they opt for to be called, 
seen as role models by two Turkish think tanks founded at the end of the 
                                                                 
57 It should be noted that the Social Democracy Party (Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi, 
SODEP) merged with the Populist Party (Halkçı Parti, HP), another newcomer party 
which was founded in 1983, and this new party made up of this fusion was named as 
Social Democrat People’s Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, SHP).  
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1980s: The Turkish Democracy Foundation (Türk Demokrasi Vakfı, TDV) 
and the Turkish Social, Economic, Political Research Foundation 
(Türkiye Sosyal, Ekonomik, Siyasal Araştırmalar Vakfı, TÜSES). 
In Germany, there is no independent policy research tradition on a 
privately funded non-profit basis as it is known in the Anglo-American 
world (Weilemann, 2009, p. 169). On the contrary, Germany has a 
longstanding tradition of state-funded academic “applied basic research”, 
particularly in the field of economics (Thunert, 2004, p. 71). As discussed 
in the previous chapter, most scholars, especially those who are much 
cited in this literature, identify think tanks as non-profit (ergo; intellectually 
independent) organizations by positing this criterion as a prerequisite for 
being a real think tank. However, as Pautz (2014, p. 440) points out, 
whereas in the English-speaking world the term think tank is used to 
evoke images of scientific objectivity and detachment, in Germany the 
term is rather deployed to call advocacy-oriented policy research 
institutes, either interest group-based policy research organizations or 
political party-affiliated foundations. Although there is a small number of 
institutions corresponding directly to those organizationally independent 
and non-profit Anglo-American style think tanks in Germany, more typical 
ones operate as the advisory bodies and research institutes associated 
with a social movement, interest group, political party and so on.  
Two long-established German political party-affiliated think tanks, the 
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), 
are safely said to have impressed Turkish politicians and intellectuals of 
the term in their attempt to establish an institution that would conduct 
research and produce ideas (as implied in the German term Denkfabrik 
meaning “thought factory”) in political, economic, and social issues. 
Furthermore, this impression does not remain a mere inspiration, it 
achieves the level of interplay and collaboration when German think 
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tanks opened branch offices in Ankara.58 In a word, the KAS59 is a think 
tank and consulting agency, whose origins dates back to 1956, directly 
affiliated with the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU). It 
conducts research related to politics and the history of Christian 
democracy, grants scholarships, and offers civic education not only in 
Germany, but also in a great deal of the country where it has offices. The 
FES, founded in 1925 in Germany, is also a political foundation, 
committed to the values and ideas of social democracy, aiming at 
promoting democracy and development worldwide as well as supporting 
the enlargement of the European Union, in association with the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany (SPD).  
As a result of the political cooperation between the CDU and the ANAP 
which came into power in 1983, the KAS could open a branch office in 
Turkey (Bağcı & Aydın, 2009, p. 89). The principal focus of study of the 
KAS Turkey Office, since its foundation, has been to support 
democratization and reform process in Turkey with intent to making the 
country become attuned to the European (Union) institutions and 
structures. It also has given countenance to decentralization process in 
civil administration and empowerment in local administration, economic 
policies based on social market economy principles protecting small and 
medium size enterprises, and intercultural and interfaith dialogue (KAS 
Turkey Office, 2014). The KAS also supported the activities of and 
collaborated with the TDV, a think tank in a close relationship with the 
ANAP, the ruling party of the term, yet organizationally independent of it.  
The TDV was founded in Ankara in 1987 by a group of people 
predominantly consisted of prominent politicians of the ANAP such as 
Rüştü Kazım Yücelen, Mehmet Necat Eldem, Güneş Taner, Eyüp Aşık, 
                                                                 
58 I should note that The KAS and the FES ought not to be considered as domestic think 
tanks focusing solely on German politics. Rather, they are huge organizational networks 
operating in more than a hundred countries. Therefore, it is not surprising to see the 
KAS as the best and the FES as the second “best think tank network” in the world in a 
recent ranking survey, Global Go To Think Tank Report 2014 (McGann, 2014),  
conducted by the Think Tank and Civil Societies Program at the University of 
Pennsylvania.    
 
59 For details regarding the history and activities of the KAS, see Weilemann (2009).   
74 
 
İmren Aykut, Mesut Yılmaz, and Bülent Akarcalı along with outstanding 
academics like Ergun Özbudun, and industrialists like Şarık Tara (Aydın, 
2006, p. 62). The political-economic outlook of the TDV can be located 
as liberal, calling for a free market economy, business-led economic 
development, rule of law, civil society-based liberties, and a political 
system operating in compliance with liberal democratic principles. As a 
liberal pro-ANAP think tank, the TDV have paid particular attention on 
conducting research related to the history and the actual situation of 
Turkish democracy, and offering civic education aiming at making 
democratic ideals as shared values of all citizens by organizing panels, 
conferences, forums, seminars and similar meetings free for all.  
The FES is the oldest political party-associated foundation in Germany, 
established in 1925 as originally an educational institute for the German 
working class. Nowadays, it spends most of its budget on overseas 
developmental aid and political education (Pautz, 2010, p. 188) as well 
as on the constitution and consolidation of democratic state structures, 
civil society, and social justice. The FES also provides research and 
ideas that the SPD politicians utilize in preparing party programmes and 
developing policies. The strong German social democratic political 
experience that gets strength from political party-affiliated think tanks 
seemed to have impressed Erdal İnönü, the leader of the SHP, the 
largest social democratic party in Turkey at the time, to design a think 
tank taking the FES that opened a branch office in Turkey in 1988, as a 
model. In this way, the TÜSES was founded in 1989 in İstanbul by a large 
segment of social democratic intellectuals and politicians of the period.60 
According to Haluk Ülman, who was responsible for the foreign policy 
research at the TÜSES, the chief goal of the think tanks was to generate 
ideas for a leftist party, e.g., the SHP, in all areas (Güvenç, 2006, p. 166). 
During the first half of the 1990s, the TÜSES brought into connection with 
European social democratic parties and think tanks, conducted policy 
research, organized numerous conferences, and published a wide range 
of policy papers aiming at proposing far-reaching social democratic policy 
                                                                 
60 For the full list of founders, see http://www.tuses.org.tr/hakkimizda/tuses-kuruculari 
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options in almost all policy areas including economy, health, 
industrialization, tax, energy, environment, technology, education, 
culture, domestic, foreign policy and so on. 
The TDV and the TÜSES take important places in the history of the 
making of think tanks in Turkey in some ways. Primarily, they are first 
examples of political party-affiliated think tanks, based around the 
German experience of political foundations such as the KAS and the 
FES.61 Unlike most of the earlier think tanks which were attentive to be 
supra-partisan, technocratic, or politically neutral, they have not wavered 
to manifest their political and economic positions. In addition to their 
research activities, they have also operated as an activist organizations, 
giving a boost to the promotion and dissemination of political ideas and 
policy preferences of their mother parties. On the other hand, their strong 
ties with political parties made their existence bound up with the power 
configuration in the political field at a given time. For that reason, their 
rise and fall is parallel to the boom and bust episode of the political parties 
to which they are associated. For instance, the TÜSES, which had 
enjoyed increasing sources of funds, media visibility, and popularity 
during the late 1980s and the early 1990s, considerably lost its 
effectiveness and research activities with the merge of the SHP with the 
CHP and its defeat in the 1995 general elections (Güvenç, 2006, p. 166). 
Even though the TÜSES and the TDV are still active to a certain extent, 
both of them are far away from their heydays. 
In a nutshell, this chapter tried to develop a historical narrative concerning 
the emergence and dissemination of Turkish think tanks, which can be 
recapitulated as follows. In the first historical stage (1961-1970), 
economic elites wanting to intervene in politics, e.g. the İstanbul-based 
industrial capitalists ascending by virtue of import-substituting 
industrialization founded several progenitors to today’s think tanks. Their 
                                                                 
61 In order to prevent a contradiction in terms, I should shed light on the use of the term 
affiliation here. In spite of strong personal, intellectual, and ideological links to political 
parties with which they are connected, these think tanks at least are not financially or 
organizationally dependent to the parties. They also should not be deemed as in-house 
research and development departments or foreign affairs tools of the parties.     
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main aim was to convey their economic policy preferences to the political 
and bureaucratic fields by means of these organizations to which they 
fund. In a political field in which political parties played a relatively weak 
role in the making of economic decisions and planning in comparison with 
the DPT bureaucrats, the think tank-affiliated intellectuals found an 
opportunity to influence planners through policy papers, conferences, 
and other tools of intellectual intervention embellished with a strong 
supra-partisan and technocratic rhetoric. By this means, they made a 
crucial contribution to the business community in their attempt to 
consolidate their social position as a class in a country where socialist 
ideas become influential among the foremost intellectuals and 
bureaucrats of the term. 
The second historical phase (1971-1980) witnessed the think tanks’ 
increasing knowledge production regarding foreign policy issues as well 
as their involvement in external affairs on behalf of the private sector and 
the state. The limitations of the Turkish state in releasing its foreign policy 
preferences into circulation and in dealing with technicality of foreign 
relations generated a need for intellectuals and specialists who could 
lend a hand to the state and also to the private sector in their diplomatic 
attempts. It could be also argued that the lack of a political context in 
which the interventions of think tanks could be considered and influential 
due to the economic crisis and political instability prevailing during the 
term prompted think tanks to shift their helm from domestic politics to 
diplomatic issues. In this period, think tanks such as the IKV and the DPE 
indeed played a part in relations and negotiations with the EEC and in 
promotion and advocacy of Turkish foreign policy in international settings. 
Finally, the last phase (1981-1993) represents the gradual 
institutionalization of policy expertise within political party-affiliated think 
tanks, which can be conceived as organizational fruits of the radical 
restoration of political and economic fields during the post-coup term. In 
this period, the state drew upon certain think tanks as foreign policy tools 
in the absence of parliamentary diplomacy. The rebirth of party politics 
with the formation of new parties and alliances in a modified political field 
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created a need for intellectuals who are able to assist in producing and 
advocating political ideas, policy proposals, and a programme for the 
sake of political parties. As long as they were useful for the state and 
political parties, think tanks did not have great difficulty in finding funds 
from the private sector or the public sector. Even, certain think tanks 
enjoyed a tax-exemption status as well as a considerable amount of 
government assistance. (Table 1 sums up my historical argument).62  
Before finishing this chapter, we may ask: What lessons do we derive 
from the history of think tanks in Turkey? The main lesson is that the 
universe that early think tanks resided in can be considered as an 
appandage to the political/bureaucratic and economic fields, rather than 
an intellectual field per se, enjoying a high level of autonomy away from 
the necessities and demands of political, bureaucratic, and business 
actors. Even though all of these think tanks were established by an 
ensemble of political/bureaucratic, economic and intellectual elites, the 
later component has always been inferior to and dependent on the former 
ones. As Bourdieu (1990, p. 145) says when he defines intellectuals, they 
were indeed “a dominated fraction of the dominant class”.  
According to my argument, the think tank universe has gained its field-
like characteristics in the middle of the 1990s. For that reason, the 
historical account I developed in this chapter limited itself to look at the 
previous history of that constituent moment. In the next chapter, I will try 
to examine the internal composition and dynamics of the think tank field 
in detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
62 Note that table 1 presents an ideal-typical representation of my historical argument.  
In order to provide a more lucid narrative, I only take the most distinctive “demand” and 
“role” of each term into consideration.        
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Table 3.1: Three phases in the emergence and formation of think tanks in 
Turkey 
 
 
 
 
Political- 
Bureaucratic 
Demand 
Economic 
Capacity 
Role of 
Think Tank 
Intellectuals 
1961-
1970 
Economic 
development 
planning 
Accumulation of 
capital under the 
import-
substituting 
industrialization  
 
Technocratic 
ideas  
1971-
1980 
Diplomatic 
activism  
Economic 
instability, 
deepening crisis, 
and the recovery 
in collaboration 
with the WB, IMF, 
and OECD  
Lobbying 
and 
economic 
advisory 
1981-
1993 
Foreign policy 
planning and 
political 
consulting  
The rise of 
export-oriented 
capital with neo-
liberal 
restructuring and 
integration into 
the world 
economy 
Policy 
expertise 
and political 
activism 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPLORING TERRA INCOGNITA: PECULIARITIES OF A STRANGE 
FIELD 
 
In the preceding chapter, I have trailed the nascense and historical 
development of think tanks. The goal of this chapter is to depict the field 
of think tanks in Turkey in its current form. According to my central 
argument, the field of think tanks was gained its field-like properties in the 
mid-1990s in consequence of a series of factors. After a short 
presentation of these factors, I will provide an analysis concerning the 
internal configuration of the think tank field by predicating on an original 
database, interviews, and field observations.  
 
4.1. Think Tanks on the Rise: From the Mid-1990s to the Present  
The proliferation of think tanks is a worldwide phenomenon gaining 
momentum in the 1980s. Social scientists working on think tanks 
enumerate a wide range of “world-historical” factors to explain this 
proliferation around the world as follows: constitutional changes and 
government reform, democratic consolidation, political stability and 
economic development in the greater part of the world, the development 
of domestically based intellectual elites, rising press freedom, 
philantrophy and voluntarism within civil society, the intensification of 
political debate and opposition, the positive attitudes of political leaders 
and political culture, the governance and development programmes of 
the WB, the UN, and the EU, the increasing complexity and technical 
nature of policy issues, globalization and the growth of non-state actors, 
the information and technological revolution, the demand for high quality 
research, policy analysis, and ideological argumentation (Stone 2004, p. 
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6; Stone 2007b, p. 264-266, Rich, 2004, p. 31-34; McGann, 2014, p. 6). 
Needless to say, these factors vary by countries in terms of degree of 
influence. Furthermore, there is also a multifarious set of national 
elements that differentiate organizational and operational characteristics, 
functions and capacities of think tanks between countries. For that 
reason, the worldwide spread of think tanks could be better understood 
as an “uneven and combined development” process taking distinctive 
shapes in different socio-historical trajectories, rather than a unilinear 
evolution based on the sequence of necessary stages.  
In Turkey, certain political and social developments have become the 
driving force behind the emergence of the think tank field in the mid-
1990s. For instance, as scholars operating in the international relations 
disicpline observes (Aras, Toktaş, & Kurt 2010, Aras & Toktaş 2012, 
Aydın 2006, Güvenç 2006), the end of the Cold War, the strenghtening 
relations between the EU and the Turkey, the breakdown of foreign policy 
consensus after the first Gulf War, and the relative liberalization, 
democratization, and pluralism giving rise to the new actors such as think 
tanks speaking up about new foreign policy and security preferences. 
Leaving the discussion about the role and affect of think tanks in 
securitization and foreign policy making to international relations experts, 
I would like to address the outcomes of this process that are key for my 
analysis.  
For one thing, think tanks’ desire to influence foreign policy making and 
to set a new course for Turkish foreign policy in a so-called “new world 
order” engendered the appearance of new think tanks presenting 
themselves as “centers for strategic research”.63 Besides, the state 
entered into the sector by establishing state-affiliated think tanks, or 
centers for strategic research with the popular denotation of the concept 
in the political discourse of the term. The Center for Strategic Research 
                                                                 
63 For instance, KÖK Strategic and Social Research Foundation (1991), the Yükseliş 
Economic and Strategic Research Foundation (1993), the Center for Strategic 
Research (1995), the National Committee for Strategic Research and Studies (1997),   
the Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (1999), to name a few. Since the 2000s, the 
number of such centers has increased dramatically.   
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(Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, SAM) established by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the National Committee for Strategic Research and 
Studies (Stratejik Araştırma ve Etüdler Milli Komitesi, SAEMK) 
established as a government-affiliated committee in the Council of Higher 
Education, and the Strategic Research and Study Center (Stratejik 
Araştırma ve Etüt Merkezi, SAREM) established as a Turkish General 
Staff-affiliated body are primary government-affiliated think tanks of this 
period.  
The wide use of the term strategy in denoting think tanks is a new practice 
one cannot encounter before the 1990s except sporadic references. This 
may be explained by the fact that the word strategy accumulates 
symbolic capital and gains legitimacy in the political discourse throughout 
the period. If words have the power to create reality instead of merely 
representing it, we can claim that the word strategy has created a specific 
reality for think tanks within the formative years of the field. The state’s 
use of this word to describe government-affiliated institutions have 
fortified and routinized its power. Indeed, the deployment of this word in 
think tank names is still a fashionable practice and supposed to bring 
prestige to the institutions. In addition, it should be noted that it is not the 
simple deployment of this word in denomination at issue. We can add 
that the researchers operating in strategic research centers have heavily 
relied on military terminology as well as the jargon of realist theories of 
international relations using concepts like geopolitics, geoculture, 
national security, sphere of influence, power politics, soft power and so 
on. 
Nonetheless, one should be wary of any interpretation reducing the 
proliferation of think tanks to the developments in foreign policy as many 
scholars in Turkey have done. As I have already indicated in the first 
chapter, these scholars operating in the discipline of international 
relations tend to harness think tanks to their missions in the field of foreign 
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policy and securitization.64 This academic discourse also nurtures the 
prevalent perception that think tanks just deal with foreign policy issues 
(author interview, Galip Dalay, December 25, 2013) by ignoring domestic 
political and social questions. Accordingly, this approach tends to 
obscure as much as it enlightens when it comes to comprehending the 
specific role that think tanks play.  
The genesis of the field of think tanks in Turkey is unlikely to be 
understood without making reference to the increasing credibility of 
liberal and libertarian thoughts in the post-Cold War period. In a historical 
moment in which Western liberal democracy is proclaimed as the final 
form of human government, the spread of the liberal ideas and values 
among a certain part of intellectuals is an intelligible occurrence. In 
parallel with liberal intellectual resurgence in the world, many think tanks 
that adopted a liberal worldview came into the picture in Turkey during 
the 1900s: the Turkey branch office of Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung 
(FNS), the German liberal party-affiliated think tank; the ARI Movement 
(Arı Hareketi), a liberal activist think tank originally founded within the 
ANAP; the Association for Liberal Thinking (Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu, 
LDT) established by a group of liberal and libertarian intellectuals; the 
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Türkiye Ekonomik ve 
Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı, TESEV), re-established and reorganized form of 
the Conference Board; and the New Democracy Movement (Yeni 
Demokrasi Hareketi, YDH), a political party and intellectual movement 
set up by a bunch of liberal intellectuals that label themselves as “the 
second republicans”.65 
                                                                 
64 It is not surprising that one of the most comprehensive research counducted on think 
tanks in Turkey bears the subheading “Foreign Policy and National Security Culture in 
Turkey”. See, Aras, Toktaş & Kurt (2010).   
 
65 Some of these intellectuals were Asaf Savaş Akat, Cengiz Çandar, Mehmet Altan, 
Etyen Mahçupyan, Kemal Derviş. The party, led by businessman Cem Boyner, was 
completely defeated in its first election, e.g., the 1995 general elections, with a voting 
rate below 1%. Apparently, the YDH was not a mass party mobilizing large crowds 
although it was organized as a political party aiming for power. It was not, on the other 
hand, a think tank in the strict sense of the word although it originated from an idea 
movement. Rather, as Baker & Şen (1994, p. 27) concisely set forth, it was a striking 
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In order to interpret the liberal intellectual resuscitation of the term, I will 
focus on the LDT as a case.66 The LDT presents itself as an “idea 
movement” (Yayla, 2013) intending to influence “the climate of opinion” 
(author interview, Özlem Çağlar Yılmaz, December 12, 2013) and to train 
young liberals through academic conferences, education seminars, panel 
discussion, publishing journals and books introducing and promoting 
liberal ideas. The emphasis on the importance of ideas is neither trivial 
nor perfunctory. The LDT, by and large, have undertaken the mission of 
opposing the dominant actors who occupy the central positions of the 
intellectual field. If we accept the intellectual field as, at least analytically, 
a world a part (Bourdieu 1990a) with its own dominated and dominators, 
its challengers and incumbents, we can safely assert that intellectuals 
who espouse left and socialist ideas were close to the second pole even 
in the 1990s. This means that the left-wing intellectuals were still more 
powerful than any segment of the intelligentsia in the struggles that occur 
in the field on defining the “real” intellectual as well as legitimate 
intellectual practices. For that reason, in the eyes of the LDT, as Gürpınar 
(2009, p. 53) rightly remarks, socialism is a father that has to be killed for 
the sake of proving itself and overcoming the Oedipus complex.67 
Indeed, the LDT has constructed its “authentic” sense of liberalism on the 
basis of the negation of socialism in Turkey stigmatized as an aggregate 
of corporatist, collectivist and communitarian ideas. The Kemalist and 
nationalist intellectual milieus, of course, is positioned on the other side 
of the front-line in the intellectual battlefield. What distinguishes the LDT 
from other think tanks of that term, notably from the centers for strategic 
research, is that it prioritizes generating and disseminating ideas in the 
                                                                 
example of a general movement in which the political activity become identical with or 
even take the place of think tank activity.        
 
66 Note that, my purpose is neither to examine the LDT case in detail nor to write its 
history. See, Özipek (2005), Gürpınar (2009), and Yayla (2013).       
 
67 Yayla’s observations on the Turkish intellectual field of the period from 1960s to 1980s 
is particularly illuminating in this respect (2013, p. 82-87). According to him, being an 
intellectual was identical with being a leftist in the these years. Therefore phrases such 
as “right-wing intellectual” or “conservative intellectual” was being perceived as 
oxymoronic within the field.       
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intellectual field instead of doing research for policy issues. Atilla Yayla, 
one the founders of the LDT, states that the most important field of power 
in a society is not the political power, yet, contrary to what is believed, is 
the intellectual power in the long run (2013, p. 66).  
Notwithstanding his intellectualism, however, Yayla lays stress that ideas 
are unable to go beyond to be intellectual gymnastics of an inner circle 
unless they contribute to solving the concrete problems of the country. 
(2013, p. 135). For that reason, he writes that the LDT should carry out 
lucid works and studies based on technical knowledge regarding 
concrete bases and potential impacts of public policies and become 
competent to announce these studies to the public (2013, p. 134-135). 
Indeed, Yayla seems to perceive the essential difference between an 
idea movement and a think tank: research for the sake of policy versus 
research as an end itself. In a word, the more the LDT performs the first 
task, the more it will become a typical think tank. 
In short, the 1990s have witnessed a sharp increase in the number of 
think tanks, both those strategic research centers, generally founded by 
government agencies, conducting foreign policy and security research for 
the use of decision makers from a nationalist and etatist standpoint and 
those liberal and pro-free market ones, lead by intellectuals and 
businessmen, working for the consolidation of the civil society and market 
as well as democratization of the country. Therefore, it may not be an 
overstatement to say that the genesis of the field was marked by the 
dichotomy between “the two cultures” of the think tank. 
Within the same decade, a new structural transformation occurred in the 
media field, which we take into account in order to grasp the think tank 
boom that have left its mark in history over the last twenty years. This 
was the abolishment of the thirty-year period state monopoly, 
represented by the TRT (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation), over 
radio and television broadcasting in 1994. Following the abolishment, 
industry giants started investing in the sector by establishing private 
television channels. In parallel, new discussion program formats in which 
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academics, journalists and “journalist intellectuals” (Bourdieu, 1998) take 
place swept through the news channels. In a short time, the media field 
become characterized by an intense concentration of media ownership 
and the establishment of cross-media oligopolies. In a country with a 
polarized political context like Turkey, the media inevitably have become 
instrumentalized, showing paralellism with or upholding the views of 
certain political parties, communities or social movements. As Turkish 
politics become more reactive to the news media, think tanks began to 
intevene in the political agenda through media organs. Nowadays, 
television commentators can procure strong symbolic buttress to the 
politicians. This is why many think tank intellectuals have been joining TV 
discussion programs not only to present an “expert opinion” concerning 
a socio-political issue, but also to promote and advocate certain policy 
choices by molding public opinion.        
Thinking with the logic of the field theory, the rise of private media 
structurally transformed the social space in which they had operated. In 
a quite simplified way, it could be said that the essential change was the 
transformation of the triadic structure that had existed from the early 
1960s into a quadripartite structure that established the rules of the game 
think tanks would play. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Tripolar structure of the think tank proto-field 
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As the simplified diagram (figure 4.1) illustrates, the social space that 
early think tanks resided, what I called the proto-field of think tanks, was 
a sphere between academia, the buraucracy, and the business. In this 
term, approximately between the early 1960s and the mid-1990s, think 
tanks tried to have an affect upon their audience, consisted of policy 
makers, polticians, business people through a set of activities including 
publications, meetings, conferences, consultancy, and even diplomacy. 
Parallel to the growth of the mass media, televisions, newspapers and 
recently social media sites have become mediums through which think 
tanks seek recognition, advocate certain political acts, and mold public 
opinion.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: Quadrupolar structure of the think tank field 
 
The following diagram (figure 4. 2) ilustrates the field of think tanks in its 
current form. With the growth of the mass media in the mid-1990s, think 
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tanks started to locate in an intermediate area enclosed by four poles that 
can be seen in the diagram. For that reason, my emphasis on the media 
is not trivial: Media organs are rather sina qua non for think tanks than 
mere mediums. I will specifically address the relationship between the 
media and think tanks above. Here, it may suffice to mark that the 
journalistic field today imposes its pressures more and more on other 
fields (Bourdieu,1998, p. 56), notably on the field of think tanks, which is 
more heteronomous space than any other field of cultural production. 
We should also look at think tanks that are mainly interested in economic 
policy. As I emphasized in the previous chapter, the common ground of 
all the early think tanks was that they were all established by or with the 
support of the industrial capitalists of the period to conduct research to 
influence development and the economic policy making process. It 
should be comfortably asserted that the capitalist class today needs think 
tanks more than they were needed in the past. Transition from the 
inward-oriented model of 1960s and 1970s in which big business 
accumulated capital in the domestic market to the export-oriented model 
in which the business world started to extend out to the foreign market, 
no doubt, have brought new problems and entailed new risks for 
investors. The increasing transnationalization of the Turkish business 
world and the growing integration of the country into the world economy 
in the post-2000 era intensified this process by posing new risks, notably 
for small and medium sized enterprises (known as KOBİ) that have 
developed from the early 1990s onward with the expansion of the neo-
liberal globalization to the Anatolia (Öniş, 2010, p. 48). The international 
expansion process is ridden with vicissitudes and risks that cannot be 
easily envisaged by both large-scale and small enterprises. In order to 
survive in a stiff competition environment, they need think tanks that 
would equip them with practical and technical knowledge (know-how) in 
coping with risks and uncertainties. In addition, as the Turkish economy 
has become rule-based and more competitive as a result of the structural 
reforms of Kemal Derviş, the minister of economy of the period 2001-
2002, the policy-based routing and public policy design – the two things 
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that economy-oriented think tanks do well – have become key to affect 
economic decision makers more than ever (author interview, a TEPAV 
director, December 30, 2013).  
During the first decade of the new millennium, new think tanks focusing 
on economic policies, sustainable economic growth, local and regional 
development came in sight. Among many others, two think tanks 
established by representatives of the private sector come to the forefront: 
Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum and the TEPAV. The 
former is a think tank formed jointly by Koç University and the TÜSİAD, 
the business association established by leading Turkish industrialists and 
businessmen in 1971 in order to represent the big business. The latter is 
a think tank that was founded under the patronage of the TOBB, an 
umbrella organization of the private sector representing all the local 
chambers and commodity exchanges in the country.  
Even though they serve the interests of the different segments of the 
capitalist class, both of them were designed to generate knowledge that 
would resolve the problems of entrepreneurs. Enjoying a considerable 
endowment fund that many think tanks are deprived of, these think tanks 
are able to mobilize outstanding academic scholars and experts to 
conduct comprehensive business and economic policy research to meet 
the needs of economic growth.68 The emphasis on the economic growth 
and development is salient in the mission statements of both think tanks. 
Indeed, as a TEPAV director stresses, their main operating principle is 
quite simple: to enhance the private sector for Turkey’s economic growth 
(author interview, a TEPAV director, December 30, 2013). Hence, such 
think tanks, more or less, can be evaluated as engines for economic 
growth through private sector development.  
                                                                 
68 When it comes to affecting policy makers, these think tanks also prove that they are 
really efficacious. For instance, the draft report about the progress plan prepared by a 
TEPAV research group lead by Güven Sak provided main policy inputs for the ninth 
development plan (2007-2013) of the DPT (Tezcek, 2011, p. 236). Thus, the TEPAV 
could guarantee government assistance and cooperation particularly in industrial issues 
on behalf of small and medium sized enterprises represented by the TOBB.   
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In short, in the mid-1990s onwards, think tanks began to be perceived as 
vital and essential tools from which different social actors could benefit in 
affecting the political sphere and public opinion, disseminating and 
advocating ideas, solving specific problems and so on. In recent years, 
we have been witnessing the new wave of think tank-ization, a process 
in which social movements, identities, and even religious communities 
along with political parties, the state, and business world establish think 
tanks. This boom, together with a set of implications, has brought two 
discernable outcomes: the spatial dispersion of think tanks has extended 
beyond two metropolitan cities and organizational forms of think tanks 
has become diversified. 
By the 2000s, the spatial location of think tanks had been İstanbul and 
Ankara, two major cities of the country where economic and political, and 
cultural capital are concentrated. Currently, there are numerous 
university-associated research centers, widespread albeit inert, across 
the country. Another reason of spatial diffusion is the appearance of 
research-oriented thematic think tanks focusing on certain problem areas 
such as the Kurdish question. For instance, Diyarbakır hosts two 
foremost think tanks of the region, conducting in-depth policy research 
on the different aspects of the Kurdish question, from the mother tongue-
based bilingual education to the village guard system: The Diyarbakır 
Institute for Political and Social Research (Diyarbakır Siyasal ve Sosyal 
Araştırmalar Ensititüsü, DİSA), the Tigris Communal Research Center 
(Dicle Toplumsal Araştırmalar Merkezi, DİTAM). 
The second point is that organizational forms of Turkish think tanks vary 
to a considerable extent. An organizational sociologist can even suggest 
that there are almost no distinct attributions that all of the organizational 
bodies pertanining to the think tank category partake. Thinking with the 
jargon of the organization theory, we could argue that think tanks 
compose a non-homogenous assemblage of organizations situated in 
the “organizational field”, sets of organizations, in the aggregate, 
“constitute a recognized area of institutional life” (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983, p. 148). As I discussed above, scholars researching think tanks 
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have been inclined to develop numerous typologies in order to deal with 
the heterogeneous character of think tanks. And, I also laid emphasis on 
the handicaps of such in tackling with think tanks as organizations. 
Typologies, in fact, fail to show organizational change in the course of 
time because the fact that they draw inflexible and distinct lines between 
“types”. In other words, they ignore temporality of organizations at the 
cost of providing a descriptive representation of the think tank field.  
In their seminal article, organizational sociologists DiMaggio and Powell 
underscores this point by saying that: “In the initial stages of their life 
cycle, organizational fields display considerable diversity in approach and 
form. Once a field becomes well established, however, there is an 
inexorable push towards homogenization” (1983, p. 148). Authors labels 
this process as “institutional isomorphism”. Three substantial 
mechanisms bring forth this process: mimesis, coercion and normative 
pressure. Think tanks in Turkey, as discussed before, constitute a weak 
field rather than a well established one. It is also in its initial stages with 
the words of DiMaggio and Powell. Therefore, it appears to be possible 
to understand why the Turkish think tank field is composed of 
characteristically heterogeneous and polymorphic organizations by 
chasing the logic of institutional isomorphism. If DiMaggio and Powell are 
right, think tanks in Turkey are likely tend to become more and more 
similar over time. According to them, incoming organizations tend to 
observe and mimic the model of what they regard the most succesful 
players or trend-setters in the field. Such a mimesis can be seen in the 
influence of the ASAM on the newcomer think tanks presenting them as 
strategic research centers. Its organizational style, based on regional and 
thematic research units (in Turkish araştırma masaları) evoking the 
modus operandi of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Bora, 2001), has been 
inherited by many think tanks focusing on security and foreign policy. A 
researcher and director associated with the USAK even points out that, 
new think tanks that were under the influence of the ASAM immediately 
embraced the term “strategy” without questioning its military 
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resonances69 (author interview, Mehmet Güçer, December 20, 2013). 
Yet, although we can find some indications of isomorphic tendencies, all 
in all, the field is characterized by polymorphism and heterogeneity.   
To sum up, the field of think tanks has been crystallized since the mid-
1990s as a result of many societal and political developments and new 
necessities. The formation of this “interstitial” (Medvetz, 2012a) field, a 
bounded space of interaction located between the four poles of the 
politics, media, business, and academia was allied with the genesis of 
the “mediators” (Osborne, 2004), a think tank-affiliated intellectual who 
compounds incompatible social skills from the aforementioned 
contiguous social universes bringing think tanks into being. In the 
following subsections, I will focus on the relations between think tanks 
and its adjacent fields. 
 
4.2. Crystallization of the Field: Signals of Relationality  
From the outset, let me remind you of the recent version of the field theory 
that I applied in this study. As distinct from the “mature” fields of Bourdieu, 
with a quite distinct logic, defined boundaries and forms of capital, these 
so-called “weak”, “interstitial”, “liminal”, “lesser”, or “in-between” fields – 
conceptualization varies by scholars – are characterized by the lack of 
autonomy by the reason of the intersectional and intermediate social 
space in which they operate. In a word, they are heteronomous social 
spaces, far from the ideal-typical sense of the Bourdieusian field 
identified as a relatively autonomous social context. Think tanks, both 
symbolically and materially, are contingent upon the social worlds around 
                                                                 
69 Note that, the ASAM was established by the renowned nationalist political scientist 
Ümit Özdağ studying on the areas such as security, intelligence, terror, and ethnic 
conflicts from a “geo-strategic”perspective. The 21. Century Turkey Institute, a new think 
tank founded under the directory of Özdağ, incorporates numerous research center 
purporting to serve Turkish society and Turkish world. This think tank exemplifies a 
thinking disposition which is still widespread in the field, a dispostion that fetishises the 
concept of strategy by “strategizing” of everything and thinking of everything as 
strategic. For that reason, it is not out of the common for such an institute to have a 
centre for “theostrategy” research employing theologists or, more precisely, self-
proclaimed “theo-strategy” experts.            
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them. By contrast with the presupposition, many scholars writing on 
intellectuals have taken for granted, that intellectuals enjoy fully cognitive 
autonomy, intellectual producers associated with think tanks, as I have 
stressed many times, conduct policy research and generate policy 
knowledge in conditions of serious restriction aroused from their 
neighboring fields. For that reason, one cannot duly discover the 
specificity of the think tank field without looking through social actors 
taking place in the adjacent fields, notably those who are holders of 
economic and political power, which think tanks are dependent on. 
Wacquant (1992, p. 17) uses the analogy of prism in order to illustrate 
what the autonomy of a field means: if a field is adequately autonomous, 
“it refracts external forces according to its internal structure”. If not, it does 
reflect external determinations originated from neighboring or intruding 
fields in lieu of refracting them pursuant to its own interior logic. The 
biological concept of “interstitial” used by researchers revising Bourdieu’s 
field theory also facilitate to understand this point. Like interstitial, which 
means a space between objects, compartments surrounding the cells of 
a tissue, interstitial fields are spaces between fields. Due to the 
boundaries of interstitial fields are porous and permeable, these fields 
are more subject to external influences when compared to a conventional 
Bourdieusian field.     
Nonetheless, while the think tank field is connected to institutions of 
economic and political power, it does not follow that this field is reducible 
to them. More precisely, while the field of think tanks is located at the 
overlapping intersection of several more institutionalized spheres, e.g., 
the political, economic, academic and journalistic fields, which it evolved 
out of, it is not identical or synonymous with them. Despite their 
intrinsically heteronomous trait, Turkish think tanks gradually have taken 
a distinctive, shall we say field-like, character since the mid-1990s, a 
change that could be pursued along several constituent dimensions.70  
                                                                 
70 Medvetz (2012a, p. 116-124) argues that the growth of network ties and formal 
linkages among think tanks, the invention of new intellectual products and practices and 
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First, think tanks have started to attract the interests of academic 
researchers beginning from the 2000s. As I discussed in the first chapter, 
there is a considerable increase in the number of academic publications 
focusing on Turkish think tanks in that period. Yet, it should be 
overemphasized that the social scientific studies regarding think tanks is 
superficial and cursory with a few exceptions. On the other hand, the 
word of the think tank, or düşünce kuruluşu with the most common idiom 
in Turkish, has become also a widely used category, so to speak a 
buzzword, in Turkish political discourse within the last decade, especially 
with their increasing visibility in the media debate. It is not a mere lexical 
shift at issue. The growing use of the category in the political and media 
discourse, the accumulated academic knowledge regarding think tanks 
along with worldwide think tank indexes and directories have made a 
significant contribution to the cohesion of this category in our intellectual 
and political vocabulary. 
The second and more important point is that novel forms of intellectual 
production and intervention apart from academic (and of course 
journalistic) research has shown up in the same period. As well known, 
in the countries that have a deep rooted history of think tank experience 
like the US, there are certain formats of intellectual production that can 
be subsumed under the category of “policy reports” or “policy papers”. In 
the following subsection, I will elaborate how these new forms differ from 
the academic modes of intellectual production. For the present, I would 
like to point out that Turkish think tanks, at least the prominent ones, have 
gained ground in finding the right and effective formats of policy paper for 
their target audience. 
Third, I would like to underscore that the emergence of think tanks has 
led to the emergence of a new type of intellectual that I prefer to call as 
“mediators” by following Osborne (2004). At the end of this study, I will 
                                                                 
the creation of knowledge about them contributed to the installation of the think tank 
category in the social world as well as the formation of the think tank field in the United 
States at least from the 1970s. His argument will give inspiration and provide a 
comparative leverage for my discussion concerning the distinctive aspects of Turkish 
think tanks they have acquired since the mid-1990s.         
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provide a discussion concerning the modus vivendi and hybrid 
dispositions of this new type of intellectual figure. For my discussion, I 
shall stress that think tank-affiliated intellectuals have gradually carved 
out a slot for themselves between the more institutionalized spheres of 
the media and academia, the academic and journalistic intellectuals. 
Finally, I want to point out the relations of cooperation and competition 
among think tanks. The heavy increase in the number of think tanks 
within the last two decades is a factor that increases competition amongst 
the actors in the field for material and symbolic resources which are at 
stake in the field. In this respect, the interstitial field of think tanks carry 
the fighting spirit to a certain degree, even though it is not comparable 
with fierce competition occurring in the ideal-typical Bourdieusian 
“battlefield” due to the bounded and heteronomous nature of think tanks. 
Centering too much upon the struggle and competition, for that reason, 
would hamper us to grasp the simultaneous trend towards cooperation 
both amongst Turkish think tanks and between domestic think tanks and 
the external actors. 
In Turkey, collaborative relations among think tanks initially can be traced 
through a series of meetings that players in the field participate in. For 
instance, in May 2010, fourteen think tanks presenting themselves as 
centers for strategic research (stratejik araştırmalar merkezi) held a 
meeting in Ankara in order to form and improve a cooperation between 
the institutions, after the first two meetings were conducted in 2007 and 
2008 (Ortaç, 2010). What is more important is that they came to a mutual 
agreement in establishing a head organization called the “Turkish Think 
Tank Platform” (Türkiye Düşünce Kuruluşları Platformu) through which 
they would jointly conduct conferences and exchange of ideas.   
Another observable tendency of cooperation is frequently conducted 
consultation meetings between think tanks and government agencies. 
For example, in December 2012, a consultation meeting was conducted 
in the Ankara Development Agency (Ankara Kalkınma Ajansı) with the 
participation of nine think tanks operating in Ankara (“Strateji ve Düşünce 
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Kuruluşları”, 2012). A similar consultation meeting was conducted under 
the presidency of the Minister of Development Cevdet Yılmaz in Ankara 
in February 2015 with attendance of the representative from ten major 
think tanks (“Düşünce Kuruluşları İstişare Toplantısı”, 2015). Examples 
of such meetings abound. Another of them was hosted by the The Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM) in 
2013. In the meeting, The TBMM Secretary General İrfan Neziroğlu 
emphasizes the vitality of knowledge sharing and experience transfer 
between think tanks and the TBMM and its research center TBMM-
ARMER. He states that think tanks generate outstanding reports and they 
share this reports with parliamentarians and politicians (Durmaz, 2013). 
To conclude, Turkish think tanks, day after day, become more aware of 
each other through an array of cooperative activities. Looking at these 
activities, one can clearly realize how think tanks who occupy different 
positions in a political or ideological spectrum come together for the sake 
of collaboration. For that reason, if one solely focus on the divergent 
ideological tendencies of think tanks by categorizing them to their implicit 
or explicit proximities to political parties and movements and postulate 
that the field is only characterized by a vicious hostility, s/he miss the 
other side of the story. 
 
4.3. The Rules of the Game: Think Tanks and Policy Research 
In this subsection, I will focus on how think tanks relate with the more 
established fields around them to find an answer to the question of what 
kind of game a think tank really play, rather than centering upon the 
system of relations between the actors in the field. The key issue is that 
the field of think tanks is shaped not only by the structure of intra-field 
relations between agents but also, and rather, by its proximity to 
coterminous fields. As I have underscored from the inception of this 
study, one cannot adequately understand the think tank universe unless 
s/he takes into account both the pressures and demand derived from its 
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adjacent fields. For that reason, I shift my focal point from the structure 
of relationships between intra-field agents to the relations between the 
fields themselves; from a kind of relationality to the other.        
From the perspective of the field analysis, this line of inquiry could be 
seen somewhat unconventional. A conventional Bourdieusian field, a 
highly autonomous and structured social space shaping the relations of 
agents, possesses its own associated forms of specific capital that the 
members of the field vie to establish monopoly over them: “cultural 
authority in the artistic field, scientific authority in the scientific field, 
sacerdotal authority in the religious field” (Wacquant, 1992, p. 17). 
Spaces that overlap and crosscut multiple institutional fields like the case 
of think tanks is troublesome to grasp within this classical framework (see 
Eyal 2002, 2013, Panofsky 2006, Stampnitzky, 2011, Medvetz 2012a). 
In fact, there is no specialized form of capital in the field of think tanks 
that agents of the field strive to obtain. Rather, as Medvetz shows (2012a, 
p. 140), they try to gather and balance various resources such as 
academic, political, economic, and media capitals belonging to the more 
institutionalized fields adjacent to think tanks. To put it metaphorically, 
they labor to reach to and carry weapons from the outside to their 
battlefield to exert their effect. 
In the context of the Turkish think tank space, thus, four types of resource, 
e.g., capital, are at stake. First and foremost resources that think tanks 
strive to assemble are economic and political capitals. The former could 
be understood as pecuniary resources and endowments that any think 
tank aspires to enhance. In recent years, some think tanks have 
endeavored to create their “equity capital” through selling their intellectual 
outputs in the “marketplace of ideas” in order to reduce their dependence 
on external entities. Political capital, in Bourdieu’s theory of the political 
field (Bourdieu, 1991b), refers to what agents, individuals or institutions, 
in the political field struggle to accumulate: the capacity and skills to 
mobilize crowds around a common goal, to win elections, to design public 
policies and so on. In terms of think tanks, it refers to skills such as to 
produce relevant policy knowledge, to establish bonds with or gain 
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credibility of political actors, and to intervene in the political agenda in an 
influential way. Academic capital, in a word, refers to indicators of 
scientific competence. Since educational credentials and degrees can be 
evaluated as objectified forms of this sort of capital, I generated a 
database concerning the educational backgrounds of expert staff of 
major think tanks (See, Appendix). Finally, media capital expresses the 
capacity to access to printed and visual media along with the ability of 
making and advocating arguments in television discussions. 
 
4.3.1. Financial Dependency of Think Tanks 
Think tanks in Turkey, in common with most of their counterparts in the 
other parts of the world, are contingent upon external institutions to 
sustain their activities. To be more precise, they are financially and 
economically dependent social organizations, rather than being self-
sufficient entities creating their own resources for their survival. To 
illustrate, the rise and fall of the ASAM constitutes the most striking 
example of the financial dependence to sponsors. When the ASAM had 
been one of the well-situated think tanks of the last decade, it had to 
suspend its activities due to the fact that their main sponsor firm, the Ülker 
Group, opted to withdraw financial support reaching to one and a half 
million dollars per annum (Yetkin, 2008). 
It would be interesting to document funding patterns as well as annual 
budgets of Turkish think tanks to measure economic capital which is at 
stake in the field. However, one of the main obstacle to achieving this is, 
as Aras, Toktaş, & Kurt points out (2010, p. 54-55), the lack of 
transparency in terms of financial structure and sources of finance in the 
field.71 For that reason, who contributes to think tanks to what extent 
                                                                 
71 Despite their emphasis on the opacity of financial structure and sources, the same 
authors do not refrain from classifying think tanks according to their budget sizes. In 
their sorting (Aras, Toktaş, & Kurt, 2010, p. 79-80), there are think tanks that have a big 
budget (over 1 million dollars), moderate budget (between 250 thousand and 1 million 
dollars) and small budget (between 50 thousand and 250 thousand dollars). However,  
their categorization comes out unjustified and unelaborated because they say almost 
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remains an open question. Even so, we can at least enumerate the 
potential financial sources for think tanks; individual or foundational 
endowments, government grants, project funds, selling of intellectual 
products and services, membership fees and so on. It should be pointed 
out that it is exceptional to find a think tank that relies on one hundred 
percent business sector or on the state for its financing. Most think tanks, 
even those which have ample sources of donation, typically compete for 
various research project-based money or sell their publications.   
Overall, think tanks are not equivalent in the sense of accessing these 
resources. The uneven distribution of economic capital makes some think 
tanks privileged vis-à-vis other ones scarcely continuing their activities. 
For instance, think tanks that have strong ties with the business 
community such as the TEPAV and the İKV enjoy ample means they 
possess through the endowments they receive by the TOBB, the 
TÜSİAD, and other industrial and commercial bodies. A director from the 
TEPAV states how the support they take from the TOBB help them to 
extend their impact and interest areas:  
From my point of view, the most important thing that makes you a 
think tank is endowment. You ought to assure a primary pecuniary 
resource in order to get back on the road without being driven 
away from any political winds. … As I see it, the field of study a 
think tank chooses is related to where it receives its donations. 
For example, since we take endowments from the TOBB, we have 
a quite extensive field of study and set of targets (author interview, 
a TEPAV director, December 30, 2013). 
Think tanks bound up with government agencies such as the SAM and 
the TBMM-ARMER also does not experience financial difficulty owing to 
a share they get from government and parliamentary budgets. The same 
thing can be said of think tanks those which operate under auspices of 
                                                                 
nothing about which think tanks find fund from where and in what ways. Such a cursory 
classification ensamples the widespread obsession of typification seen in scholars 
studying on think tanks.      
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universities. For instance, Fuat Keyman, the director of the İPM, says that 
the financial support of the Sabancı University provides assurance them 
in surpassing what he calls the problem of sustainability (author interview, 
February 17, 2013). 
Think tanks which are deprived of the financial assistance of powerful 
sponsors contend for state funds offered by various governmental 
organizations such as the Scientific and Technological Research Council 
of Turkey (Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu, TÜBİTAK), 
The Republic of Turkey Promotion Fund (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Başbakanlık Tanıtma Fonu Genel Sekreterliği), and the Turkish 
Cooperation and Coordination Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon 
Ajansı Başkanlığı, TİKA), development agencies, ministries and the like. 
They also seek international sources of financing such as the EU 
fundings or other project-based funds provided by institutions like the 
Open Society Foundations, the National Endowment for Democracy, 
German party-affiliated think tanks and so on. In the absence of stable 
economic resources, or “a philantrophic culture and a bourgeois ethics” 
that is the trademark of the US think tanks (author interview, Vahap 
Coşkun, February 21, 2014), “project fetishism” (projecilik) appears as a 
potential way out for many think tanks even if they are reluctant to do it.    
Apparently, think tanks in Turkey depend heavily on external sponsors 
for financial support. More than that, many of the great majority of them 
substantially bank on short-run contributions. To put it more plainly, their 
very existence are beyond their own control and agency; the ultimate 
decision makers that would determine their destiny are those who 
economically support think tanks. Needless to say, financial resources 
enable think tanks to make research and generate policy knowledge. Yet, 
the crucial point from the lenses of the field analysis is that such an over-
dependence on sponsors and clients have certain restraints on the 
production of policy knowlege. After all, to what extent think tanks are 
able to go beyond the demands and interests of those who subsidize 
them is the besetting question that think tank-affiliated intellectuals are 
unwilling to face. A noteworthy answer to this question comes from the 
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Social Research Foundation (Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı, SAV), a radical 
research organization that differs from other think tanks by holding left-
wing ideas and solutions in social and economic issues. The SAV actually  
occupies a marginal position in the field of think tanks by challenging the 
acknowledged norms of policy research. In their eyes, making contact 
with the market or the state for fund undermines their activities based on 
voluntariness:  
Not to receive fund provides credibility and independence to us. 
For example, some people had suggested us to make an 
application to the EU projects, but we did not. If you strive to find 
money, you must recast your organizational model completely. 
This is why labor unions have broken down. Plus, the institution 
from which you receive fund directly designate what you will write 
(author interview, Serap Kurt, March 14, 2014). 
Think tanks that are not categorically opposed to engage in project-based 
funds try to develop some strategies to overcome the over-reliance on 
sponsors. The first strategy that I identified is the effort to generate 
considerable income through putting intellectual products on the market. 
For instance, Galip Dalay from SETA indicates that they are able to 
generate approximately 40% of their expenditures by selling their 
publications and preparing ad hoc reports for various clients for a fee. 
(author interview, December 25, 2013). The second and the more 
prevalent strategy is to diversify funding sources in order not to be at one 
sponsor’s mercy. Perhaps the most preoccupied think tank-affiliated 
actor with this issue is Atilla Sandıklı, the president of BİLGESAM and 
founder of some other think tanks. Sandıklı argues the increasing 
predominance of the business logic at the Turkish Asian Center for 
Strategic Research (Türkiye Asya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, 
TASAM) of which he was one of the founders as a main reason for living: 
As we [TASAM] come to be known and receive projects, the 
president started to see us as workers and himself as a boss. 
Thus, the independent operation principle of a scientific research 
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center became tainted. ... In addition to the employer-employee 
relations, the problem of resourcing is another factor threatening 
the independence of think tanks. ... In order to overcome this 
problem, we expanded the number of our sponsors by six. For 
that reason, even if one or two of them go bankrupt or withdraw 
the support, we are able to move on (author interview, June 2, 
2014). 
 
4.3.2. Think Tanks and Politics: Between Involvement and 
Detachment 
The financial dependence prompts think tanks to lay out their work having 
regard to the needs and demands of their sponsors and clients. 
Rendered with the words of the field theory, this refers to a renunciation 
from intellectual or cognitive autonomy to a certain degree. When it 
comes to the relations of think tanks to political actors, it is possible to 
say that all think tanks seek to establish ties with political actors, notably 
political parties, policy makers, and political activist groups, to have a 
voice and impact on existing political issues. According to my finding, the 
main controversy within the think tank field is not over whether think tanks 
should get in touch with political actors or not, but over how and to what 
extent they ought to bring into connection with these actors. In other 
words, what is at stake is the “problem of involvement and detachment” 
in Elias’ sense of the term (Elias, 1956). And, I should add that this 
controversy could be safely read as a symbolic struggle over the very 
definition of the category of think tanks and of the intellectual.  
Some members of the field, such as Hatem Ete from the SETA, see the 
political engagement with a political entity as the identification mark of 
think tanks: “After all, think tanks function as a project of a political 
identity” (author interview, January 6, 2014). Similarly, when I address 
the problem of the definition of think tanks in my interview with Ahmet 
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Yıldız, the head of the TBMM-ARMER, he confidently pose the political 
positioning as the distinguishing feature of think tanks:  
There is considerable problems in definitions. From my 
standpoint, all think tanks have a political position. Second, the 
better part of them, if not all, are engaged to certain political 
tendencies. This could be a political party, a non-governmenta l 
organization, or a social movement (author interview, January 2, 
2014). 
This view argues that a think tank could be only deemed to be succesful 
as long as it achieves to balance the production of policy knowledge and 
political advocacy. This is why Ete defines an intellectual as a person 
“who blends knowledge with a political position, but does not allow the 
knowledge s/he produced confined to the limits of that political position” 
(author interview, January 6, 2014). Here, we can clearly observe the 
problem of involvement and detachment. Accordingly, a think tank-
affiliated intellectual should bring knowledge and political predispositon 
together to be intellectually powerful; however, at the same time, he 
should not become a secterian or partisan who is mired in his own 
political milieu. Still, it is not so easy to play this equilibrium game and to 
preserve cognitive autonomy in a field encompassed by the political field. 
An expert staff member from the SDE, a think tank proximate to the 
government party, concedes that:  
These institutions [think tanks] alternate between generating 
knowledge in real terms and performing swordsmanship, as 
newspapers did at one time. This dilemma can arise from the 
institutions by themselves. But rather, expectations of political 
parties in the second direction bring about such an ambiguity 
(author interview, Murat Yılmaz, December 24, 2013). 
Other prominent think tanks hold the idea that a think tank ought not to 
be too close to a certain political locus. This line of argument calls for an 
impartiality to the different political actors or at least equal distance to 
103 
 
every political positions. It automatically follows that they question the 
legitimacy and credibility of such think tanks as Fuat Keyman, the director 
of the İPM, does: 
The most important problems encountered by think tanks are the 
problem of capacity (funding and sustainability) and the problem 
of legitimacy. Some think tanks have legitimacy problem due to 
their proximity to the government, but they have capacity. This 
problem can be overcomed with treating other actors equally and 
collaborating with them (author interview, February 17, 2014).   
In order not to confront such a legitimacy and problem, these think tanks 
strategically refrain from establishing close links with a political party or 
at least rhetorically announces that they are equally distant to every 
political and ideological position. On the other hand, think tanks which 
are connected to the main segments of the capitalist class tend to remain 
more neutral to political agents since they are mainly interested in the 
technicality and design of economic policies. To put it differently, because 
they generate the knowledge on behalf of the private sector, they are able 
to adopt a technocratic or at least a pragmatic attitude towards their 
political interlocutors. A director from the TEPAV draws attention to this 
point:  
Think tanks like us can work with both labour unions and 
employer unions at the same time on the same issue. We can 
also work with both the AKP and CHP. … We built a capacity. 
We have a credibility related to technical competence. And we 
have an operational network under favour of the TOBB. For that 
reason both the AKP, CHP and MHP read and communicate with 
us (author interview, December 30, 2013). 
Others take a supra-partisan and politically detached stance to reach the 
loosely defined ideal of “optimality”. These think tanks highlights the 
concepts such as common mind, synergy, and brainstorming to manifest 
themselves as broad-minded, intellectually independent and politically 
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supra-partisan. The BİLGESAM is the paragon of that kind of 
organizations aiming at creating a vision for the future of the country in a 
way that would be the reflection of the common mind:  
We do not take a political party as a reference, but do the society, 
the people. Our studies reflect the Turkish optimal. Namely, there 
are always points on which everyone does not compromise, but 
we set forth the intersection point of all positions. We try to 
develop the common mind here, not the mind of a political 
position (author interview, Atilla Sandıklı, June 2, 2014). 
How can we explain these differences? From my point of view, the 
problem of involvement and detachment presented here is partly 
attributed to the lack of codified or structured procedures that would 
regulate the relations between political agents and think tanks. In Turkey, 
people who are familiar with think tanks easily identify which one of them 
are proximate to which political party. The perplexing point is that the 
same think tanks portray themselves as impartial and non-partisan in 
their mission statements and in public settings. Their “presentation of the 
self”, in Goffman’s sense of the term, vary by audiences; while they 
present themselves to the broader public audience as intellectually 
independent and politically neutral, they also may present their allegiance 
to their political clients in the back stage.  
Either this or that way, think tanks seek to enter into connection with 
political agents to exert their effect on policy making. Almost all think tank 
members indicate that politicians increasingly need and demand for 
policy-related research and knowledge as well as symbolic support and 
advocacy. To be sure, academia is not duly functional to generate the 
knowledge of which politicians are in need due to the fact that academics 
are highly tardy researchers contemplating on, broadly speaking, 
disciplinary-driven or interest-ridden questions rather than policy-related 
issues dictated by the political agenda. Moreover, as I will discuss below, 
purely scientific research and knowledge production procedures and 
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processes demands a long period of time and thus cannot address a 
politicians’ needs to instant knowledge. 
Expert staff of think tanks, hovewer, could foresee potential risks in 
particular areas that politicians cannot easily undertake and/or inform 
them about beforehand. The bureaucrats, for example, are ideally 
supposed to serve to the same purpose. In a country like Turkey where 
the buraucratic field is subject to ongoing struggle for the control of the 
strategic locations and stakes of the field, politicians could benefit from 
think tanks in short-circuiting the bureaucracy and accelerating the 
decision-making process. In comparison with bureaucrats, think tanks 
exert an “influence without responsibility” (Denham & Garnett, 1999) over 
policy due to idea that they are officially non-authoritative entities. 
Developing this phrase, I may add that think tanks seek “credibility 
without accountability”. So long as political elites find these institutions 
credible and serviceable, they become an indispensable part of not only 
policy making but also doing politics. Lastly, think tanks can also be 
utilized as a greenhouse where future high level politicians, 
administrators, and political consultants are developed.72 
 
4.3.3. Think Tanks and the Media: A Mutualistic Relationship 
In order to survive and succeed, think tanks indispensably have to 
establish relationships with decision makers and sponsors. Furthermore, 
they also have needed to establish ties with media organs in a political 
environment which have become more and more susceptible to the news 
media from the mid-1990s to the present. For the most part, the 
relationship between the media and think tanks is a mutually beneficial 
one. 
                                                                 
72 The AKP has already started to benefit from former leading think-tank affiliated 
intellectuals as advisors, party executives, or members of parliament. Some of them are 
Yasin Aktay, Etyen Mahçupyan, Hatem Ete, Taha Özhan, İbrahim Kalın to name just a 
few.     
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Think tanks seek access to the printed and visual media organs for 
several purposes. In the first place, many think tanks seek public visibility 
with the intention of increasing their political impact. According to my 
findings, think tanks follow several distinct but interrelated strategies in 
this regard. Ideologically or politically neutral think tanks see public 
visibility as a crucial oppurtunity and instrument of political effect. 
Politically engaged think tanks, in addition to the first strategy, also 
benefit from media coverage as a medium of advocacy. I also should add 
that insider or embedded think tanks which have established strong ties 
with the power elite of Ankara behind closed doors have not needed 
media coverage to exert their political influence. For that reason, it is 
important to keep in mind that public visibility through media coverage is 
not a mark of policy influence per se.     
As I indicated above, for a think tank it is not always possible to directly 
access policy makers. In the circumstances, access to mass media 
enables think tanks to make authority claims on particular policy areas 
and thus affect policy debates. Appearing on television and publishing 
op-ed pieces in the newspaper, think tank members can indirectly 
influence political elites and policy makers in a environment where media 
opinion and commentary have considerable impact on policy makers and 
political elites. They also can increase their recognizability and credibility 
in the eyes of their political and media clients. The head of the USAK-
Center for Social Studies puts it when I ask him why think tanks attach 
importance to public visibility: 
When we publish a report, we dispatch it to almost all decision 
makers. It is like a throwing a stone at the well. Someone gets 
back to you, others do not. But, you have a media coverage, you 
are recognized. In this way you lift your effectiveness (author 
interview, Mehmet Güçer, December 20, 2013). 
After all, increasing influence and recognition as well as advocacy via 
media coverage are almost self-evident profits that many think tanks 
107 
 
seek, not only in Turkey, but also around the world.73 In what follows, I 
will rather focus on the think tanks’ specific role in molding public opinion. 
In their Bourdieu-inspired study on media intellectuals and opinion 
production in the United States, Jacobs and Townsley (2011, p. 13) 
analitically identify the “space of opinion” as a sphere located at the 
overlapping intersection of several institutional orders such as academic, 
journalistic and political fields, where elite actors debate serious issues 
of common concern. As distinct from the classical image of public sphere 
including face-to-face deliberations and informal conversations between 
citizens, the space of opinion is a field in which “media intellectuals”, i.e., 
think tank-affiliated intellectuals, journalists, columnists, opinion 
researchers, activists and the like, comment on the hot issues through 
the news, entertainment and social media.  
Following Jacobs and Townsley’s conceptualization, I suggest that 
Turkish think tanks as suppliers of “expert opinion” are one of the main 
members of such a space of opinion and media punditry. This brings us 
to the second major mission of think tanks in Turkey: To mold “public 
opinion” by producing opinion concerning policy issues and 
disseminating it by means of media organs. This complementary mission 
go hand in hand with the first mission that influence policy makers 
through policy research. Taken all together, these missions provide us 
and idea regarding the question of what a think tank really does.   
Most of my respondents laid weight on the importance of opinion 
formation as a crucial role of a think tank. Even, some members of the 
think tank field posit that the most substantial function of think tanks is to 
influence and transform public opinion (author interview, Harun Kaban, 
December 12, 2013). Some of them make a clear division between two 
                                                                 
73 The increasing public visibility of think tanks as a worldwide phenomenon has 
triggered new discussions on the normative idea of “public intellectual” in the sociology 
of intellectuals in recent years. For instance, Mistzal (2012) argues that think tank 
expert’s monopolization of public forum can present a threat to the quality of public 
debates in Western democracies. In today’s context, she suggests, the omnipresent of 
media makes think tank intellectuals as almost the main authority in charge of ideas. 
For her, the rise of think tank intellectuals as public figures also hinder the abilities of 
academics to act as public intellectuals.    
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audiences, policy makers and the general public, and determine the kind 
of activity they will conduct according to agents that whom they want to  
influence:  
We ask a question after conducting an activity: Do we want to 
influence policy makers or the public opinion? If we want to raise 
awareness in the public opinion about an issue, we conduct panel 
discussions about that topic and seek media coverage. But, there 
is already an awareness about some topics such as the Palestine 
question in the public. In this case, it is more logical to try to directly 
affect policy makers (author interview, Galip Dalay, December 25, 
2013). 
However, we should be cautious about the implications of media opinion 
and commentaries disseminated in particularly television discussion 
programs. To be sure, public debate today is organized mainly through 
media organs and public opinion, if any, is uttered in discussions between 
television commentators, all of whom pretend to represent common good 
with a mission of raising the awariness of the public in key issues. Indeed, 
the journalistic field in general, and television in specific, has a very 
special power to form the opinions, perceptions, and beliefs – in a word, 
“collective representations” in Durkheim’s sense of the term –  of citizens. 
Having said that, the journalistic field in itself is a highly heteronomous 
space, subjected to the constraints of the market and political power more 
than any other fields of cultural production (Bourdieu, 2005a, p. 41). In 
the sight of the field theory, closeness to power invariably comes to mean 
complicity and violation of the autonomy of the field. And, television 
constitutes the most heteronomous sector or subfield of journalism 
(Bourdieu, 2005a, p. 41). That is to say, those who speak on television 
are consciously or unconsciously subject to a very subtle and “invisible 
censorship” (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 15-18). Permit me to crystallize this point 
with the words of one of my respondents who frequently appears in TV 
debates: 
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Turkish media needs more opinion leaders as it become 
diversified. Think tanks are like the storage centers that would 
dispatch these opinion leaders to them. Besides, they feel 
comfortable since they more or less predict what a think tank 
member would articulate. They choose participators among the 
differences [different perspectives] they manage to categorize. 
Ultimately, they do not summon a person who would become 
unfavorable (author interview, Murat Yılmaz, December 24, 
2013). 
These statements provide us insight concerning how a television 
discussion is prearranged behind the scenes. In the absence of 
“unfavorable persons”, many tv discussions take the shape of a 
monologue in which all participators advocate and promote certain 
political positions, rather than an fruitful dialogue through which 
participators are open to being convinced by a counter argument. In other 
words, television discussion shows fail to satisfy standardts of rational 
deliberation or reason by providing distortion as often as they provide 
lucidity, and self-serving performances as well as careful deliberation and 
argumentation (Jacobs & Townsley, 2011, p. 5). 
With these restrictions in mind, we can finally focus on the think tanks 
researchers’ effort to distinguish themselves from other opinion 
producers taking place in media debates. Many of them place themselves 
in a position between academics and journalists in terms of intellectual 
profundity and rhetorical style. They try to find a style through which they 
will be both convincing and pellucid to political agents and the broader 
public without being neither too scholarly nor too superficial. With an 
articulated claim on authority and expertise concerning heavy matters, 
think tank-affiliated intellectuals argue that, in comparison with academic 
scholars and journalists, they are the most proper candidates who would 
satisfy the demand of expert opinion in the media field:  
Relationship between media and academic is not workable for 
the both sides. When media organs appeal to academics, they 
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don’t find a performance what they expected. Academic scholars 
express opinions that are slightly related to current issues. 
Journalists, on the other hand, only speak on daily issues. For 
news channels, think tank experts make and impression that they 
would cover the expectations (author interview, Hatem Ete, 
January 6, 2014). 
 
4.3.4. The Dynamics of Knowledge Production outside the 
University 
The preceding subsection pointed out the role of think tanks in forming 
and influencing the wider climate of opinion mainly through media organs. 
This subsection will rather focus on how and to what extent policy 
research policy-oriented knowledge they strive to generate differ from the 
procedures of academic research and social scientific knowledge 
production. Discerning these differences as well as similarities is a vital 
point for conceiving policy research as a discrete mode of intellectual 
practice and intervention. 
At the outset, I ought to underscore that think tank-affiliated researchers 
mostly come from or synchronously operate at the academic field. When 
compared to deep-rooted think tanks in the Anglo-American and 
European world gathering a variety of professionals from other more 
institutionalized fields such as journalists, bureaucrats, politicians, 
company executives together as expert staff, Turkish think tanks are 
overwhelmingly contingent upon academic social scientists for the 
production of policy knowledge. Two third of the researcher staff at think 
tanks included in my sample either have studied for a doctorate or earned 
a doctoral degree (see Appendix). This means that they are (supposed 
to be) familiar with the logic, temporality, and procedures of scientific 
knowledge production. This point is pivotal since the specific illusio, i.e., 
the tendency of players to believe in the importance and legitimacy of the 
game they collectively agree to play, of think tank-affiliated actors is 
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formed as a consequence of a two fold performance, complementary and 
contradictory at the same time. On the one hand, they constantly 
endeavor to distinguish themselves from the pure academic scholar and 
think tanks from universities by downplaying academia in many respects; 
they still hold to renumerate the academic field and utilize a scientific way 
of knowledge production on the other. 
Think tank members, as if they speak with a single voice, in chorus lay 
weight on how academia lives in a vacuum far from the actual political 
developments and remain incapable to bring forward policy proposals 
that would help overcome existing policy problems. When it comes to the 
question of why academia is ineligible to produce relevant policy 
knowledge, they put forward different reasons depending upon their 
ideological positions. Those who are proximate to liberal values complain 
about the lack of academic freedom that would enable and exhort 
academics to conduct research about key issues and disseminate its 
findings and proposals to the broader public along with the scientific 
audience. Vahap Coşkun from the DİSA, a Diyarbakır based think tank 
conducting in-depth research pertinent to the Kurdish question, express: 
“Academicians doing research in think tanks presumably feel themselves 
more comfortable than they feel in the academy. The muggy air and 
restrictive environment of the academy turn into a realm of freedom in 
think tanks” (author interview, February 21, 2014). Conversely, socialist 
research centers aiming at producing knowledge from which class politics 
would benefit, bemoan the commercialization of the academic field: “We 
must ask whether science is still being done in the academy. Because, 
looking at many things like technoparks, it is obvious that they try to 
generate knowledge serving to the needs of the market” (author 
interview, Serap Kurt, March 14, 2014). 
The lack of autonomy and academic freedom under conditions of political 
and bureaucratic constraints, commercialization and economization 
serving demands to the market, or conformism of living in an ivory tower 
are some standard criticisms directed to academia by think tank 
intellectuals. The level or substance of criticism vary by the positions of 
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think tanks. The thing that does not change is the the fact that academia 
is the “constitutive other” of think tanks, an other which is on the one hand 
prior and superior to them, yet cumbersome and decayed on the other. 
And they add that their very presence is the affirmation of the collapsing 
monopoly of universities in the area of scientfic knowledge production.  
One way or another, think tanks recite the disfunctionality of the academy 
as one of their raison d'être. After all, it is possible to say that if there were 
an academic field responding to the demand for policy knowledge, there 
would be no need for think tanks. The further question here is that how 
knowledge produced by these organizations differs from that produced in 
universities. According to my findings, there are considerable differences 
in terms of temporality, credibility, and research outputs. 
In the first place I would like to dwell on the temporality steering the 
generation of policy knowledge. This is a crucial point since the fact that  
historical process bringing about the social differentiation of spheres of 
activities does refer not only to territorrial expressions such as Weber’s 
“value spheres” or Bourdieu’s “fields”, but also, as Dick Pels reminds 
(2003, p. 4), to diversity of temporal cultures according to which each 
distinctive social activity operates its own specific rhythm and time. If 
fields have differential paces and social times, the field of think tank 
should has its own temporality. This distinctive temporality could be better 
perceived by comparison with temporalities of adjacent fields, namely the 
academic and political ones. 
By comparison with other professional occupations such as politics and 
journalism, science is a slower activity characterized by the “lack of 
haste” (Pels, 2003, p. 2). Although there are many individual stimulations 
as well as institutional pressures within the academic field accelerating 
the scientific research, the academic notion of time is still at a distance 
from the swift rhythm of the political world. The policy research conducted 
by think tanks, on the contrary, is a very “hasty” practice that has to keep 
pace with the political agenda in order to be relevant and effective. For 
that reason, academics operating in think tanks encounter a problem of 
temporization. While they are used to concentrating on several topics 
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they have selected for a long period of time to research and write at 
university, academic scientists associated with think tanks have to hasten 
or curtail their research procedure at the expense of the infraction of 
occupational ethics to fulfill the needs of their clients and consumers.74 
Thinking with the concepts of field theory, we may note that these 
academics operating in think tanks experience a hysteresis effect, a time 
lag or mismatch between habitus and field occuring as a result of socio-
cultural and economic change, due to the disparity and disruption 
between their scientific habitus and the temporal structure of the think 
tank field. Asked to name the main differences between the policy 
research and pure academic research, a think tank-affiliated researcher 
who is at the same an academic researcher, he more or less described 
such an effect: 
We don’t tackle with the DNA of tomato here. Rather, making a 
salad from it serves our purposes. It should not to be thought that 
we deviate from academic ethics and discipline. What we want 
from our personnel is to produce papers which are academically 
straighthead but not pure academic. Naturally, they should be as 
fast as possible. … We have wittnessed that many recondite 
professors who came here could not produce anything. They are 
not incompetent, they just can’t accommodate themselves 
(author interview, Mehmet Güçer, December 20, 2013). 
The DNA metaphor actually is not trivial. As a matter of fact, Turkish think 
tanks began to give form to novel forms of publications as intellectual 
outputs distinguishable from academic ones. Two significant examples 
are “policy reports”, in-depth analyses of particular policy issues, and 
“policy briefs”, succinct summaries of specific policy issues and proposals 
about their solution. Apart form these, think tanks produce shorter and 
transitory policy papers called “policy notes”, “perspectives”, “opinions” 
                                                                 
74 An experienced member from the field admits, “Sometimes, problems elicited by 
power relations occur. Problems such as ignoring some points and details or saying 
them implicitly can occur as well” (author interview, Murat Yılmaz, Deecember 24, 
2013).    
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and the like, analogous with op-ed pieces and columns, aiming at 
influencing less important current affairs.  
The trademark of all these policy papers, as distinct from most of the 
academic products, is that they all intend to provide clear proposals and 
options for policy makers. In brief, all policy papers are supposed to have 
a host of viable suggestions of which policy makers can put into practice. 
They reprocess and transform scientific knowledge into a more practical 
knowledge form from which their target audience would benefit. 
Therefore, at the end of policy reports, authors write their suggestions 
and best policy options item by item in a a confident way. Unlike many 
academic scholars, authors of policy reports do not have the luxury to 
ruminate about their subject matter or prevaricate over words and 
sentences where they are not entirely assertive about: “There are pretty 
much predicates in our studies” says a researcher, “We don’t keep away 
from making self-assured and sharp sentences” (author interview, Hatem 
Ete, January 6, 2014). Needless to say, writing in a plain language by 
avoiding theoretical and conceptual discussions is a key to generate an 
effective policy paper. Özge Genç from the TESEV, a think tank 
collaborating with prominent academics in policy research for the most 
part, reflects: “Academicians take an overtly normative and idealist 
stance in some matters. Sometimes, they generate extremely theoretical 
papers. In principle, they are just supposed to make a clear analysis and 
suggest concrete proposals” (author interview, March 11, 2014). 
As is seen, intellectual outputs of think tanks could be discriminated from 
purely academic products with regard to the style of writing, scientific 
profundity, organization of the text and the like. However, an overarching 
question still remains unanswered: Where does the intellectual credibility 
of a think tank product really come from? A scholar pondering upon 
suchlike question specific to British think tanks concludes that due to the 
fact that think tanks conduct research outside academia or any other 
agreed intellectual framework within which its value could be judged, 
there is no basis for intellectual authority and credibility for a think tank 
product, any more than the fact that someone worked so hard to make it 
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valuable (Cummings, 2005, p. 167). In other words, while we can judge 
scholarly credibility of scientific arguments with respect to their 
methodological and theoretical frames or empirical evidences, we cannot 
follow the same protocols in assessing think tank productions.     
It is true that think tanks in Turkey like their counterparts around the world 
has been fraught with a problem of constituting intellectual authority and 
credibility in the absence of a framework with agreed conventions, 
principles, and norms that make a think tank output intellectually credible 
and valuable. Actually, for some think tanks “scientific authority” or 
“academic credibility” is not an objective in its own right. “Following 
academic and methodological rules is not a virtue per se. There are 
various knowledge levels and types. Frame of reference makes it [a 
policy paper] credible,” a think tank member tells me in an interview 
(author interview, Özlem Çağlar Yılmaz, December 12, 2013). This view 
again brings us to the ideological positioning of think tanks that we have 
already discussed. In this case, the notion of credibility is derived from 
the criterion of whether a policy paper speaks consistently from a 
philosophical and/or political viewpoint (a “frame of reference” like 
liberalism or social democracy) or not. After all, think tanks appeal to 
political actors rather than a scientific audience. The overarching point is 
to achieve this without falling into the trap of “ideological bias” or “political 
activism” (author interview, Etyen Mahçupyan, March 24, 2014). 
Nevertheless, I should restate that there is no criterion of credibility 
agreed upon by all think tanks. And, some of them still try to enhance 
their “academic” credibility by giving the reason that they already cling to 
scientific methods and work with academic researchers. Before finishing 
the chapter, I would like to point out that as the field of think tanks become 
more institutionalized and the relational orientation of agents within the 
field increase in the medium and long term, the internal standards and 
protocols of policy research and knowledge production will become more 
crystallized and distinctive from that of academia.                         
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
THINK TANK INTELLECTUALS AS MEDIATORS 
 
In this study, I have endeavored to construct think tanks as a sociological  
object with the instruments of Bourdieusian field analysis. In addition to 
Bourdieu’s and his followers’ studies, I have drawn from empirical and 
theoretical works of many sociologists working on intellectuals including 
mainly Gil Eyal, Thomas Medvetz, and Thomas Osborne. The concept of 
field indeed was of prime importance to my analytical strategy aiming at 
disposing of two prevalent analytical strategies deployed by many studies 
on think tanks. As distinct from such accounts, the unit of analysis of this 
study was neither think tanks as organizational or institutional bodies per 
se, nor think tank intellectuals as individual social actors, but rather the 
field of think tanks as an interstitial space located between the 
intersection of more institutionalized fields of politics, business, media, 
and academia. Inspiring from Bourdieu’s call for a “double reading” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 152), a research principle that should 
be taken seriously by any researcher to overcome the dichotomy 
between “internalist” and “externalist” accounts prevailing in the study of 
cultural production fields, I tried to historicize my empirical objects by 
considering both the relations of them with their adjacent spheres from 
which they accumulate material and symbolic resources and the intra-
field relations of struggle and competition between the agents. In our 
case, the internalist readings have tended to delienate think tanks as 
hothouses of independent intellectual procuders by assuming that they 
are self-sufficient social actors operating according to its own logic 
whereas the externalist explanations have inclined to reduce the very 
existence of think tanks to wills of an array of forceful social agents or to 
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the direct effects of socio-economic transformations or crises. As 
discussed in the first chapter, the former account is represented by 
pluralist scholars, while the latter is by elite theorists. 
This study also differs from the general body of think tank literature with 
its conceptual, methodological, and theoretical tool box. It is worthy of 
note that a great majority of scholars who are taking think tanks seriously 
and publishing books and articles regarding them mostly operate within 
the disciplines of political science, international relations, policy studies, 
or management; not only in the Anglo-American world, but also in Turkey. 
As I particularly accentuated, the overwhelming majority of publications 
related to Turkish think tanks belong to Turkish international relations 
scholars. Their studies, in a widespread manner, have treated think tanks 
as an ascending actor in Turkish foreign policy, acting a part in the 
formation of national securitization and foreign policy making and transfer 
processes. It is almost impossible to find a discussion concerning the 
dynamics of knowledge production or implications of intellectual 
intervention emanating from the think tank universe in their articles. This 
is, of course, neither inexplicable nor perplexing. What I would like to 
point in this regard is that due to their disciplinary inclinations and modus 
operandi, these scholars tend to belt think tanks to its mission in the field 
of foreign policy by neglecting or even consciously ignoring a discussion 
concerning such questions.      Therefore, although they are somehow 
helpful to grasp the affect of these organizations, these studies are 
superficial and unsatisfying. This study, as opposed to the reductionist 
tendency of the international relations approach, tried to treat think tanks 
from a standpoint fortified with the insights and tools of sociology of 
intellectuals and knowledge.  
My work, on the other hand, can be read as an attempt to surpass the 
discord between those who rhapsodize about think tanks and those who 
castigate them. The former position is fundamentally represented by the 
authors of a comprehensive compilation on Turkish think tanks (Kanbolat 
& Karasar, 2009). This compilation is ridden with essays emphasizing the 
vitality and necessity of think tanks for Turkey and complaining about the 
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problems of such institutions like the lack of experts, resources, and the 
habit of strategic thinking. The latter approach towards think tanks can 
be seen in the essays of socialist and liberal authors (for instance, Bora 
2001, Taşkın 2006, Çınar 2014). These authors aim to expose and 
condemn the servility of think tanks that they see as politically and 
ideologically engaged to dominant powers. Even though their criticisms 
can be deemed as valuable, the way they treat these organizations is 
extremely normative and full of value-laden judgements. In an 
epistemological plane, these two opposing views on think tanks are like 
the two sides of the same coin. While the authors from the first side 
establish, so to speak, a “love affair” with their research object, the others 
are said to have established a “hate relationship” with those 
organizations. In this present study, I tried to construct think tanks as a 
sociological object pursuant to reflexive social scientific protocols of 
knowledge production without becoming mired in either pseudo-scientific 
encomia or normative criticism. In addition, I would like to add that 
multidimensional social phenomena such as think tanks should be 
studied from an analytical perspective as far as possible rather than a 
normative one.  
Moreover, this dissertation also varies from the manistream typological 
accounts on think tanks with its emphasis on the topological logic arising 
from the field theory. In this place, I will not replicate my criticisms 
concerning the deficiencies of typologies that have been widely 
acclaimed by researchers around the world. As far as the Turkish think 
tank experience is concerned, we cannot speak of clear-cut distinctions 
or deep-seated types corresponding to typologies. From the lenses of the 
field theory, it is likely to say that Turkish think tanks differ from each other 
with respect to the position they occupy and to the pole (academic, 
political, bureucratic, or mediatic) they are proximate in the field. 
Let me make explicit some tendencies of differentiation here, hinging on 
my historical argument concerning the genesis of the field. As it can be 
remembered, the early think tanks were founded by İstanbul-based 
industrial capitalists wishing to intervene in politics in an era of import-
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substituting industrialization. Though the economic structure and 
capacity of Turkey has considerably changed within the last five decades, 
the different segments of capitalist class still and increasingly make use 
of think tanks in many ways. Enjoying ample means they possess 
through the endowments they receive from their powerful sponsors such 
as the TÜSİAD, the TOBB, or other commerical and industrial bodies, 
they are able to conduct in-depth economic policy research. They are 
also extremely useful in predicting potential risks that any enterprise 
could encounter in the market and producing efficient solutions to them. 
In the conditions of so-called “knowledge-based economy”, they appear 
as invisible engines for economic growth through private sector 
development. To sum up, think tanks which are proximate to the business 
world and economic capital distinguish themselves from other think tanks 
with their goal-oriented operating principles, highly specialized 
researcher staff, technocratic and supra-partisan stance. 
On the other hand, the founding moment of the field in the mid-1990s is 
marked by the simultaneous rise of the two diametrically opposed think 
tank cultures: those strategic research centers, generally founded by 
government agencies, conducting foreign policy and security research for 
the use of decision makers from a “nationalist and etatist” standpoint and 
those “politically liberal and pro-free market” ones, lead by intellectuals 
and businessmen, working for the consolidation of the civil society and 
market as well as democratization of the country. This duality is still 
visible in the field, albeit not as apparent as it was in the context of the 
1990s. 
The another factor differentiating this study is its emphasis on think tanks’ 
specific role in the “opinion production” in addition to the production of 
“policy knowledge”.75 In the Anglo-American world, authors tend to drive 
forward one of these two functions by ignoring the other. At best, they 
                                                                 
75 The distinction between the opinion and knowledge may seem unclear. For the 
purpose of my argument, I deploy the term opinion as a belief or conviction implying a 
position taking. As distinct from knowledge, or at least from its scientific and specialized 
forms, opinions are ready to be sent to laymen or to the broader public in a rhetorical 
form primarily via media organs.      
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conceive these two tasks as the functions of different “types” of think tank. 
Accordingly, while “university without students” (academic think tanks) 
generate ideologically unbiased and scholarly rigorous policy knowledge, 
“advocacy tanks” sell ideologically distorted opinions in the marketplace 
of ideas from an unbashedly partisan position. According to my findings, 
the historical peculiarity of Turkish political and intellectual landscape 
have forced think tanks to fulfil these two contradictory but 
complementary duties, e.g., policy research and political advocacy, at the 
same time. With the words of the field theory, the space of “knowledge 
production” and the space of “opinion production” overlap each other in 
Turkish field of think tanks, at least from the rise of the media field in the 
mid-1990s. Before that term, think tanks had exerted their influence 
behind closed doors throughout three decades. Their audience and 
clients fundamentally had been a group of bureaucrats, politicians, or 
business people. Today, think tank intellectuals seek to intervene in 
public by making their opinion known and try to mold the opinions of 
others, namely “public opinion”. And, as Turkish politics become more 
susceptible to the news media, think tanks began to intervene in the 
political agenda through printed, visual and social media organs. By 
regulating and molding “public opinion” as media pundits, commentators, 
columnists, think tank intellectuals today symbolically bolster and overtly 
advocate certain political agents and their actions.   
At the cost of repetiton, I should lay emphasis on the fact that less 
institutionalized and more heteronomous weak spaces such as the think 
tank field is not suited to be analyzed like a conventional or ideal-typical 
Bourdieusian field analytically posited as a highly autonomous 
microcosm of social action with a specific history, coherent internal logic 
and distinctive forms of capital. For that reason, I focused on the relations 
between the fields themselves rather than relations between the intra-
field agents throughout the study. As a result, I concluded that think tanks 
are both materially and symbolically dependent upon their neighbouring 
fields and such a high degree of dependence directly influence their 
identity constructions and self-representations. In the same vein, it could 
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be said that it also forms a new hybrid intellectual habitus and even give 
rise to the genesis of a new type of intellectual what I prefer to call 
“mediators” by following Osborne (2004). 
In passing, let me clarify a point. By underscoring the heteronomous 
nature of these organizations, I do not claim that think tanks are only 
parasitically nourished from symbolic or material resources of 
coterminous fields. It is true that they procure methodological and 
conceptual tools and research personnel from the academic field, 
pecuniary support from the state or market forces or gain public visibility 
and reputation through the media and so on. Nevertheless, what is at 
stake is rather a symbiosis; more precisely, a set of reciprocally beneficial 
interactions between think tanks and the aforesaid fields. To put it 
roughly, this quid pro quo situation partly explains the unprecedented 
boom in the number of newcomer members entering into the field. 
In this picture, what mainly arouses my interest is the rise of a new kind 
of intellectual with a discernable intellectual habitus. Understanding the 
formation or structuration of the habitus of a think tank intellectual is 
crucial for my discussion here. Roughly speaking, the concept of habitus 
refers to a set of durable bodily and mental dispositions, integrating 
previous social experiences and functioning as a pattern of appreciation 
and perception that regulates social action. This notion recalls us that the 
social action cannot be relegated into either external restraints or 
subjective whim, the structure or the agency. In our case, think tank-
affiliated social actors are imposed upon norms and rules of this 
emerging sphere of social action. However, they cannot be simply 
regarded as conformists to such external constraints. Rather, as I 
indicated with the biological metaphor of symbiosis, structure and agency 
here is not in uncompromising conflict. Structures in this case enable 
agency even more than they constrain as Giddens’ idea of “duality of 
structure” and Bourdieu’s “generative structuralism” imply. Thus, as I 
hope to show in the fourth chapter, they are rather strategic improvisers 
who are at the same time trying to respond and adapt to both structural 
restrictions and oppurtunities offered by the space in which they operate. 
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In other words, they are neither “independent intellectuals”, in both the 
analytical and normative sense of the term, as scholars working within 
the mainstream pluralist political science claim, nor “apparatchiks” 
(agents of the apparatus) or mere “subservient intellectual machineries” 
at the mercy of powerful elites as elite theorists and some Marxian 
accounts assert.  
What is certain is that think tank intellectuals perform in an area that is 
highly affected by the Turkish field of power. Having an abstract 
character, the (meta)field of power is “the space of relations of force 
between agents or between institutions having in common the 
possession of the capital necessary to occupy the dominant positions in 
different fields” (Bourdieu, 1996b, p. 215). More precisely, it is a system 
of struggles in which powerful holders of various institutionalized species 
of capital (economic, cultural, political and the like) enter into rivalry with 
each other to designate which resources will be the most valuable and 
legitimate in advanced societies. In fact, my aim is not to discuss the 
system of positions in the Turkish field of power. Instead, I would like to 
highlight again that the weak field of think tanks in Turkey is subject to 
“an external or heteronomous principle of hierarchization” that applies to 
the field the hierarchy prevalent in the field of power, rather than “an 
internal and autonomous principle of hierarchization” that hierarchizes in 
compliance with the values specific to the field (Hilgers & Mangez, 2015, 
p. 8).  
This logic indicates that each particular field generates its own 
autonomous and heteronomous poles. For instance a field of art can 
become polarized around those who subscribe to the idea of “art for art’s 
sake” or opt for art forms favorable to the demands of people who 
politically and economically dominate the field as it seen in the example 
of European “bourgeois art”. This logic provokes me to ask the question 
that to what extent think tanks can generate an autonomous pole in that 
sense. As my findings suggest, think tanks tend to produce applied, 
oriented, and practical forms of knowledge, e.g., “policy knowledge”, 
rather than basic or fundamental research or “knowledge produced for 
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the sake of knowledge”. If such a knowledge production process as one 
of the identification marks of think tanks, it would be a naive optimism to 
expect them to carve out a niche for the intrinsic demands of their 
“creative projects” (Bourdieu, 1969), if they have any, in such a subspace 
of knowledge production. 
This brings us the intermediating role of think tank intellectuals. Scholars 
from different disciplines and perspectives have actually referred to this 
mediating role of think tanks with different characterizations. In this 
respect, this study shares a similiar insight with certain analyses on think 
tank intellectuals. For instance, Thunert (2000) locates German think 
tanks as “catalysts” contributing to the internationalization of policy 
making and policy discourse in Germany. Smith (1993) identifies 
American policy experts operating in think tanks as “idea brokers” trying 
to compromise the principles of scholarly investigation with the needs of 
partisan politics. Suggesting that think tanks are a manifestation of 
knowledge/power nexus, Stone (2007b) view them as “mediators” 
between science and society, decoding, interpreting, and reformulating 
socio-economic realities. Desai (1994) uses Hayek’s term of “second-
hand dealers” in analyzing neoliberal British think tanks. According to 
Desai, these institutions are not typically intellectual originators but 
second-hand dealers that collect, distill and preserve certain strands of 
ideas and widely diffuse them in current polict debates. Examples 
abound.    
From my point of view, the most remarkable study on the increasing 
salience of such a certain kind of intellectual function all over the world 
can be found in the Osborne’s analysis of “mediators” (2004). Offering a 
heuristic typology of different types of intellectual conduct according to 
the four dimensions, e.g., the substance, rationale, stylization, and 
strategy of the intellectual work, he adds “experts” and “mediators” to 
Bauman’s classical intellectual models of “legislators” and “interpreters”. 
It should be noted that Osborne does not situate his argument in causal 
or explanatory terms; legislation, interpretation and mediation are 
epistemic forms upon which individuals or even the same individual draw 
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to legitimate or make sense of a specific kind of intellectual attitude. For 
the purpose of my discussion, I will only make reference to mediators 
here. Let me quote a long passage from Osborne’s paper encapsulating 
the gist of his argument (Osborne, 2004, p. 440-441): 
This is the intellectual worker as enabler, fixer, catalyst and broker 
of ideas. Perhaps the salient feature, though, is the association of 
mediators with movement. The mediator is simply the one who 
gets things moving. This would mean that the sense of ‘mediation’ 
does not lie in the fact that the mediator is someone who mediates 
in a ‘spatial’ sense, that is, who stands between two (or more) sets 
of interests, simply as a passive ‘intermediary’. It lies, rather, in the  
fact that for the mediator an idea is seized or appropriated as 
much as it is created out of nothing (in Deleuze’s language, the 
mediator is a bit like an empiricist - always ‘in the middle of 
things’). It is not creation ex nihilo; rather, creativity is emergent, 
the product of interactions and processes rather than inspiration. 
Thus for the mediator to invent is already - and perhaps only - to 
mediate. Furthermore, the sense of ‘mediation’ is meant here to 
draw attention to the fact that ideas are of no premium unless they 
are capable of being ‘mediatized’ - not just run out in the mass 
media but in the sense of being performative, capable of arousing 
attention and making a communicative difference. 
Osborne’s descriptions corresponds to a large extent think tank 
intellectuals in Turkey. They really aim at bringing their scientific 
knowledge and expertise into the service of decision makers or other 
clients by packaging them in an understandable, marketable, accessible, 
and practical form. The substance of their intellectual work is thus 
facilitating “vehicular ideas” and stylization is embodied by mediation 
requires an “aesthetic attitude” towards ideas, in the sense of seeing 
them as discrete, contingent and particular (Osborne, 2004, p. 441).76 On 
                                                                 
76 Even, “The mediator’s very ontology of intellectual production”, writes Osborne (2004,  
p. 443), “is to facilitate an idea”.  
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the other hand, the function of think tank intellectuals in Turkey is not 
limited to generating policy knowledge in a useful form. As I discussed 
above, they also act a very crucial part in the formation of public opinion 
by bringing ideas decisively into the public focus mainly through news 
media organs. In this sense, their strategy is to make ideas and opinions 
steadily liquid and mobile by releasing them into circulation in different 
spheres. To sum up, think tank intellectuals in Turkey can be thought as 
the par excellence example of a new kind of intellectual conduct, namely 
“the act of mediation”. Undertaking a never-ending effort to reconcile and 
balance various contradictory functions (academic, political, journalistic 
and so on) they also represent the genesis of a new intellectual habitus 
and even a way of life. 
Before finishing my argument, I would like to ask a provocative and 
normative question as to mediator intellectuals. If “speaking truth to 
power” is not a Panglossian idealism, but the genuine task any 
intellectual should seek to fulfil as Said suggests (1996, p. 102), (to what 
extent) can think tanks intellectuals succeed in telling the truth to power? 
I am not so sure. For, if we express by reformulating Clifford Geertz’s 
famous phrase concerning the semiotic concept of culture (Geertz, 1973, 
p. 5), the think tank intellectual could be conceived as an animal 
suspended in webs of power he himself complicitly has spun. And, 
although there are some signals of search for relative independence from 
external pressures, it does not seem easy for them to break such 
dependencies in a short time. Time will tell the truth.          
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APPENDIX 
SUPPLEMENTARY DATA 
 
The database presented here is based on the academic backgrounds of 
the research personnel (n=167) at seven think tanks that take an 
important place in my sample. The data were gathered in March 2015 
and do not reflect the personnel change that may have occurred after that 
time. In order to establish such a database, I drew from the curriculum 
vitas and resumes of think tank-affiliated research staff at each particular 
organizations. I should underscore that I only included the in-house staff 
described as “expert”, “researcher”, “analyst”, or “research fellow” who 
are currently active. Those who are weakly affiliated with think tanks such 
as “traniees” and “visiting fellows” as well as “research assistants”, 
“administrative staff”, “members of the board of directors” and “members 
of the advisory committee” are not included in the count.  
Thus, I achieved to extract a group of people focusing chiefly on the 
research and knowledge production from a more broad cluster. Pursuant 
to the logic of the data, I also excluded think tanks that rely heavily on 
external researchers for their projects and avoid to employ staff member 
apart from a couple of people from the data set. In addition, I comprise a 
database of gender distribution in the think tank field, predicating on the 
same research staff. This data can provide us insight concerning the 
question of who really mediates between the fields.   
127 
 
 
Figure A.1 : Research staff characteristics in terms of educational background 
 
 
Figure A.2: Educational attainment of research staff at prominent think tanks 
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Figure A.3: Academic disciplines studied by research staff  
(“Other” includes: Journalism, Literature, Psychology, Criminology, 
Anthropology, Education, Urban Planning, Cultural Studies, Development 
Studies) 
 
Figure A.4: Proportion of academic disciplines attained by research staff  
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Figure A.5: Gender distribution in major think tanks 
 
 
Figure A.6: Gender distribution in the space of think tanks 
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